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Abstract
My dissertation consists of three essays on lobbying activities by special interest groups.
The first paper, “Ex Post Lobbying,” systematically documents ex post lobbying, the pro-
cess by which firms allocate resources during the implementation stage after congressional
authorization. Previous theories assume all lobbying is done ex ante, where lobbying activ-
ities occur before Congress votes. However, my analysis of over 633,731 lobbying reports
demonstrates that almost half of lobbying activity from 1998 to 2012, that targeted specific
bills, occurred ex post. I argue that the goal of ex post lobbying is to allow firms to bargain
over private benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rule-making
processes that clarify non-specific parts of bills. Ex post lobbying provides a chance for
non-participants in the ex ante lobbying stage to claim their share from government policy.
The second paper, “Options for Trade Protection,” investigates the effect of partisan
dynamics on forms of trade protection. I argue that when partisans are highly divided re-
garding protection policies, information about favors to special interest groups is more likely
to be revealed to voters. Therefore, policy makers deliberately employ opaque and more
inefficient policy instruments such as non-tariff barriers, instead of simple tariffs. I provide
a simple model for this theory, and by using data on trade barriers on U.S. commodities in
the 1990s, I find strong empirical support for the model’s implication.
The third paper, “Money and Access: Empirical Evidence from the Foreign Lobbying
Registration Act,” takes advantage of an invaluable source of contact information from lob-
bying reports submitted by foreign governments to the United States. I find that democratic
countries pay less in fees to their lobbying firms than non-democratic countries, and that
iii
there is overall a large premium to a top lobbying firm, which often charges more of a
premium to less democratic foreign government clients. I also find that (i) campaign con-
tributions and contacts are positively correlated, and (ii) when controlling for both member
and country attributes, past contributions are a much stronger predictor of current contacts
than concurrent contributions especially for the House Representatives.
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| Introduction
My dissertation, entitled Three Essays on the Political Economy of Lobbying, examines
the mechanism and the effect of special interest groups’ influence on economic and regulatory
policy in the U.S.
Chapter 1, entitled “Ex Post Lobbying,” systematically documents ex post lobbying,
the process in which special interests allocate resources in the implementation stage after
congressional authorization. Previous theories assume ex ante lobbying, where lobbying
activities occur before Congress votes. However, my analysis of over 633,731 lobbying reports
demonstrates that almost half of lobbying activity from 1998 to 2012, that targeted specific
bills, occurred ex post. I argue that the goal of ex post lobbying is to allow firms to bargain
over private benefits that arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rule-making processes
that clarify non-specific parts of the bill. While some legislation is very specific about the
duties of regulatory agencies, many pieces of legislation provide only a vague framework and
do not go into great detail. Groups exert ex post lobbying efforts in order to secure rents
on the indeterminate part of the bills.
This implies that there is a classic collective action problem among relevant actors. Ex
post lobbying provides a chance for non-participants in the ex ante lobbying stage to claim
their share from government policy. The formal model that I develop in this paper suggests
that larger firms within an industry and trade associations bear a disproportionately large
share of the ex ante lobbying burden. This problem of collective action in ex ante lobbying
becomes more severe if there are a large number of non-specific benefits in a bill and if
market shares are more equally distributed among firms. In addition, I present evidence
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that targeting non-legislative federal agencies and employing in-house lobbyists instead of
hiring lobbying firms occurs more in ex post lobbying stage.
Chapter 2, entitled “Options for Trade Protection,” examines how the political conditions
affect the choice of trade protection instruments. Both the glassware and rubber footwear
industries are beneficiaries of trade protection under U.S. trade policy, yet rubber footwear
is protected by non-tariff barriers that are considerably more inefficient. Despite the con-
siderable variation in specific policies governing protected commodities, much less is known
about how trade policy is developed for specific goods. The task of this paper is to under-
stand what conditions influence choices of protectionist instruments. I argue that the choice
of a specific form of protectionist policy is due to different incentives faced by an incumbent
to employ opaque procedures in order to make it harder for voters to gather information on
the incumbent’s policy biases toward special interests. When partisans are highly divided
on protectionist policies, information about an incumbent’s biases toward special interest
groups is more likely to be revealed to voters. Conversely, if Democrats and Republicans
work together on legislation to protect a certain commodity, protectionist policies should
be less complex because there will be diminished incentives for partisans to exploit their
opposition’s position on a particular policy proposal. I provide a simple model for this the-
ory, and by using data on trade barriers on U.S. commodities in the 1990s, I find strong
empirical support for the model’s implications.
Studying the link between money and access to politicians has been a challenging task,
mainly due to the lack of sufficiently detailed data on lobbying contacts. In Chapter 3,
entitled “Money and Access: Empirical Evidence from the Foreign Agent Registration Act”
and co-authored with Karam Kang, we take advantage of the Foreign Agent Registration
Act of 1938 (FARA), which mandates that lobbyists representing foreign entities submit a
semi-annual report detailing all domestic political contacts, including information on who,
when, why, and how those contacts were made. This comprehensive lobbying contact data
enables us to systematically study what role money plays in lobbying and access to political
contacts. Specifically, we ask two questions: (i) What determines the cost of lobbying? and
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(ii) Do campaign contributions buy access to the policy makers?
We find that democratic countries pay less in fees to their lobbying firms than non-
democratic countries, and that there is overall a large premium to a top lobbying firm, which
often charges more of a premium to less democratic foreign government clients. We also find
that (i) campaign contributions and contacts are positively correlated, (ii) when controlling
for both member and country attributes, past contributions are a much stronger predictor
of current contacts than concurrent contributions especially for the House Representatives,
and (iii) for the Senators and the first-term members, the correlation between contributions
and contacts is very weak.
To further study the relationship between money and access, we look at the chronological
sequence of contacts and campaign contributions. In particular, we find that about 4% of
the contact records in the data are associated with campaign contributions within a 30-day
window of that contact (referred to as “timely contributions”). These timely contributions
are more frequently given to Senators and the members with a leadership position or a
committee chairmanship. The amount of such contributions are significantly less when they
are given by lobbyists at top lobbying firms. We do not find evidence that these timely
contributions initiates access.
3
1 | Ex Post Lobbying/Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction
Lobbying is the heart of interest group politics.1 Interest groups lobby intensively to
influence policy, and total spending on lobbying easily outpaces campaign contributions.2
During the 2005-2006 election cycle, total Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions
to candidates amounted to 372 million dollars. Spending on lobbying activities during the
same period amounted to 5 billion dollars. The total federal lobbying spending for 2012 alone
was 3.3 billion dollars and the total number of registered federal lobbyists was over 12,000.3
In their survey, Gais and Walker (1991) note that 80 percent of the sample group considers
lobbying to be an important activity, but only 23 percent state that campaign contributions
are important. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi (2002) find that for firms engaging in
campaign contributions, as well as lobbying, the ratio of their lobbying expenditures to PAC
contribution is about 10 to 1. Extensive evidence shows that lobbying is the most important
interest group activity that influences government policies (Milyo, 2002; Baron, 2006).
To understand the nature of lobbying, scholars have developed three major theories:
1The definition of lobbying activity stated in the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 is as follows:
“Any oral or written communication (including electronic communication) to a covered executive branch
official or a covered legislative branch official that is made on behalf of a client with regard to the formation,
modification, or adoption of federal legislation, rule, regulation, policy, the nomination or confirmation of a
person for the United States government.” See: http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/lda.htmlOffice of the
Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives
2In the literature, scholars use the term “lobbying” interchangeably with “campaign contributions” (PAC
contributions), and any broader set of political activities by special interest groups. In this article, I follow the
definition of lobbying stated in the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 to clearly differentiate lobbying
from other types of special interest group activities.
3http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/Center for Responsive Politics
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They view lobbying as an exchange, an information transmission, or a legislative subsidy.
Scholars of exchange theories argue that lobbying buys votes and this is a quid pro quo
process (Stigler, 1970; Snyder, 1992; Besley and Coate, 2001; Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2002;
Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky, 2009). The second model sees information transmission as the
heart of the lobbyist-legislator relationship. Interest groups who have private information on
the state of nature strategically transmit their information to persuade legislators (Hansen,
1991; Austen-Smith, 1993; Lohmann, 1995). The last model sees lobbying as a legislative
subsidy. The objective under this strategy is neither to exchange nor to persuade, but to
assist natural allies in achieving their objectives (Hall and Deadorff, 2006).
Despite these stark differences of opinion about why interest groups lobby, the three
theories share a key assumption: Lobbying activities are expected to occur before the con-
gressional voting stage. The exchange theory of lobbying assumes that the purpose of
lobbying is vote buying. Special interests are assumed to lobby before major voting events -
either committee votes or House (Senate) floor votes. The informational theory of lobbying
supposes that transmission of information occurs before politicians cast their votes. Finally,
the legislative subsidy theory views the role of lobbying as helping legislators draft a bill.
Therefore, scholars subscribing to that theory assume lobbying to be underway before the
floor vote takes place, occurring most often at the committee stage. Figure 1.1Procedures
of Policy Making and Predictions of Lobbying Theoriesfigure.1.1 summarizes how the three
main theories of lobbying predict lobbying patterns.
These predictions leave significant amounts of actual lobbying data unexplained. When
we set the threshold at the final vote by Congress (i.e., a vote on a conference report),
43.63% of lobbying activity that targets specific bills is ex post in the sense that special
interests use their resources after congressional voting has been completed.4
What explains ex post lobbying? Most, if not all, political economy models on lobbying
assume that voting on a bill is the end of the game. The assumption is that after the vote,
4When we set the threshold at the first House vote, 92.82% of lobbying activity that targets specific bills
is ex post. For more details on how to measure ex post lobbying, see section 1.2.
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Figure 1.1: Procedures of Policy Making and Predictions of Lobbying Theories
payoffs for interested parties are fully realized (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). In contrast,
I argue that the interaction between special interest groups and policy makers is a two-stage
game - bill passage and implementation - and interest groups face different problems at each
stage. Each act of legislation has two dimensions that affect the payoffs for relevant parties:
1) whether a benefit from a bill is collective or private; and 2) whether a bill is specific
or non-specific regarding how it will be implemented. The collective or private dimension
determines whether an industry as a whole enjoys benefits from legislation they support,
or bears the costs of legislation they oppose. For example, tariffs can be considered to
be collective benefits, and producer-specific subsidies to be private benefits. The second
dimension, specific or non-specific, describes the amount of discretion Congress leaves to
federal agencies and bureaucracies to complete the details of legislation.
Passage of a bill determines the payoffs for groups from both the collective component
and the minute details of the bill. Legislation often specifies some general policy objectives
for the federal agency to follow, and some legislation is very specific about the duties of a
regulatory agency. For example, the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act and the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act provided a detailed formula regarding the price structure for
domestic crude oil. As a result, the Federal Energy Administration had minimal discretion in
conceding price regulation (Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, 1992). However, many pieces
of legislation provide only a general framework and do not specify details. Many details in
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public policy are inserted in the regulatory or implementation stages, so payoffs are fully
realized only when lobbying at these stages is completed.5
Even the 2,300-page Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act left
most of the real decision-making to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
other agencies.6 It is not surprising that many groups identify the implementation arena
as the place where proposed legislation acquires specific details that actually affect their
welfare (Hula, 1999). Therefore, groups exert ex post lobbying effort to claim rents on
bills’ unspecified areas when the bills contain a higher proportion of uncertainty about their
implementation.7 The significant level of ex post lobbying at the implementation stage after
bill passage implies that it should be explicitly considered.8
This implies that there is a classic collective action problem among relevant actors. To
secure the desired result at the bill passage stage, ex ante lobbying efforts should be exerted.
But there is an incentive for groups supporting a bill to sit back at the stage of ex ante
lobbying and enjoy the collective benefits that passing a bill generates without bearing any
costs.9 Ex post lobbying provides a chance for those who are inactive in the ex ante lobbying
5For example, The Occupational Safety and Health Act stated its ambitious goals in this way: “...to
assure, so far as possible, every working man and woman in the nation safe and healthy work conditions.”
Although it provides some additional guidance, it left the job of defining, through rules, key legal terms
such as “so far as possible,” “safe,” and “healthy” to the administering agency, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 allows agencies to make rules to
fill the gaps left by Congress, the president, and the courts in formulating public policy law (Kerwin, 2003).
6Federal agencies are responsible for defining details of at least 243 financial rules.
The SEC alone is responsible for developing 95 rules on topics such as derivatives
trading.http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/business/28lobby.html?pagewanted=all“Ex-Regulators
Get Set to Lobby on New Financial Rules,” The New York Times, July, 27, 2010.
7Even groups that opposed the bill participate in ex post lobbying to influence implementation
stage to maximize their own benefits. For example, two large companies in derivatives trading, the
CME Group and the IntercontinentalExchange, strongly opposed passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. But
once the bill passed, they fought against each other on the specific rules of the so-called position
limits plan.http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/wall-st-united-in-disdain-for-dodd-frank-but-split-on-
the-details/“United in Distain for Dodd-Frank, Wall Street is Split on the Details,” The New York Times,
October, 5, 2011.
8Gordon and Hafer (2005, 2007) consider corporate political activities at the regulatory stage. Although
they acknowledge the significant distributional consequences of regulation implementation on firms’ welfare,
the mechanism they introduce assumes that corporate expenditures only target legislators who could reduce
the scope of the regulatory mandate.
9Rodrik (1986) presents a model showing how lobbying incentives differ depending on the characteristics
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stage to claim a share of the non-specific benefits from government policy once the bill
becomes law. The theoretical model predicts that bills with higher non-specific components
will draw a higher proportion of ex post lobbying, while firms with larger market shares
will bear a disproportionately high burden in ex ante lobbying. The model also suggests
that lobbying by smaller firms may reduce the incentive for larger firms to lobby ex ante.
Under-provision of ex ante lobbying efforts will be greater in sectors where the market shares
of firms are more equally distributed.10
Empirical data on lobbying activity supports bill- and group-specific patterns of ex ante
and ex post lobbying predicted in the model. By analyzing 633,731 lobbying reports filed
between 1998 and 2012 that specified the bills passed from the 107th Congress through the
111th Congress, I present systematic patterns of bill- and group-specific ex ante and ex
post lobbying activities. Ex ante lobbying is more widespread for bills that have a highly
deterministic and collective nature, such as bills from the Homeland Security Committee. In
contrast, bills from the Energy and Commerce or Ways and Means Committees show a higher
ratio of ex post lobbying. At the firm-level, firms with large market shares devote resources
to both ex ante and ex post lobbying activities, while firms with small market shares are
more likely to participate in ex post lobbying if a bill is short on specifics and has a higher
distributive component. I also show that firms targeting non-legislative regulatory and
bureaucratic agencies, and employing in-house lobbyists instead of hiring outside lobbying
firms, have higher ex post lobbying.
This paper makes three contributions. First, it systematically presents the different
patterns of lobbying by heterogeneous interest groups. Despite richness in the development of
theories about lobbying, systematic empirical evidence on lobbying, in contrast to campaign
of trade protections. While collective action problems in lobbying are prevalent when seeking tariffs that
have a public good nature, special interests do not suffer from free rider problems in cases of producer-specific
subsidies which are private goods in nature.
10Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) discuss how market structure, whether oligopolistic or competitive, affects
the mode of lobbying by firms-whether they lobby together through their industry trade association or
individually. They document that more competitive and less concentrated sectors are more likely to organize
politically and lobby together as a trade association. But they assume symmetry among firms.
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contributions, is lacking. Empirical studies on lobbying have mainly relied on surveys of
special interest groups (Wright, 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998) and it is only recently
that studies on lobbying have utilized data from lobbying reports.11 Furthermore, interest
groups are usually treated in the literature as identical actors even though they differ in
terms of their goals, priorities, and resources. In this paper, I document how different
groups employ different lobbying strategies.
Second, this paper highlights a dynamic and crucial, yet rarely emphasized, aspect of
lobbying activities: timing.12 Lobbying groups join the political game at different times and
they have different goals depending on their choice of timing. Understanding this dynamic
aspect of lobbying activities enhances our understanding of various incentives and strategies
that interest groups employ.
Third, this essay fills the gap left by studies of interdependencies between lobbying and
legislative procedures. As Helpman and Persson (2004) note, attempts to integrate lobbying
models and legislative models with special interest group politics have been scarce. This
significantly limits our ability to understand the motivations and behaviors of relevant actors
in the political game because, as Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) pointed out, individual
and group interests are redefined by the operation of the social institutions through which
they must work. Examining how lobbying and political institutions interact will deepen our
understanding of how institutional settings affect the behaviors of special interest groups.
In the next section, I present evidence of ex post lobbying from comprehensive data
on lobbying reports, combined with information on bills obtained from the Library of
Congress.13 Then I propose a model to explain the rationale behind ex post lobbying in
11The non-exhaustive list includes (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi, 2002; Hansen, Mitchell, and
Drope, 2005; de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Deniz Igan, and Prachi Mishra,
and Thierry Tressel, 2009; de Figueiredo and Cameron, 2009; Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi, 2012;
Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra, 2011; i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen, 2011; Igan
and Mishra, 2011; Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra, 2011; Tovar, 2012)
12Wirl (1994) and Polborn (2006) provide theoretical models of dynamic lobbying.
13Source: http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=selectFieldsreset=1The Senate’s Office of Public
Records (SOPR) and the http://www.opensecrets.orgCenter for Responsive Politics.
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section 1.3. In section 1.4, I present empirical patterns in ex post lobbying. In section 1.5,
present my conclusions.
1.2 Data and Stylized Facts
1.2.1 Data Description and Coding Criteria
The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), which was enacted in 1995 and reformed in 2007,
requires that interest groups filing their lobbying reports give specific information about
their lobbying activities.14 A lobbying report includes information on the client who paid
for the lobbying services, the registrant who provided the lobbying services, expenditures,
and the period of the lobbying activity. A quarterly lobbying report should specify the
issue areas lobbied for, and if specific legislation was lobbied for, a list of those bills under
each issue. Therefore, I was able to match a bill with interest groups that lobbied on it.15
To match lobbying data with congressional activities, I collected information on legislative
proposals originating in the House between the 107th and the 111th Congresses. Among the
3,202 bills that reached the House floor, I choose bills that became law, were designated by
either H.R. or H.J.RES, and are controversial—they pass the House under the question of
“On Passage.” These stipulations reduce the total to 174 bills.16
For each bill selected, I match lobbying reports that were filed from 1998 through 2012.
The unit of observation in this paper is the matching of a bill with a lobbying report that
mentions that bill.17 The summary statistics of bills and lobbying activity is shown below
in Table 1.1Summary Statistics of Bills under “On Passage” question that became Law in
14http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.htmlU.S. House of Representatives, Office of
the Clerk
15For more information on the nature of the lobbying report, see Appendix D
16Bills under the question of ‘On Passage’ are usually the most important and controversial bills. For a
detailed account of the bill selection process used in this study, see Appendix B. Appendix B also includes
an analysis of ex post lobbying for the cases in which I include all bills that became laws.
17If a lobbying report mentions the same bill under different issue areas, I counted it as “one.” If a lobbying
report mentions multiple bills, the report has multiple entries in the data since the match between the bill
and the report is unique for each bill.
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Each Congress and Lobbying Activities on them from 1998 through 2012table.1.1.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Bills under “On Passage” question that became Law in
Each Congress and Lobbying Activities on them from 1998 through 2012.
Congress Year Majority # Bills # Lobbying Reports Average Reports Per Bill
107th 2001-2002 R 36 1,300 36
108th 2003-2004 R 39 2,145 55
109th 2005-2006 R 34 9,661 284
110th 2007-2008 D 32 22,908 716
111th 2009-2010 D 33 40,627 1,231
Total 2001-2010 174 76,641 440
In total, there are 76,641 lobbying reports that match observations.18 Lobbying activities
skyrocketed between the 109th and the 110th Congresses for two reasons. First, reform on
the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) in 2007, under the name of Honest Leadership and
Open Government Act of 2007, increased lobbying reporting from bi-annually to quarterly.
Second, the Democratic Party’s control of a majority in the House, for the first time since
the end of the 103rd Congress in 1995, drew a huge inflow of lobbying activity as major
agendas changed.
To determine the timing patterns of lobbying activities, I compared the date of the con-
gressional vote, obtained through the Library of Congress, and the time period of lobbying
activity from the lobbying reports.19 I use three thresholds for date of the congressional vote:
1) the date of the committee vote, 2) the date of the first House floor vote, 3) and the date of
the final congressional vote—usually the vote on the conference report. Figure 1.2Congres-
sional Procedures and Three Thresholdsfigure.1.2 presents three cases of final congressional
action. I use threshold 3 to define ex post lobbying since that is the last action taken by
Congress before the president signs the bill into law. However, setting different thresholds is
18The total number of unique lobbying reports is 74,855. For more information on lobbying report com-
position, see Appendix B.
19The date a lobbying report is filed, and the period of activity it describes, are different. Each registrant
must file a quarterly report on Form LD-2 no later than 20 days after the end of the quarterly period beginning
on the first day of January, April, July, and October of each year in which a registrant is registered.
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still useful since it reveals the volumes of lobbying activity at the different junctures within
a legislative process.
House
Vote
Committee
Vote
Bill 
Proposed
Senate
Vote
Conference 
Vote
Threshold 1 Threshold 2 Threshold 3
Figure 1.2: Congressional Procedures and Three Thresholds
One limitation in coding the timing of lobbying activity is that lobbying reports do not
specify the exact dates when lobbying occurs. Lobbyists only report on the quarter in which
they engage in lobbying activities. The following diagram in Figure 1.3Coding Criteria on
Possible Cases of Lobbying Timingfigure.1.3 gives a sense of how I define the timing of
lobbying. Case 1 is where defining ex ante and ex post lobbying is clear. If floor voting
takes place in the second quarter of a given year, all lobbying activities before the second
quarter of that year are ex ante. If lobbying activity takes place after the vote, starting
from the third quarter of that year and years following, it is ex post lobbying. Case 2 shows
that determining the precise timing of lobbying is tricky. If the floor vote and lobbying take
place in the same quarter of a given year, lobbying activity could be ex ante or ex post. In
this case, I code them as ex ante to eliminate the possibility of overestimating the incidence
of ex post lobbying. Combined with the setting the threshold at the date of the vote on the
conference report, these coding criteria gives the most conservative measurement of ex post
lobbying.
1.2.2 Evidence of Ex Post Lobbying
In this section, I examine the volume of ex post lobbying both in terms of the number
of lobbying report submissions and the amount of money spent. First, I investigate ex
post lobbying in terms of the frequency of lobbying report submissions. Table 1.2Summary
Statistics on Lobbying Type Based on the Frequency of Bill-Lobbying Report Matches.
Threshold = Date of the Final Congressional Votetable.1.2 presents the summary statistics
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Figure 1.3: Coding Criteria on Possible Cases of Lobbying Timing
on types of lobbying when the threshold is set to the final action by Congress. Under this
threshold, ex post lobbying means special interest groups lobby after all congressional actions
are closed. Observations are divided into two cases. First, clear cases include observations
only if ex ante and ex post lobbying activities are clearly identified. Second, every observation
of lobbying activity is listed in the columns under “All Cases,” and the lower boundary of
the ex post lobbying percentage is provided.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics on Lobbying Type Based on the Frequency of Bill-Lobbying
Report Matches. Threshold = Date of the Final Congressional Vote.
Clear Cases All Cases
Congress Ex Ante(%) Ex Post(%) Na Ex Ante Ex Post N b
107th 83.36 16.64 494 90.85 9.15 918
108th 83.29 16.71 757 91.47 8.53 1,467
109th 67.64 32.36 3,243 84.15 15.85 6,554
110th 59.40 40.60 4,070 66.33 33.67 5,007
111th 50.97 49.03 8,853 53.81 46.90 13,591
Total 56.37 43.63 46,808 62.68 37.32 76,641
Note: a = Number of lobbying reports under clear cases. b = Number of lobbying reports under all cases.
In clear cases, 43.63% were ex post lobbying on average across five sessions of Congress.
Variation across Congresses is large: while only 16.64 % of lobbying in the 107th Congress
was ex post, the 111th Congress shows ex post lobbying at 49.03%. Considering all cases,
13
37.32% were ex post lobbying on average.20
Figure 1.4Volume of Lobbying Activities Before and After Votefigure.1.4 shows lobbying
volumes before and after the vote. The dotted line indicates final congressional vote dates
and it shows that lobbying activities are intensified before and after final congressional votes.
At the same time, there is a significant amount of lobbying activity after final congressional
votes. Some lobbying activity even targets bills that passed Congress more than 20 months
previously.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
Final Vote
−5 0 5
Time Differences in Lobbying Activity From Vote (Quarter)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 1.4: Volume of Lobbying Activities Before and After Vote
If we set the threshold earlier than the final congressional voting (e.g., the date of the
House floor vote or the committee vote on a bill), the amount of ex post lobbying is even
larger. For example, if we set the threshold as the first House floor vote on a bill, which
is the first major vote on the floor for bills that originated in the House, 92.82 % received
ex post lobbying among clear cases and 76.03 % received ex post lobbying for all cases.
Table 1.3Summary Statistics on Lobbying Type Based on Frequency of Bill-Lobbying Report
Matchestable.1.3 presents the detailed information at the congressional level. This implies
that many groups start lobbying after the first major vote has been taken. If we set the
20When I set the threshold as the date when the president signs a bill into law, there is not a large
difference in terms of the ex post lobbying ratio since the time gap between the conference vote and the
president’s action is quite small in most cases.
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threshold at the date of the committee vote, the ratio of ex post to ex ante lobbying is even
higher.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics on Lobbying Type Based on Frequency of Bill-Lobbying
Report Matches
Clear Cases All Cases
Congress Ex Ante(%) Ex Post(%) Na Ex Ante Ex Post Na
107th 22.60 77.40 624 62.85 37.15 1,300
108th 23.88 76.12 1,051 62.70 37.30 2,145
109th 4.00 96.00 6,022 40.16 59.84 9,661
110th 12.65 87.35 17,195 32.82 67.18 22,908
111th 3.63 96.37 28,842 11.84 88.16 40,627
Total 7.18 92.82 53,734 29.89 70.11 76,641
Note: Threshold = Date of First House Floor Vote. a = Number of lobbying reports under clear cases. b
= Number of lobbying reports under all cases.
What if we measure ex post lobbying using the amount of money spent? One caution in
analyzing lobbying spending is that when a special interest group files its quarterly lobbying
report, it only reports the total spending per report without delineating the amount spent
on each issue. This is not a problem when a lobbying report details actions on a single
issue because total spending reported is exactly the amount spent on that issue. However,
many lobbying reports detail actions taken on multiple issues. On average, a lobbying report
contains five different issue areas. Therefore, comparing lobbying spending between ex ante
and ex post lobbying is not straightforward. To overcome this limitation, I present two
measures of lobbying expenditures.
First, I take a subsample of lobbying reports that only mentioned one issue: 12,566
observations out of 76,641 cases.21 Among these reports, average amount spent on ex ante
lobbying was $51,308, and the average amount spent on ex post lobbying was $43,161. The
second measure of the amount spent on lobbying is calculated as follows. I first count the
number of issues in each lobbying report. Some lobbying reports are single-issue reports
21It seems that single-issue lobbying reports have some selection issues because 90% of single-issue lobbying
reports are filed by hired lobbying firms.
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and some reports cover more than 60 different issue areas.22 After counting the number of
issues, I divide total spending by the number of issues in the report. This gives the average
spending per issue. The average lobbying spending per issue was $50,175 on ex ante lobbying
and $51,007 on ex post lobbying. Figure 1.5Distribution of Lobbying Spending (log scale)
between Ex Ante and Ex Post Lobbying among Single Issue Lobbying Reports (top) and the
Average Lobbying Spending per Issue (bottom)figure.1.5 shows the distribution of lobbying
spending in both measures.23 There is no discernible difference in spending between ex ante
and ex post lobbying activities. Both measures of lobbying spending confirm that special
interest groups spend significant amounts of money on ex post lobbying.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of Lobbying Spending (log scale) between Ex Ante and Ex Post
Lobbying among Single Issue Lobbying Reports (top) and the Average Lobbying Spending
per Issue (bottom).
22The majority of lobbying reports mentioned three or fewer issues. The maximum number of issues
mentioned in a lobbying report is 68. There are three lobbying reports that mentioned 68 issues and all
lobbying reports were filed by the Association of American Medical Colleagues in the 111th Congress.
23This is based on all cases. Clear cases show a similar pattern: average ex ante spending is $62,100 and
ex post spending is $69,095.
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1.3 A Model
In this section, I present a simple model that explains patterns of timing in lobbying
activities.24 The main idea is as follows. I assume an industry supports a bill’s passage.25
Legislation encompasses two features: collective benefits and private benefits.26 While some
bills show higher levels of collective benefits, others include high levels of private benefits.27
Passing a bill guarantees that all relevant actors enjoy the collective benefits from the bill, but
individual effort should be exerted to secure private benefits from the bill. It is interesting
that while passing a bill is a collective action, claiming private benefits is an individual
action after the bill’s passage. The classic collective action problem arises in this case.
The model presented here tries to answer two questions. First, who bears the burdens
of collective action at the bill-passage stage (that is, the costs of ex ante lobbying efforts)?
Second, how are lobbying patterns in terms of timing affected by different bills? The model
predicts that at the bill-passage stage, large firms with high market share bear dispropor-
tionately higher burdens in the collective action. Firms with smaller market share are more
likely to join ex post lobbying efforts to enjoy private benefits. Also, the model predicts that
the percent of ex post lobbying of the total amount of lobbying will increase as the ratio of
private benefits in the bill increases. In sum, group-specific patterns in terms of timing of
24A general idea of the model comes from following sources: Olson (1965), Olson and Zeckhauser (1966),
and Grossman and Helpman (1996). They discuss the problem of free rides’ in lobbying between the thriving
and declining industries in a dynamic setting. However, their discussion on the collective action problem
mainly depends on the industry structure and they do not consider factors such as group heterogeneity and
legislation characteristics.
25But this is not a critical assumption. The same logic can be applied to the case where an industry
opposes the passage of a bill. In this case, the ex ante lobbying effort should be exerted to block the bill’s
passage. But ex post dynamics are the same.
26I use the terms “collective” and “private” benefits instead of “specific” and “non-specific” to emphasize
the dynamics of the collective action problem among firms. Of course, not all collective benefits are specific
and not all private benefits are non-specific. Esteban and Ray (2001) present a model on group size and the
collective action having a collective prize with a varying mix of public and private characteristics. But they
assume that all individuals supporting the same bill are identical.
27There are several papers that discuss differences between the collective incentive as an industry and the
private incentive as an individual firm of business political activity (Lichtenberg, 1989; Hansen and Mitchell,
2000; de Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; Hansen, Mitchell, and Drope, 2005).
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lobbying activities and the bill-specific lobbying patterns are expected.
1.3.1 Set Up
Consider an industry with n firms. Each firm, denoted by j, is characterized by its
size in relation to the industry. Let αj be the size of firm j. The industry is a vector of
sizes (α1, α2, ..., αn).28 Firms in this industry can benefit from lobbying policy makers since
passing legislation generates rents. To enjoy the rents, firms must exert effort. Formally,
each firm can exert ex ante effort eAj and ex post effort e
P
j . Thus, the total effort of a firm j
is measured by eAj + e
P
j .
29
Let Π be the rents derived from lobbying the legislature. These benefits are increasing
in the total ex ante effort exerted by firms in the industry, thus Π = f(
n∑
j=1
eAj ) where f
′ > 0.
There is a parameter, β ∈ [0, 1] which indicates the ratio of the collective and specific
benefits in each bill.30 If the parameter β is close to 1, the bill has a significant portion
of collective benefits and is specific about how to implement the legislation, so passing the
bill itself guarantees higher collective benefits to groups and the ways in which rules will be
set at the implementation stage is well-defined. Little ex post lobbying effort is required to
secure private benefits. Bills on foreign policies may have a β close to 1. In contrast, if β
is close to 0, the ratio of the private benefits of the bill is higher and the legislation is short
on specifics; therefore passing that bill does not automatically guarantee certain benefits
to relevant groups. To secure the private benefits that legislation generates, groups have
to exert ex post lobbying efforts to influence the specific rule-making process. Non-specific
appropriations and tax bills show these types of features.
28This can be interpreted as lobbying effectiveness as well. Large firms usually have greater resources,
such as more information and experiences about the policy-making process or frequent contacts with policy
makers. Therefore we can assume that lobbying effectiveness is correlated with the market size of a firm.
29Efforts level eAj and eBj are assumed to be continuous in the general version. But for simplicity, I assume
they are binary in the simple example.
30In this model, I assume β is exogenous. But it is possible that special interests influence the magnitude
of β at the ex ante lobbying stage by influencing the legislative body. In an extension, I plan to endogenize
β as a function of ex ante lobbying efforts by special interests.
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By exerting ex ante lobbying, all firms in the industry can derive collective benefits from
the rents and the size of individual prizes from the collective benefits is proportional to the
firm’s market size, αj . By exerting ex post lobbying, each of the firms can extract a fraction
of the private benefits. This fraction increases with both the ex post lobbying effort of the
firm and the size of the firm in the industry.31 The cost of ex ante and ex post efforts are
denoted by cAj and c
P
j . Also, to engage in lobbying activity, firms have to bear an up-front
fixed cost, F.32 The probability that each firm’s market size is at most α is G(α), where G
is a continuously increasing function.
Let Pj be the fraction that a firm j derives from the private benefits in Π. This fraction
depends on both total ex post lobbying and the size of the firms, according to the following
expression:33
Pj(e
p, α) =
epjαj
n∑
j=1
epjαj
∀j ∈ {1, ..., n} (1.1)
Combined, the net earnings of each firm from lobbying corresponds to the following
expression:
βαjΠ(e
A) + (1− β)Pj(ep, α)Π(eA)− cAj − cPj − F (1.2)
31This assumes the rent-seeking function, or the portion of the private benefits, should be defined as
Pj(e
p, α) =
e
p
jαj∑n
j=1 e
p
jαj
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}. However, this rent-seeking function may be different for the regulation-
type policy and the procurement-type policy. For the regulation-type policy, the size of rent that groups get
from ex post lobbying is proportional to their market sizes. For example, if you collect more information
on the tax code, the benefit you can enjoy is proportional to your market size. But competition among
interest groups still exists. In a procurement-type of policy, it is similar to dividing a fixed pie among
interest groups. Therefore, the portion that you can extract from exerting ex post lobbying may not depend
on a firm’s market size. But if we assume market size is positively correlated with lobbying efficiency, the
rent-seeking function that I assume in the model can also apply to procurement-type legislation.
32It is well-known that there are high entry costs to engage in lobbying activities, especially for small
groups.
33This is similar to one of the most widely used contest success functions from Tullock (1980)’s probability
function.
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Each firm chooses its effort according to the following optimization problem:
max
eAj
βαjΠ(e
A) + (1− β)Pj(ep(eA), α)Π(eA)− cAj − cPj − F
s.t. Pj(e
P (eA), α) =
epj (e
A)αj
n∑
j=1
epjαj
Π(eA) = f(
n∑
j=1
eAj )
ePj (e
A) ∈ argmax
ePj
βαjΠ¯(e
A) + (1− β)Pj(ep(eA), α)Π¯(eA)− c¯Aj − cPj − F
βαjΠ(e
A) + (1− β)Pj(ep(eA), α)Π(eA)− cAj − cPj − F ≥ 0 (1.3)
1.3.2 Analysis
For simplicity, I assume that the rent is created if at least one firm is willing to engage
in ex ante lobbying.34 Then Π(eA) is simplified
Π =
 1 if at least one firm does lobby ex ante0 otherwise
If β = 1
I start with the case where a bill provides an entirely collective good. What matters is
whether there is one firm willing to engage in ex ante lobbying to generate that collective
good and which firm it is. In this case, we only need to check the incentive compatibility
of ex ante lobbying activity since engaging in both ex ante and ex post lobbying activities
and engaging in only ex post lobbying activity are dominated strategies.35 The optimization
problem is simplified
34There are various ways to set rules on the size of rent, Π. For example, I can set the threshold Π∗
which satisfies that if Π ≥ Π∗, the rent will be provided and if Π < Π∗, rent will not be provided. Also the
functional form of f can be defined specifically.
35Benefits under each activity are as follows. U(eP ) = −cP − F , U(eA + eP ) = αj − cA − cP − F ,
U(eA) = αj − cA − F . It is obvious that U(eP ) < U(eA + eP ) < U(eA) holds.
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max
eAj
αj − cA − F
s.t. αj − cA − F ≥ 0 (1.4)
First, from the participation constraint, if αj < cA+F , the firm obtains a negative payoff
if it lobbies ex ante and 0 if it does not lobby ax ante. Therefore, for those αj < cA + F ,
no lobbying activity is optimal. Set the cutoff α∗ = cA +F . For those αj ≥ cA +F , payoffs
depend on the action:
Uj =

0 if does not lobby ex ante
αj − cA − F if does lobby ex ante
(1−G(α∗))αj if does not lobby but other firm lobbies ex ante
If (1−G(α∗))αj ≥ αj − cA − F , a firm j does not contribute. This leads to the condition
G(α∗) ≤ c
A + F
αj
(1.5)
We know that if αj = αn, equation 1.5equation.1.3.5 implies that the biggest firm in the
market provides ex ante lobbying and all other firms do not lobby. The case where β = 1
is similar to the general public goods provision game. Under this case, the largest firm,
αj = αn engages in ex ante lobbying and everyone else, αj 6= αn, enjoys a free ride.
If β = 0
This is the case where a bill is entirely private. To claim a benefit, ex post lobbying is
necessary. In this case, we only need to compare payoffs between lobbying both ex ante and
ex post, and lobbying only ex post, since lobbying only ex ante is a dominated strategy. The
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optimization problem simplifies to
max
eAj
Pj(e
p(eA), α)Π(eA)− cAj − cPj − F
s.t. Pj(e
P (eA), α) =
epj (e
A)αj
n∑
j=1
epjαj
Π = f(
n∑
j=1
eAj )
ePj (e
A) ∈ argmax
ePj
(1− β)Pj(ep(eA), α)Π¯(eA)− c¯Aj − cPj − F
Pj(e
p(eA), α)Π(eA)− cAj − cPj − F ≥ 0 (1.6)
From the participation constraint, given that the biggest firm in the industry provides an
ex ante lobbying activity, a firm j 6= n participates in ex post lobbying if Pj(eP , α) ≥ cP +F
is satisfied. Therefore a firm with α∗j which satisfies the condition that
Pj(e
P , α∗j ) = c
P + F (1.7)
is the smallest firm among those that engage in ex post lobbying. If we solve the equation
1.7equation.1.3.7, it generates the threshold firm size
α∗j =
(cP + F )
n∑
i 6=j
ePi αi
ePj (1− cP − F )
Firms with sizes greater than α∗j will participate in the ex post lobbying process and
their equilibrium ex post lobbying effort is derived from the 1.6equation.1.3.6:
eP∗j =
√
αj
n∑
i 6=j
ePi αi −
n∑
i 6=j
ePi αi
αj
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If 0 < β < 1
This is the case where legislation includes both private and public benefits. A firm’s
optimization problem is the same as presented in the equation 1.3Set Upequation.1.3.3
above. Given that the biggest firm provides ex ante lobbying to generate the collective
good, a firm j 6= n participates in ex post lobbying if and only if
βαj + (1− β)Pj(eP , αj) ≥ cP + F (1.8)
Assume that a firm with α∗j satisfying the equation 1.7equation.1.3.7 participates. We
know Pj(eP , α∗j ) = c
P + F holds. Then we compare the value of βαj + (1 − β)Pj(eP , αj)
and Pj(eP , αj) when αj = α∗j . With this exercise, we can identify the smallest firm that
participates in ex post lobbying when a legislation is entirely private (β = 0); it has an
incentive to participate in ex post lobbying when the bill includes both the collective and
private benefits (i.e. 0 < β < 0).
The benefit from the private benefits as a function of ex post lobbying efforts is defined
as Pj(eP , α∗j ) =
αj∑
j∈{∀i:eP
i
6=0}
αj
.36 Since the denominator is less than 1, Pj(eP , α∗) > αj .
Therefore, βα∗j + (1− β)Pj(eP , α∗j ) < Pj(eP , α∗j ) = cP + F holds.37
This implies the firm with α∗j is the smallest among those that participate in ex post
lobbying when β = 0 does not have an incentive to participate when β > 0 since the cost
outweighs the benefit. Therefore the threshold α∗∗j that satisfies the participation constraint,
equation 1.8equation.1.3.8, is greater than α∗, the market size of the smallest firm that
participates in ex post lobbying when β = 0. Also as β approaches 1, it becomes harder
to satisfy the participation constraint and therefore the threshold level of market size, αj ,
should increase.
The prediction of firms’ lobbying patterns as a function of a market size, αj , and the
36Since ePj = 1 for j ∈ {∀i : ePi 6= 0}, the formula Pj(eP , α∗j ) is simplified.
37The left hand side can be rearranged as β[αj − Pj(eP , α∗)] + Pj(eP , α∗j ). Since αj < Pj(eP , α∗), β[αj −
Pj(e
P , α∗)] + Pj(eP , α∗j ) < Pj(eP , α∗).
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collectiveness of a piece of legislation, denoted by β, is presented in Figure 1.6The prediction
on the relationship between market share (α) and lobbying pattern as a function of degree
of collective benefits in a legislation (β). Case I depicts the situation where the rents are
provided if at least one group exerts ax ante lobbying. Case II describes the situation where
the rents are provided if the sum of ex ante lobbying passes a certain threshold level. The
lines indicate the minimum size of a firm who joins different lobbying strategies, depending
on βfigure.1.6. Case I depicts what I analyze here: the collective good is provided if at least
one firm engages in ex ante lobbying. Under this scenario, the largest firm, whose market
share is αn, always provides the collective good by exerting ex ante lobbying effort, other
firms whose market sizes satisfy the condition αj ≥ α∗ engage in only ex post lobbying,
and firms with market size αj < α∗ do not participate in the lobbying process. As the β,
the collectiveness of a bill, increases, the size of the smallest firm that participates in the
lobbying process increases.
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Figure 1.6: The prediction on the relationship between market share (α) and lobbying
pattern as a function of degree of collective benefits in a legislation (β). Case I depicts the
situation where the rents are provided if at least one group exerts ax ante lobbying. Case
II describes the situation where the rents are provided if the sum of ex ante lobbying passes
a certain threshold level. The lines indicate the minimum size of a firm who joins different
lobbying strategies, depending on β.
Case II in figure 1.6The prediction on the relationship between market share (α) and
lobbying pattern as a function of degree of collective benefits in a legislation (β). Case
I depicts the situation where the rents are provided if at least one group exerts ax ante
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lobbying. Case II describes the situation where the rents are provided if the sum of ex ante
lobbying passes a certain threshold level. The lines indicate the minimum size of a firm who
joins different lobbying strategies, depending on βfigure.1.6 depicts the prediction under the
scenario that the collective good is provided if the sum of ex ante lobbying by relevant actors
passes the fixed threshold such that
Π(eA) =

1 if Π =
n∑
j=1
eA ≥ Π∗
0 if Π =
n∑
j=1
eA < Π∗
Under this condition, firms with αj ≥ α∗∗ definitely engage in ex ante lobbying. Depending
on the value of β, firms decide whether they also participate in ex post lobbying. As β
becomes close to 1, fewer firms participate in ex post lobbying activity. Firms whose market
size αj is between α∗ and α∗∗ only engage in ex post lobbying activity and the number of
firms employing ex post lobbying decreases as the collectiveness of the bill, β, increases.
1.3.3 The Optimal Level of Lobbying Effort
In this section, I investigate how the opportunity to engage in ex post lobbying affects
the level of ex ante lobbying in a general setting with two firms, j ∈ {1, 2}. I analyze two
games in a general framework. The first is a static situation where each firm only considers
lobbying in the current period. Under this assumption, firms decide their optimal level of
ex ante lobbying without considering ex post lobbying.38 Under this scenario, firms are
very naive in the sense that they only consider the current stage. Exerting ex ante lobbying
effort does not have any impact on ex post lobbying and vice versa. This will be used as
a benchmark.39 The second is a dynamic situation where firms make decisions on ex ante
lobbying by taking into account ex post lobbying. Exerting more ex ante effort increases the
38Here we assume that the portion of the private benefits Pj , that is determined in the ex post lobbying
stage, is given and ex ante lobbying by special interests does not affect the ex post lobbying efforts and
therefore has no impact on the fraction.
39This benchmark case is similar to what is assumed in most political economy models on lobbying.
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size of rents but at the same time, it generates more competition during ex post lobbying
to claim non-specific private benefits. Therefore, there are tradeoffs in exerting ex ante
lobbying effort. This is a novel feature of the model. The main focus of this section of the
paper is to compare the optimal levels of ex ante lobbying efforts between the static and
dynamic games and identify how the opportunity of ex post lobbying affects incentive to
engage in ex ante lobbying.
The Static Game Equilibrium
In the static game, firms solve two independent games. Decisions on ex ante and ex post
lobbying are independent. First, solve the problem with respect to eAj . Here we assume
each firm’s share of the private benefits derived from ex post lobbying is fixed (P¯j). For
simplicity, I assume a cost function takes a quadratic form such as cj = 12c(e
A
j )
2. The size
of rents is a function of the sum of ex ante lobbying efforts by the firms and it is defined
as Π(eAj ) = f(
n∑
j=1
eAj ). I assume f(
n∑
j=1
eAj ) =
n∑
j=1
ej . I take the first order conditions of the
equation 1.3Set Upequation.1.3.3 for each firm and solve for the Nash equilibrium ex ante
and ex post effort levels.40
Proposition 1. The equilibrium set of ex ante and ex post effort levels, (e∗ABj , e
∗PB
j ), in
the benchmark static game satisfies the following conditions:
e∗A1 =
βα1 + (1− β)P¯1
c
, e∗P1 =
√
α1α2(1− β)Π¯(eA)
c
e∗A2 =
βα2 + (1− β)P¯2
c
, e∗P2 =
√
α1α2(1− β)Π¯(eA)
c
The intuition behind the Proposition 1is simple. Each firm exerts more ex ante efforts
as its market size increases. As the ratio of collective benefits in the bill increases (β ↑), a
firm j whose market size is greater than the exogenously given share of the private benefits
in the ex post stage, P¯j , will increase its ex ante lobbying efforts and a firm i whose market
40See Appendix A for the proof.
26
size is smaller than P¯i will decrease its ex ante lobbying efforts.41 Given ex ante efforts and
the size of rents are determined, it is the market structure that determines firms’ ex post
efforts. As the market share becomes more equal, the level of ex post effort increases since
competition is more intense.42
The Sequential Game Equilibrium
In the sequential game, firms take into account the consequences of ex ante lobbying
on the ex post lobbying stage when they make a decision on their level of ex ante efforts.
Therefore, I solve the sequential game by backward induction. First, I solve the ex post
lobbying stage game. Assume the size of rents, Π(eA) is fixed and deduce ePj . In the ex post
lobbying stage, the sequential game is exactly the same as the static game. Therefore, the
equilibrium levels of ex post lobbying effort for firm 1 and 2, e∗P1 and e∗P2 , are
e∗P1 =
√
α1α2(1− β)Π¯(eA)
c
, e∗P2 =
√
α1α2(1− β)Π¯(eA)
c
(1.9)
The possible difference in ex post lobbying effort between the static and sequential games
comes from the possibly different level of ex ante lobbying efforts and its consequences for
the size of rents. If the size of rents varies, it affects the incentive of other players and
therefore the competition on rents could be different. Denote the ex post lobbying effort
e∗Pj that satisfies equation 1.9equation.1.3.9 as e¯
P
j .
Given e¯P1 , we now move backwards to the first stage to find the equilibrium ex ante
41This is derived from
∂eAj
∂β
. Assume a government decides how much non-specific private benefits are
distributed among firms in the ex post stage. If a firm j receives a fraction of private benefits more than
its market share, it has an incentive to exert more ex ante effort as the private portion of the bill increases.
However, if the private portion of the bill decreases, the ex post stage’s influence on the firm’s payoff declines
and market share that affects the payoff from the collective benefit becomes more important. Therefore,
a firm whose market share is greater than what the government promises to give in an ex post stage will
increase its ex ante effort.
42The fact that ex post effort level is the same for two firms is derived from the assumptions that cost
function does not depend on market share, αj . But this is not critical for solving the problem.
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lobbying effort, eA1 . The maximization problem in the first stage is as follows:
max
eA1
α1βΠ(e
A) + P1(e¯
P (eA), α1)(1− β)Π(eA)− 1
2
c{(e¯P1 (eA))2 + (eA1 )2} − F (1.10)
s.t.
Π(eA) = f(eA)
e¯P1 ∈ argmax
e¯P1
P1(e¯
P (eA), α1)(1− β)Π(eA)− 1
2
c(e¯P1 )
2 − F
I take the first order conditions for each firm and solve for the Nash equilibrium ex ante
and ex post effort levels.43
Proposition 2. The equilibrium set of ex ante and ex post effort levels, (e∗ASj , e
∗PS
j ), in the
sequential game satisfies the following conditions:
e∗A1 =
α1β + (1− β)P1(eP , α)
c
+
1− β
c
[α1α2(eP ′1 eP2 − eP1 eP ′2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
Π(eA)− c∂e
P
1
∂eA1
]
e∗P1 =
√
α1α2(1− β)Π¯(eA)
c
,where eP ′1 =
∂eP1
∂eA1
and eP ′2 =
∂eP2
∂eA1
.
How does the ex post lobbying opportunity affect the level of ex ante lobbying activity?
Compare the ex ante effort in the sequential game to the ex ante effort in the static game.
There are two new components added in the sequential game equilibrium. The first compo-
nent,
[
α1α2(eP
′
1 e
P
2 −eP1 eP
′
2 )
(eP1 α1+e
P
2 α2)
2 Π(e
A)
]
, refers to how the ex ante lobbying effort of firm 1 affects the
ex post lobbying efforts of itself and the other firm. This can be separated into two parts:
[α1α2(eP ′1 eP2 − eP1 eP ′2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
]
Π(eA) =
[ α1α2(eP ′1 eP2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
]
Π(eA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part I
+
[ −α1α2(eP1 eP ′2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
]
Π(eA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part II
(1.11)
43See Appendix A for the proof.
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From the definition of P1(eP , α), the sign of Part I in the equation 1.11equation.1.3.11 is
positive since more ex ante lobbying effort by firm 1 increases the size of rents and it leads
to more ex post lobbying for firm 1 itself. In contrast, the sign of Part II is negative. Part
II shows the relationship between firm 1’s ex ante lobbying effort and its effect on firm 2’s
incentive in ex post lobbying. If firm 1puts more effort into ex ante lobbying, it increases
the size of the rents and therefore firm 2 has more incentive to exert ex post lobbying. But
due to the negative sign, it takes a negative value.
The second new component regarding the difference between the static and sequential
games, −c∂eP1
∂eA1
, comes from additional cost. In terms of cost, firm 1 must pay the additional
cost, c
[
∂eP1
∂eA1
]
, if exerting more ex ante lobbying effort induces more ex post lobbying effort.
Combined, we have extra benefits and extra costs in the sequential game compared to the
static game. Extra benefits are as follows:
1− β
c
{ α1α2(eP ′1 eP2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
}
Π(eA) > 0 (1.12)
This implies that as firm 1 exerts more efforts ex ante, it increases the size of the rents
and therefore induces more ex post lobbying to claim additional private benefits. But at the
same time, there are extra costs that firm 1 must pay:
1− β
c
{ −α1α2(eP1 eP ′2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
Π(eA)− c∂e
P
1
∂eA1
}
< 0 (1.13)
Therefore, the degree of ex ante lobbying efforts in the sequential game compared to the
static game depends on the size of extra benefits and the extra costs.
eAB1 =
α1β + P¯1(1− β)
c
(1.14)
eAS1 =
α1β + P1(1− β)
c
+
Extra Benefits︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− β
c
α1α2(e
P ′
1 e
P
2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
Π +
Extra Costs︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− β
c
{ −α1α2(eP1 eP ′2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
Π− c∂e
P
1
∂eA1
}
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There are several interesting comparative statics worth noting. As β converges toward
1, ex ante lobbying effort in the sequential game is the same as that in the static game
because this becomes a game that purely provides for the public good, and therefore, no ex
post lobbying stage is required. This means there is no difference between the static game
and the sequential game. In contrast, when β converges toward 0, the difference in the ex
ante lobbying effort between the static and the sequential games is maximized. A simple
simulation illustrates how the size of collective benefits in bills and the market structure
affect ex ante lobbying efforts in the sequential game as in Figure 1.7Comparison of Ex Ante
Efforts between the Static and Sequential Games as a function of Market Size (α) and the
Ratio of Collective Benefits (β)figure.1.7.44 First, as market share increases, a firm increases
its ex ante lobbying effort in both the static and sequential games. Second, except in the
case of a monopoly, the ex ante lobbying effort in the sequential game is always smaller
than its counterpart in the static setting. Ex post lobbying opportunities lead to the under-
provision of ex ante lobbying efforts. There are some small firms that would exert ex ante
lobbying in the static game but would not exert it in the sequential game. Third, the issue of
under-provision of ex ante lobbying effort is severe as the market becomes more competitive,
i.e., when market shares are similar.
1.4 Patterns in Ex Post Lobbying
In this section, I present patterns in ex post lobbying that are implied by the model. First,
it is predicted that bills with more non-specific private benefits draw more ex post lobbying.
I examine this hypothesis by checking the ex post lobbying ratio for bills originating from
different committees. Second, the model shows that groups with larger market shares bear
disproportionately high burdens in ex ante lobbying. Using the data on firms that lobbied
for the Dodd-Frank legislation, I show that large firms and trade associations are more
likely than small firms to exert ex ante lobbying efforts. Third, given the fact that ex
44To compare ex ante lobbying efforts in the static and the sequential games, I set the parameters such
that c = 1, β = 0.5 to illustrate the case when 0 < β < 1.
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Figure 1.7: Comparison of Ex Ante Efforts between the Static and Sequential Games as a
function of Market Size (α) and the Ratio of Collective Benefits (β).
post lobbying targets the implementation stage, it is expected that lobbying activities that
contact bureaucrats and regulators should be more ex post. Finally, I examine how the
choice of employing in-house lobbyists or hiring outside lobbying firms is related to ex post
lobbying patterns. Since ex ante lobbying processes involve more contact with legislators
and ex post lobbying may require firm-specific information in the interaction with regulators,
it is expected that hiring professional lobbying firms, whose most important asset is their
access to legislators, is more frequent in ex ante lobbying, while the use of in-house lobbyists
is more frequent in ex post lobbying. All these conjectures are empirically supported.
1.4.1 Bill-Specific Patterns
First, the model predicts that some bills draw more ex ante lobbying and others invite
more ex post lobbying, depending on the parameter β, which indicates the amount of col-
lective and specific benefits to be garnered from the bill. Figure 1.8Ex Post Lobbying Ratio
at a Bill Level [clear cases]figure.1.8 shows this prediction is supported by the data. For
each bill in the sample, I calculate the ex post lobbying ratio. Figure 1.8Ex Post Lobbying
Ratio at a Bill Level [clear cases]figure.1.8 shows that there are bill-specific patterns of tim-
ing lobbying efforts. While some bills draw an overwhelmingly high ex ante lobbying ratio,
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others generate a higher ratio of ex post lobbying.45
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Figure 1.8: Ex Post Lobbying Ratio at a Bill Level [clear cases].
When bills do not require post-bill-passage efforts at the individual level for their benefits
to be enjoyed, ex ante lobbying dominates. These are bills from which the passage itself
produces a public good to relevant actors. For example, bills originating in the Homeland
Security Committee do not generate many ex post lobbying efforts. Across all 174 bills, the
average ex post lobbying ratio is 0.23. But the ex post lobbying ratio for bills related to
national security are much lower than the average ratio. For example, 25 lobbying contacts
were made on “H.R.5682: United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act”
which passed in the 109th Congress, but none of the contacts resulted in ex post lobbying.
In contrast, bills that required individual post-bill-passage efforts to claim benefit from
non-specific parts generated considerable levels of ex post lobbying. In this case, a bill’s
45One may wonder whether the lobbying pattern is determined by the time when a bill is introduced into
Congress, or the amount of time during which a bill is considered in the legislature. For example, bills
introduced very late in the session, or bills with a shorter time span between their introduction and their
passage may show a higher ratio of ex post lobbying since the time is too short to lobby during the legislation
process. In contrast, if a bill is introduced earlier in the session, or the time span is long enough between
its introduction and its passage, lobbying can be conducted during the legislative session and, therefore, one
may expect the ratio of ex post lobbying to be lower. Although there is a negative relationship between
the duration of the time span and the ex post lobbying ratio, there is still a significant level of variation in
terms of the ex post lobbying ratio among bills with the same time span. Figures included in Appendix C
illustrate this point.
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passage itself creates some rents at the aggregate level but the uncertainty regarding how
the bill will be implemented remains. Therefore, to benefit from the legislation, relevant
parties must exert some lobbying effort during the ex post stage. For example, 205 lobbying
reports cited lobbying for “H.R.4297: Tax Relief Extension Reconciliation Act” which passed
in the 109th Congress. Among them, only 34 cases are ex ante lobbying, while 171 cases
are ex post lobbying. This example highlights the fact that features of bills influence modes
of lobbying. To systematically examine how the different contents of bills affect lobbying
patterns, I calculate the mean ex post lobbying ratio of bills originating in the same House
committee.
Figure 1.9Ex Post Lobbying Ratio at Committee Levelfigure.1.9 compares the ex post
lobbying ratio across different bills coming from different committees.46 As one would expect,
bills coming from the Homeland Security (HS) or Oversight and Government Reform (OV)
Committees induce little ex post lobbying.47 In contrast, bills coming from the Energy
and Commerce (EG) or Ways and Means (WM)) Committees generate significantly higher
levels of ex post lobbying. Those bills are usually more complex and produce more unresolved
uncertainties. Groups need more information to take advantage of the benefits in these bills.
One may argue that ex post lobbying could be ex ante lobbying for future legislation if
bills are annually renewed, e.g., appropriations bills. Despite specifying the previous year’s
bill in their lobbying reports, special interest groups may have lobbied on the contents of
a future appropriations bill rather than lobbying for the implementation or specific details
46Following is the information on what each abbreviation stands for in the Figure 1.9Ex Post Lobby-
ing Ratio at Committee Levelfigure.1.9: SC = Science and Technology, HS= Homeland Security, AD =
Administration, IR = International Relations, OV= Oversight and Government Reform, JU = Judiciary,
AG= Agriculture, AS = Armed Services, IN = Intelligence, TR= Transportations and Infrastructures, FS=
Financial Services, AP = Appropriations, ED = Education and Labor Force, WM = Ways and Means, EG
= Energy and Commerce.
47Readers may wonder why bills coming from the Science and Technology committee generate so little ex
post lobbying. This may be due to the fact that the government’s decisions on research support for science are
made on merit and expertise as well as peer reviews from institutions such as the National Science Foundation
(NSF) or the National Health Service (NHS). That means there is little room for lobbying groups to use
political pressure to influence non-policy makers in this area. Also, note that the Appropriations Committee
has jurisdiction over defense contract bills, while the Homeland Security Committee does not. Note that
observations per committee are small and bills coming from the same committee may have very different
characteristics. Hence, one needs to be cautious when interpreting this graph.
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Figure 1.9: Ex Post Lobbying Ratio at Committee Level
of the passed legislation.48 I present supporting evidence from the analysis on specific bills
indicating that this concern does not explain the majority of ex post lobbying activities.49
First, I present the volume of lobbying activity before and after the vote date in Fig-
ure 1.10Lobbying Volumes Before and After from the Congressional Voting Date in Appro-
priations and Non Appropriations Bills. Vertical solid lines indicate the final congressional
voting datefigure.1.10. I divide the bills into two groups: appropriations bills that are
generally annually renewed, and non-appropriations bills that have longer time horizons.
Patterns on the timing of lobbying for appropriations and non-appropriations bills do not
show a significant difference. Lobbying activities are generally intensified around the con-
48This assumes a situation in which a special interest groups indicates that it lobbied on the Defense
Appropriation Bill of 2010 in the third quarter of 2011. If the Defense Appropriation Bill of 2010 was passed
in Congress on June 2010, this lobbying activity is ex post lobbying. However, it is possible that the special
interest group tried to influence the upcoming Defense Appropriations Bill of 2011, although it had specified
the previous year’s bill.
49Not every lobbying report specifies bills that were targeted. Lobbying disclosure forms require regis-
tered lobbyists to list the general lobbying issue area code on each form submitted. Under the general
issue area code, lobbyists can fill in specific lobbying issues. Sometimes they write specific bill names and
sometimes they put in a broad set of issues. Among the lobbying reports that were filed between 1998 and
2012, 46% listed specific bills (see Appendix B for more details). For the list of general issue codes, see
http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/help/WordDocuments/lobbyingissuecodes.htmU.S. House of Represen-
tatives, Office of the Clerk
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gressional vote date but lobbying activities may continue beyond 20 months following the
final congressional vote. For non-appropriations bills that have a longer time horizon (e.g.,
five years for the Omnibus farm bill), a significant amount of ex post lobbying immediately
after the bill passed indicates that ex post lobbying activities are not ex ante lobbying for
future bills. The case of appropriations bills is also interesting because, despite the fact that
appropriations bills are renewed annually, groups still specify previous appropriations bills
in their lobbying reports.
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Figure 1.10: Lobbying Volumes Before and After from the Congressional Voting Date in
Appropriations and Non Appropriations Bills. Vertical solid lines indicate the final congres-
sional voting date.
Another piece of supporting evidence that indicates ex post lobbying is not only con-
cerned with ex ante lobbying for similar bills in the future is presented in Figure 1.11Ex
Post Lobbying Ratio Between Appropriations Bills and Non Appropriations Billsfigure.1.11.
It shows the ex post lobbying ratio between appropriations and non-appropriations bills. If
the ex post lobbying is only concerned with ex ante lobbying for future bills, the ex post
lobbying ratio for the appropriations bills should be similar since it has the same legislative
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cycle. But, there is great variation in lobbying patterns for appropriations bills. This is true
for non-appropriations bills as well and this implies that bill-specific characteristics matter
more than simply the time-cycle of the bill’s consideration.
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Figure 1.11: Ex Post Lobbying Ratio Between Appropriations Bills and Non Appropriations
Bills.
1.4.2 Group-Specific Patterns
Second, the model implies that groups with greater resources to engage in ex ante lob-
bying and groups with small market share are more likely to focus on ex post lobbying.
To examine this prediction, I calculate the ratio of ex ante and ex post lobbying for each
group.50 Figure 1.12Ex Post Lobbying Ratio at Client Level [clear cases]figure.1.12 shows
the pattern of lobbying at the group level.
Some noticeable patterns emerge from the group-level data. First, many groups specialize
in either ex ante lobbying or ex post lobbying. In particular, small firms that submit few
lobbying reports and have limited resources show a polarized lobbying pattern. While sectors
50I restrict the data on groups whose minimum lobbying is greater than 2.
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Figure 1.12: Ex Post Lobbying Ratio at Client Level [clear cases].
such as ideology and single-issue advocacy groups engage more in ex ante lobbying, the
agribusiness and energy/natural resources sectors show higher ex post lobbying ratios on
average.51 Second, groups that have more resources and lobby more frequently show more
balanced resource allocations between ex ante and ex post lobbying, although they are biased
toward ex ante lobbying. For example, Citigroup Management Corporation submitted 67
different lobbying reports and its ex post lobbying ratio is 0.44. Lockheed Martin, one of the
most active players in lobbying Washington, submitted 114 different lobbying reports and
its ex post lobbying ratio is 0.27. Third, trade associations such as Pharmaceutical Research
& Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) or the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO),
show higher ex ante lobbying compared to individual groups. For example, the Biotechnology
Industry Organization submitted 75 lobbying reports and its ex post lobbying ratio is 0.27.
To identify a group-specific pattern with more precision, I examine the pattern of groups
who lobbied on bill H.R.4173: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act that passed in the 111th Congress. The Dodd-Frank Act was one of the most controver-
sial and important pieces of legislations in the 111th Congress and 4,386 lobbying reports
51The average ex post lobbying ratio for all sectors is 0.31. The ex post lobbying ratio for ideology/single
issue groups is 0.27 and the defense sector’s ratio is 0.14. Ex post lobbying ratios for the agribusiness and
energy/natural resources sectors are 0.39 and 0.4, respectively.
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submitted by 871 different groups (as of 2012) specifically mentioned this ball. Among
these groups, I only consider firms and trade associations since that is what I assume in the
model.52 The number of unique firms is 523, and the number of trade associations is 205.
The Dodd-Frank Act can be described as a bill that lacks specific details despite spanning
some 2,300 pages. It required that 398 mandated rules be written by federal agencies and
regulators and it is often cited as a law that is short on specifics.53
For each firm, I collect the revenue and employment data from Orbis, a global company
database. Orbis divides firms into four categories: small(S), medium (M), large (L), and
very large (VL). Among 523 firms that lobbied on the Dodd-Frank Act, 419 firms (80.11%)
are considered to be very large firms. Firms submitted 2,764 lobbying reports and trade
associations submitted 1,204 lobbying reports in total. Among the 2,764 lobbying reports
that firms submitted, 2,366 (85.6%) have large firms as their clients. To examine the lobbying
pattern by different groups, I calculate the ex post lobbying ratio in terms of frequency of
lobbying reports filed and lobbying spending for different sizes of firms and trade associations.
Table 1.4Summary Statistics on Ex Post Lobbying by Firms and Trade Associationstable.1.4
presents detailed information on the firms and the associations that lobbied on the Dodd-
Frank Act. As the model predicts, small- and medium-sized firms show a higher ex post
lobbying ratio, measured in terms of both the frequency of lobbying reports and expenditures
on lobbying. Large and very large firms are shown to be disproportionately engaging in ex
ante lobbying.54 Trade associations are more likely to engage in ex ante lobbying compared
to small- and medium-sized firms. Given the collective action problems that firms face at
the ex ante lobbying stage, this is also consistent with what the model predicts.
52143 Labor unions, lawyers & lobbyists, and ideology/single issue groups also lobbied for this bill. I
dropped them in the analysis.
53http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/on-finance-bill-lobbying-shifts-to-regulations/“On Finance
Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations,” The New York Times, June, 28, 2010.
54The difference in ex post lobbying ratios between small/medium size firms and large/very large firms is
statistically significant.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics on Ex Post Lobbying by Firms and Trade Associations.
Firm Type No. No. of Report %a Spending(USD) %b
Small Firm 35 97 49 2,671,763 42
Medium Firm 31 124 53 4,315,598 50
Large Firm 38 177 38 8,360,378 33
Very Large Firm 419 2,366 41 180,484,736 37
Trade Associations 205 1,204 42 83,121,727 42
Total 728 3,968 45 278,954,202 41
Small + Medium 66 221 51 6,987,361 47
Large + Very Large 457 2,543 40 188,845,114 36
Trade Associations 205 1,204 42 83,121,727 42
Note: a = Ex post lobbying percentage in terms of lobbying report frequency. b = Percentage of ex post
lobbying in terms of lobbying spending.
1.4.3 Contact Agency Pattern
Third, I predict that ex post lobbying aims to target rule-making processes by federal
agencies. From this argument, one would expect to observe more ex post lobbying among the
lobbying activities that target administrative agencies. In this section, I examine whether
this is the case. The Lobbying Disclosure Act requires that names of federal agencies should
be listed on line 17 of any issue pages in the lobbying disclosure form.55 “Federal agency”
includes not only Congress, but also the bureaucratic and regulatory agencies. Unlike spend-
ing, the contacted federal agencies are listed separately under each issue in a report. For
example, 3M’s 2010 fourth quarter lobbying report citied 17 different issue areas. Under
the issue of “Copyright/Patent/Trademark,” 3M lobbied on the house bill, H.R.1260: The
Patent Reform Act of 2009 in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Under the
issue of “Taxation/Internal Revenue Code,” 3M lobbied on H.R. 2348: Energy Tax Provi-
sions and it targeted four different federal institutions: the House of Representatives, Senate,
Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).
There are some cases where a lobbying report lists multiple bills under the same issue
55http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.htmlU.S. House of Representatives, Office of
the Clerk
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area. In this case, it is hard to differentiate the targeted agencies per bill. Therefore, I
also analyze the targeted agencies among bills mentioning only a single-issue.56 I divide
all targeted agencies into two groups: legislative and administrative. Legislative agencies
include the House of Representatives and the Senate; administrative agencies include all
other institutions.57 Table 1.5Summary Statistics on Lobbying Type by Targeted Agency
[clear cases]table.1.5 shows the summary statistics of lobbying type by contacted agency for
all lobbying reports as well as for single-issue reports.
Table 1.5: Summary Statistics on Lobbying Type by Targeted Agency [clear cases].
All Reports Single Issue Reports
Type Ex Ante(%) Ex Post Na Ex Ante Ex Post N b
Legislative 56.46 43.54 57,997 57.10 42.90 14,460
Administrative 50.86 49.14 61,052 52.73 47.27 6,924
Total 53.59 46.41 119,049 55.69 44.31 21,384
Note: a = Number of lobbying reports among all reports. b = Number of lobbying reports among single
issue reports.
First, among the lobbying activities that targeted the House and the Senate, 56.46%
was ex ante and 43.54% was ex post. When lobbying focused on contacting federal agencies
and bureaucrats, 50.86% was ex ante lobbying and 49.14% was ex post lobbying. The
ex post lobbying ratio is greater when the lobbyists target non-legislative federal agencies
and the difference is statistically significant.58 Second, despite the increase in the ratio of
ex post lobbying when targeting administrative agencies, contacting legislative bodies in
ex post lobbying is still prevalent. This may seem to contradict the expectation that one
should observe more lobbying activities targeting federal regulators and bureaucrats at the
56Lobbying reports for a single-issue may have different characteristics from reports on multiple issues.
Usually, single-issue lobbying reports are filed by professional lobbying firms (80.32%) and hired lobbying
firms disproportionately contact legislators (72.44%) compared to in-house lobbyists.That explains why the
absolute volume of contact of legislators is twice the volume of contact of administrative agencies in single-
issue lobbying reports. Therefore, it is possible that I am underestimating ex post lobbying that targets
federal regulators and bureaucrats in the analysis of single-issue reports.
57“Administrative agencies” includes both bureaucratic and regulatory agencies. I do not distinguish them
here.
58A simple t test confirms this (t-statistic is -19.4304 and p value < 0.001).
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ex post lobbying stage. But it is well known that legislators can influence the decisions of
bureaucrats on specific rulings. As a result, special interest groups access legislative bodies
to influence federal regulators indirectly through legislators (Arnold, 1987; McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast, 1987).59 For example, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
lobbied Congress to delay the Environmental Protection Agency’s air pollution rules that
could cost jobs of 50,000 workers in mining, utility, and railroads industries.60 There are
many other examples in which groups lobby Congress to put pressure on federal agencies and
bureaucracies regarding the rule-making and implementation processes. Therefore, empirical
evidence showing that interest groups still heavily lobby legislative bodies at the ex post
stage is not surprising.
1.4.4 In-House v.s. Lobbying Firm Patterns
Finally, I analyze whether the choice of different lobbying options is related to different
lobbying patterns. When special interest groups decide to lobby, they can employ in-house
lobbyists or hire professional lobbying firms. In-house lobbying means that firms or groups
employ their own lobbyists. When a group hires a lobbying firm, the client pays the lobbying
firm for its services and the lobbying firm files a lobbying report on behalf of the client. Since
professional lobbying firms disproportionately contact legislators, and firms that may need
to reveal their proprietary information when interacting with regulators would avoid hiring
professional lobbying firms due to concerns about information leakage, I expect in-house
lobbying cases to show higher levels of ex post lobbying involvement compared to hiring
59The Congressional Review Act was created in 1996 as a special way to give Congress the authority to
overturn final rules made by federal regulators and bureaucrats. The repeal of bill S.2184, the so-called
ergonomics rule for workspace injuries enacted under the Clinton administration, in the 107th Congress was
the first time Congress invoked the Congressional Review Act of 1996. This is a textbook case of how the
regulatory process can be influenced by outside forces through the legislative body (Skyzycki, 2003).
60http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/16/16greenwire-power-plant-union-asks-congress-to-delay-
epas-87699.html“Power Plant Union Asks Congress to Delay EPA’s Air Pollution Rules,” The New York
Times, May, 16, 2011.
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lobbying firms.61 Table 1.6Summary Statistics on the Lobbying Venues and the Lobbying
Patterns. [clear cases]table.1.6 shows the relationship between the lobbying option and
lobbying patterns. It indicates that groups are more likely to employ in-house lobbyists in
ex post lobbying and this is consistent with the expectation.62
Table 1.6: Summary Statistics on the Lobbying Venues and the Lobbying Patterns. [clear
cases]
Type Ex Ante(%) Ex Post(%) Number of Lobbying Reports
In-House 53.31 46.69 18,658
Lobbying Firms 58.40 41.60 28,150
Total 56.37 43.63 46,808
In sum, ex post lobbying is more prevalent when bills have more private and non-specific
characteristics, target federal regulators and bureaucrats, and hire in-house lobbyists. Also,
small and medium firms are more likely to engage in ex post lobbying activities than larger
firms and trade associations, according to their ex post ratios.
1.5 Conclusion
Despite the fact that interest groups continue to lobby after the passage of a bill in
Congress, scholarly research on post-vote interactions between special interest groups and
policy makers at the implementation stage is strikingly lacking. Current theories on lobbying
primarily focus on the pre-vote stage and leave a significant amount of lobbying unexplained.
This paper aims to fill that gap. By analyzing 633,731 lobbying reports filed between 1998
and 2012, I show that almost half of lobbying activity that targeted specific bills occurred
during the ex post stage. This paper also explains why special interest groups have an
incentive to lobby ex post. While some pieces of legislation are very specific about the
61de Figueiredo and Tiller (2001) show that if competitive proprietary information is revealed in the
lobbying process, firms are inclined to choose to lobby independently, instead of using trade associations.
62The difference in terms of lobbying pattern between in-house and lobbying firms is statistically significant
as well (t-statistic is 10.86 and p value < 0.001).
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duties of regulatory agencies, many provide only a general framework and do not provide
a great amount of detail on implementation itself. I argue that ex post lobbying aims to
extract non-specific private benefits from legislation.
Identifying ex post lobbying patterns brings forth the issue of the collective action prob-
lem among special interest groups because ex post lobbying provides a chance for those who
are inactive in ex ante lobbying to claim their shares from government policy. If special
interest groups face tradeoffs in exerting their efforts between ex ante and ex post stages,
an interesting question arises: Who pays the cost to obtain a desirable outcome at the
bill-passage stage? My model demonstrates that groups with larger market shares bear a
disproportionately high share of the burden at the ex ante lobbying stage and firms with
smaller market shares and limited resources are more likely to engage in ex post lobbying if
the private and non-specific benefits from the legislation are large. Empirical evidence from
the data about lobbying activities on the Dodd-Frank bill supports this prediction from the
model.
The main point and key contribution of this essay is that lobbying patterns are bill-
specific as well as group-specific. Even though lobbying activities are mainly concerned with
influencing government policy, attempts to integrate lobbying incentives with the contents
of legislation have been scarce. Also, there is little systematic empirical evidence of lobbying
behavior at the individual group level. This essay fills these gaps in the lobbying literature
by showing how legislative conditions such as bill content and individual-level constraints
affect the lobbying strategy of special interest groups.
Lobbying has become an everyday buzz word in the American media. Despite the intense
media attention and its significant consequences, we are left with two unresolved questions:
What is the exact mechanism of lobbying activities, and how can we measure the influence
of lobbying on policy? This paper tackles the first challenge and provides one mechanism of
how lobbying works. In particular, this paper shows that groups spend enormous resources
and energy on lobbying even after legislation has passed in the Congress. Subsequently, it
provides an explanation as to why groups engage in ex post lobbying. Understanding the
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mechanism of lobbying is important in preventing scholars from underestimating the volume
of lobbying activities by only measuring money spent before bills pass in Congress.
In this paper, I touched upon only one aspect of the dynamics of lobbying: timing. How-
ever, there are more issues to address in order to better understand the dynamic mechanism
of lobbying activities. How do lobbying activities differ between groups targeting govern-
ment procurement and groups trying to influence regulatory policies? How do industries
with greater homogenous preference differ in their lobbying strategies compared to groups
with more differentiated preferences? These are possible future research topics. The next
step after identifying the mechanism is to measure the efficacy of lobbying activities. It
is well-known that measuring the effect of lobbying activities on public policy is extremely
challenging. However, a better understanding of the lobbying mechanism will provide a
promising roadmap to measure the efficacy of lobbying in the future.
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2 | Options for Trade Protection/Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
Glassware and rubber footwear both benefit from special protection under U.S. trade
policy, yet the incidence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on rubber footwear is considerably
greater. Although there is a considerable variation in the specific policies governing protected
commodities, much less is known about how trade policy is developed for specific goods.
Since different instruments generate different incentive structures for rent-seeking and hence
have differential implications for social costs, a better theory is needed to explain the form
of specific trade policy. The task of this paper is to understand what conditions influence
the choice of protection instruments.
I argue that the choice of a specific form of protectionist policy is largely dependent upon
different levels of information available to voters. Specifically, when more information about
the protection of special interest groups is available to voters, politicians have a strong
incentive to set complex protectionist policies such as NTBs. This is because complex
instruments raise the challenger’s cost of revealing information on the incumbent’s favors
to special interest groups, and therefore, those favors are less likely to be detected. On the
other hand, simpler protection instruments which are economically “efficient,” such as tariffs,
are likely to be chosen when the supply of information to voters is limited.1
In the context of trade policy, this implies that when partisans are highly divided on
1Tariffs also generate a huge social deadweight loss, compared to free trade situation. When I say
“efficiency,” the word should be understood in terms of a relative perspective among different protection
instruments.
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the choice of a protectionist policy, incentives for the challenger to reveal the incumbent’s
favors to special interest groups are very high. Here, we expect to observe a more complex
form of protection policy. On the other hand, if Democrats and Republicans work together
on a particular legislation to protect a certain commodity, in other words when bipartisan
support is high, protectionist policies will be less complex because there will be diminished
incentives for partisans to exploit the opposition’s position on a particular policy proposal.
Theories that connect information and the level of favors to special interest groups have
been developed mainly by the information school of economists who stress the importance
of informational asymmetries between politicians and citizens. Citizens are presumed to be
poorly informed about the effects of various policies and types of politicians, and this leads
politicians to select inefficient and difficult-to-trace methods of redistribution over more
transparent and efficient methods (Coate and Morris, 1995).
From the perspective of the information school, asymmetric information between politi-
cians and voters is fairly constant across commodities so we should not expect to observe
variation in protection policies. However, since there are significant variations in terms of
protection policies—for example, some are only protected by high tariffs and others only
by NTBs—this implies that emphasis should be placed on institutional arrangements that
result in different amounts of information available to voters. Therefore, I ask, what insti-
tutional conditions provide more information to voters about politicians’ favors to special
interest groups?
According to the electoral competition model, a more intense competition among can-
didates leads to more information available to voters (Bowler and Donovan, 2011). A vote-
maximizing opponent has a great incentive to reveal the incumbent’s favors to special interest
groups in order to receive more votes. When the proportion of informed voters increases,
the complex form of protection can be an optimal choice for the incumbent candidate with
respect to voters and with special interest groups. First, the complex form of protection
policy is less visible and it is less clear how much it will affect voters’ welfare. This im-
plies that the opponent must pay more costs to reveal information on incumbent’s favors to
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interest group. Political competition thus generates biased information: It informs voters
about protectionist measures that have simple effects on consumer welfare but tells them
little about measures wit more complex effects (Kono, 2006). Regarding the relationship
with special interest groups, the complex policy can be a useful mechanism for legislators to
solve the political commitment problem (Dixit and Longregan, 1995; Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2001). High electoral competition means that future protection for a specific industry
cannot be guaranteed: If the challenger is elected in the next election, the protection may
disappear. In these circumstances, the complex policy has the advantage of drawing support
from special interest groups because the complex policy is difficult to identify and overhaul.
In the next section, I provide a theory that illustrates the incentive problems that incumbent
politicians face after the choice of a protection instrument.
2.2 Theory
If a transparent policy is socially desirable, why does the complex policy persist? Most
answers to this question have focused on the “information effect,” which stresses the informa-
tional asymmetries between politicians and citizens (Nelson, 1976; Tullock, 1989). But these
answers assume that informational asymmetry is constant across different issue areas, and
therefore, within the “informational school” framework it is hard to explain the variations
within inefficient policies.
That voters are imperfectly informed does not mean that they are irrational. Given
an informational structure, voters can rationally calculate costs and benefits. The level of
information available to voters, however, varies by issue area. The effects of trade policy are
particularly difficult to calculate and are rarely intuitively evident. For instance, suppose
that the government provides special subsidies to the automobile industry, and subsequently
consumer prices of cars suddenly rise. The public cannot simply blame government policy
because this rise in prices might come from some other macroeconomic factor such as a
change in exchange rates. Since the benefits or losses of the trade policy are more stochastic
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than other types of policies, citizens only observe a noisy signal of whether the policy was
warranted ex post.
Legislators face trade-offs because they must be responsive to constituent preferences,
and also cater to interest groups whose contributions help them secure reelection. This
framework of trade-offs was introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Their model
features a government with a small open economy that values both its population’s welfare
as well as campaign contributions from import-competing producers who gain from increased
protections. If we apply this framework to a given legislator, the legislator should care about
both the votes from voters and the money from interest groups in order to be elected. Failing
to pursue policies consistent with their constituent’s interest will diminish their chances of
reelection. Meanwhile, running for office is an expensive proposition, and interest group
contributions are one way through which legislators subsidize campaign costs. In order
for the marriage between legislators and interest groups to be successful, legislators must
demonstrate their commitment to interest groups’ goals. However, an interest group’s goals
are often in conflict with overall constituents’ interests. Therefore, when protection for
interest groups harms the welfare of voters, the legislator’s reelection chances fall as more
information about the legislator’s protection of interest groups is revealed. Then, under
what conditions is more information available to voters?
I argue that the lack of bipartisan support for protecting a certain industry leads to
more available information to voters and consequently, more complex protection instrument
is more likely to be adopted to meet the goal of players. In this case, the incentive for
the challenger to reveal the incumbent’s favors to interest groups is very high. At the
same time, interest groups face the greatest uncertainty about the future of their interests
when the forms of protections are highly dependent on the partisan composition of the
legislature. Here, we expect to observe a more complex form of protection policy. On the
other hand, if both Republicans and Democrats have interests in protecting an industry,
the muted difference between partisans suppressed the need for the complex policy because
neither Republicans nor Democrats have an electoral incentive to reveal those favors to
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voters during the campaign. This implies that the level of available information to voters
is lower than when the parties disagree on commodity protection policies. Therefore, when
bipartisan support exists, protectionist policy should be less complex because there will be
diminished incentives for partisans to exploit the opposition’s position on a particular policy
proposal.2
Then, how does the complex policy serve the legislator’s goal? A commitment problem
exists among a group of actors if they can improve their situation by committing themselves
to follow a particular course of action but are unable to do so (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2001). To draw support from interest groups, legislators must solve this commitment prob-
lem. Incumbent legislators cannot guarantee their re-election, and if the challenger is elected,
interest groups cannot know for certain whether the current special protection will be ab-
rogated or reduced as a consequence of the incumbent’s defeat. Complex policy has the
advantage of being difficult to undo by future legislatures. Complexity solves the com-
mitment problem by ensuring that protections remain in place whether or not they secure
reelection. The problem is solved because the legislator provides protections to a commodity
that are difficult for future legislatures to identify and overturn and, in exchange, receives
the contributions she needs to fund her reelection campaign.
Before moving to the next section, more clarity about the complexity in protectionist
policy is warranted. Complexity in protection policy can be understood in several ways. The
approach I take here is to make comparisons between tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
Trade policy analysts distinguish between three broad forms of protections: tariffs; core non-
tariff barriers such as anti-dumping laws, quotas, and voluntary export restraints (VERs);
and quality NTBs, including packing requirements, inspections and testing (Bhagwati, 1967;
Baldwin, 1970; Kono, 2006). Tariffs are simple taxes with straightforward effects: a 20% ad
2Some readers may wonder why special interests do not always prefer the complex form of policy, if it
is more durable. However, there are tradeoffs between the amount of rent that special interests can extract
(efficiency from the perspective of special interests) and the duration. Becker shows why interest groups
have an incentive to have an efficient rent-seeking policy (Becker, 1983). While the simple form of policy can
be more efficient but less durable, the complex form of policy is less efficient but more durable. Given these
tradeoffs, political conditions affect the incentives of special interest groups to prefer one over the other. I
tackle this issue in detail in the model section.
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Valorem tariff raises import prices by 20%. Although quotas and other VERs, like tariffs,
unambiguously hurt consumers by raising prices on imports, it is much more difficult for
consumers to say how much these measures increase prices. The welfare effects of quality
NTBs are even more difficult to fathom.
Conventional wisdom in political economy suggests that once an economic policy is
introduced, it is likely to persist. Coate and Morris (1999) provide one explanation for
this persistence by arguing that when an economic policy is introduced, agents will often
respond by undertaking actions in order to benefit from it. These actions increase their
willingness to pay for the policy in the future. Rodrik argues that the probability that a
policy reform is kept in place in the future will depend positively on the responsiveness of
private investment in the reform when it is initially introduced (Rodrik, 1991). Different
protection policy instruments will generate different incentive structures for rent-seeking
and hence will have differential impacts on social costs. Complex policy makes it difficult
for citizens to scrutinize what favors are granted to special interest groups, which allows
inefficient policy to continue without any reform. If citizens could easily identify and directly
vote on the magnitude of gains and losses and the identities of winners and losers from
trade restrictions, there is little doubt that inefficient policies would not persist. Calls
for reform often center on the desirability of simplification. Particularly on import policy,
there has been a long demand for greater transparency: simple and readily understandable
border measures (tariffs) are preferred over more opaque measures such as quotas and hidden
protections through standards or other measures (Krueger and Duncan, 1993).
2.3 An Example: Two Cases
Before we move to the model, I present some concrete examples of how partisan politics
affect the form of protections. The first example is the case where bipartisan support exists:
orange juice. Juice processors in the U.S. purchase about 95% of Florida’s fresh orange
production. If we look at Florida’s GDP by industry, agriculture accounts for 22%, making
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it the second biggest section after services (24%).3 If we look at campaign contributions
and lobbying in the 1998 election cycle, the fruit and vegetable industry contributed $1.036
million to all candidates nationwide. Of the total, 67% went to Republican candidates and
33% went to Democrats. However, Florida’s contribution was more balanced. Among the
largest contributors, Florida Citrus Mutual contributed 57% to Democrats and 43% to Re-
publican candidates in Florida’s elections.4 Given employment conditions and contribution
schedules, it is in both parties’ interests to support Florida’s main industry and it is highly
risky to oppose any trade protection on orange juice.
The history of orange juice protection clearly shows this dynamic. The Smoot-Hawley
Act (Tariff Act) in 1930 initiated the frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) citrus tariff.
There had been no change in citrus tariff until 1947 when the General Agreement Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) was agreed in Geneva, Switzerland.(VanGrasstek, 2001).
There were several attempts to reduce or eliminate the citrus tariff in the 60s and the
70s. But both attempts did not succeed. When the 103rd Congress passed the NAFTA
bill, it still included special provisions for citrus. These provisions granted a 15-year phase-
out on import tariffs.5 Muraro, Spreen, and Roka (2000) estimate that transportation
costs and the Florida equalization tax add an additional 10 cents to the cost of delivered
product to the United States. The effect of bipartisan support for protecting the orange
juice industry through high tariffs can be found in the domestic and import share of U.S.
orange juice supply, 1985 - 1999. Despite the intense trade liberalization and various trade
deals, domestic production has increased from 46% in 1985 to 62 % in 1999, while imports
have decreased from 37% in 1985 to 16% in 1999 (Donovan and Krissoff, 2003).
The example of partisan politics in trade protection comes from the automobile industry.
While Democrats strongly support import protections on automobile industries, Republicans
rarely express support for this issue. Campaign contributions by the United Auto Workers
3Source: US Census Bureau
4Source: opensecrets.org
5Source: http://flcitrusmutual.com/industry-issues/trade/fcojtariff.aspx
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(UAW), for example, show a stark difference in their preferences: Of all 207 law makers
receiving campaign contributions from the UAW PAC in 2008, only of two are Republicans
(Senator Arlen Specter and Representative Frank LoBiondo).6. Also, due to the character-
istics of the industry, auto workers are concentrated in specific districts where unions play
a significant role and strongly support the Democratic party. These partisan characteris-
tics of trade protection on the automobile industry bring fierce debates whenever bills on
automobile-industry protection come to the floor.
Final voting patterns also elucidate the partisan characteristics of automobile protec-
tion. In early February 1982, UAW-backed “domestic content” legislation was introduced
in Congress (H.R.5133 ), which would have required import restrictions, so-called “quotas.”
H.R. 5133 passed the House on December 15 by a vote of 215 to 188, mostly along partisan
lines.7 On 2 February 1983, Congressman Richard Ottinger (D-NY) again introduced do-
mestic content legislation, essentially identical to H.R. 5133, entitled the Fair Practices in
Automotive Products Act (H.R.1234). On November 3, 1983, by a vote of 219 to 199, again
along partisan lines, the House passed H.R.1234.8
It is well known that the competitiveness of the U.S. automobile industry has been in
decline, and employment by the six major domestic auto producers has dropped each year
since 1979. But the market share of imports indicates that protection measures are “effective”
in a sense to protect domestic markets. The market share of imports was 15.2% in 1979 and
rose to 22.2% by 1980. But introducing VER (voluntary export restraints. e.g. one kind of
NTBs) effectively reduced the market share of imports to 18.9% in 1984 (Crandall, 1987).
6Source: opensecret.org. Arlen Specter (R-PA) was the most liberal Republican Senator based on his roll
call voting record at that time (later, he “finally” switched to Democratic party) and Representative Frank
Lobiondo (R-NJ) was the third most liberal House Republican in the 110th Congress (2007-2008). Source:
voteview.com
7In the 97th Congress (January 3, 1981-January 3, 1983), there were 244 Democrats and 191 Republicans
in the House. For H.R.5133, 170 Democrats supported the bill and 44 opposed it, whereas 57 Republicans
supported the bill and 131 opposed it.
8In the 98th Congress (January 3, 1983-January 3, 1985), there were 272 Democrats and 163 Republicans
in the House. For H.R.1234, 187 Democrats supported the bill and 32 opposed it, whereas 67 Republicans
supported the bill and 132 opposed it (http://beta.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/1234).
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Protection measures on automobiles, including the frequency of NTBs shows a substantially
higher percentage of NTB use (64% in 2008).
2.4 The Model
I investigate the equilibrium policy choices under two different political situations and
examine the implications of equilibrium policy choices for social welfare. The timing of the
model is as follows. First, nature determines θ ∈ {A,B} whether bipartisan support exists
or not. An industry then offers a menu of campaign contribution schedules, k. Given the
menu of campaign contribution schedules, an incumbent chooses a protectionist instrument,
σ, to maximize its probability of reelection. Then voters cast their votes, taking into account
the signal they received from the incumbent’s behavior.
2.4.1 Set Up
• Actors = {an industry, an incumbent politician, and a representative citizen}
• Time: Infinite repeated game.
• States: There are two possible states of nature, θ - partisan (A) or bipartisan (B).
Nature determines this.
• The Incumbent: There is a public policy which favors the industry but is costly to
citizens at large. The incumbent can choose to introduce the policy or not, and if he
introduces it he then decides between using tariff or NTBs. Denote the incumbent
choice as σ ∈ {0, T,N}. This policy is chosen by the incumbent politician in each
period. This policy choice gives a signal to voters about the incumbent’s behavior.
At the end of the period, the incumbent faces an election against another politician.
The winner then becomes the incumbent in the next period. The outcome of the
election is determined by the voting decision of the representative citizen. Holding
an office is valued by politicians and they derive utility from ego rent γ. Hence by
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promising not to reelect the incumbent if he introduces the policy, the citizen has some
influence on the policy decision. However, the firm can lobby the incumbent politician.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), this lobbying takes the form of the firm
offering the incumbent politicians “political contributions” (bribes) to influence their
choice. Thus, a politician in office receiving bribe κ obtains a utility γ+κ. Therefore,
in deciding whether to introduce the policy, the incumbent must tradeoff the benefits
of the contribution with the costs of losing office. Politicians discount future utility
at rate δp. Once ousted from office, a politician cannot run again. The incumbent
politician’s utility function is:
maxσ
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(σ) + γ(σ)] (2.1)
 incumbent’s choice variables: σ = {0, T,N}.
• The Industry: Assume the industry to be an import-competing and declining in-
dustry. The industry decides the bribe schedule κ depending on their expected utility
from the incumbent’s policy choice and the bribe they need to pay to implement the
protection policy. The expected utility from the protection policy depends on the state
of the nature (θ) and the types of protection policy (σ) that the incumbent chooses.
The industry offers bribes if and only if their expected utility is greater than the com-
pensation on the ego rents for the incumbent, δP γ1−δP . Assume that the rent (Rσ) under
the Tariff regime is RT and the rent under the NTB regime is RN , where RT > RN .
Assume there is no rent if the incumbent does not introduce any protection policy,
that is R0 = 0. However, if the incumbent chooses Tariff, the signal to voters of these
favors is greater than when the incumbent chooses NTB. And the difference becomes
greater under partisan circumstances because the challenger has more incentive to re-
veal that information to voters. Therefore, the industry trades off the amount of rent
they can extract and the duration of favors if the incumbent introduces the policy. I
assume that the firm discounts future profits at a rate δF . Under each regime, the
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bribing schedule is as follows:
κ0,θ =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1F [EU
s
0,θ −
δPγ
1− δP ] (2.2)
κT,θ =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1F [EU
s
T,θ −
δPγ
1− δP ] (2.3)
κN,θ =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1F [EU
s
N,θ −
δPγ
1− δP ] (2.4)
Expected utility can be represented in a more concrete way such as:
EU s0,θ = mτ (0, θ) ·R0 = 0 (2.5)
EU sT,θ = mτ (T, θ) ·RT (2.6)
EU sN,θ = mτ (N, θ) ·RN (2.7)
, where mτ (0, θ) means a voting rule by the representative citizen. If we plug 2.6Set
Upequation.2.4.5 through 2.7Set Upequation.2.4.5 into 2.3Set Upequation.2.4.2 through
2.4Set Upequation.2.4.2, we have a complete bribing schedule of the industry:
κ0,θ =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1F [0−
δPγ
1− δP ] (2.8)
κT,θ =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1F [mτ (T, θ) ·RT −
δPγ
1− δP ] (2.9)
κN,θ =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1F [mτ (N, θ) ·RN −
δPγ
1− δP ] (2.10)
κ∗(m) = max
{
0, κσ,θ
}
 industry’s choice variable: κ.
• The representative citizen: I assume the social cost that is caused by trade pro-
tection, c, that the representative citizen should bear is equal to the expected utility
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of the industry, that is,
c = EU sσ,θ (2.11)
The citizen discounts future costs at rate δc and the citizen’s lifetime utility will be
−
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1C c = −
[ c
1− δC
]
(2.12)
In each period, the voter’s sole decision is whether to reelect the incumbent. Fol-
lowing standard procedure in the political agency literature, I assume that at the
beginning of each period the citizen commits to a voting rule and chooses it so as
to maximize his expected future utility. I assume that the citizen will observe the
policy decision of the politician and the state of the nature. He does not observe
the bribe offered to the politician. Thus, a period τ voting rule mτ is a vector
[mτ (0, A),mτ (0, B),mτ (T,A),mτ (N,A),mτ (T,B),mτ (N,B)].
mτ (σ, θ) is the probability that the citizen reelects the period τ incumbent if στ =
σ, θτ = θ. Then we have an ordering in terms of the incumbent’s vote share from the
citizen depending on the incumbent’s choice and the state of the nature:
mτ (0, A) = mτ (0, B) > mτ (T,B) = mτ (N,B) > mτ (N,A) > mτ (T,A)
Or depending on the state of the nature,
mτ (0, A) > mτ (N,A) > mτ (T,A), if θ = A
mτ (0, B) > mτ (T,B) = mτ (N,B) if θ = B
The rationale on this ordering is as follows. First, if the incumbent does not introduce
any protection policy, the state of the nature θ does not affect the voter’s voting
rule. Therefore, mτ (0, A) = mτ (0, B). Second, under the partisan circumstance in
protecting the industry, choosing a tariff regime gives a more visible signal to voters
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than a NTB regime in terms of favors that the incumbent provides to SIG. NTBs are
less visible and therefore are less likely to be detected by voters. Since the challenger
has an incentive to reveal those favors, types of protection instruments determine
the vote share that the incumbent could receive from the voters. Therefore, we have
mτ (N,A) > mτ (T,A). Third, under the bipartisan state of the nature, the challenger
has no incentive to reveal the favors that the incumbent provides to SIG because he
would also provide those favors to SIG if elected. Given this lack of incentive, I assume
the types of protection instruments do not make a big difference. For simplicity, I
assume that mτ (T,B) = mτ (N,B).9
 a representative citizen’s choice variable: mτ (σ, θ)
At the beginning of period τ , the partisan nature of protection, θ, is revealed. That
is, θ is exogenous. The sequence of events is as follows. First, the citizen announces
his voting rule, mτ ∈ [0, 1]6. Next, the firm offers the incumbent a bribe, κτ ∈ <+,
for choosing to implement the policy between T or N, depending on the state of the
nature. Then, the incumbent politician makes a policy decision, στ ∈ {0, T,N}.
Since we have already described payoffs, we have a complete description of the game.
The standard solution concept for such an infinite-horizon perfect-information game
is subgame perfect equilibrium. Strategies in a subgame perfect equilibrium might
depend upon history in complex ways. However, the partisan nature in protecting
the industry is the only payoff relevant state variable in the model. Thus I focus on
Markov-perfect equilibria, where actions depend only on within-period histories and
the partisan nature of the protection.
Under this assumption, the citizen’s voting strategy is a mapping µ : {σ, θ} → [0, 1]6.
So that in any period τ , the incumbent faces the reelection probability mτ = µ(θ).
A bribing strategy for the industry is a mapping ψ : θ × [0, 1]6 → <+, implying that
9It may be still true that mτ (N,B) > mτ (T,B) with the condition that |mτ (N,B) − mτ (T,B)| <
|mτ (N,A)−mτ (B,A)|. I consider this general case in the extension.
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in any period τ , the bribe offered to the politician is κτ = ψ(θ,mτ ). A strategy for
the politician is a mapping ρ : {θ} × [0, 1]6 × <+ → {0, T,N}, implying that the
politician’s period τ policy decision is στ = ρ(θ,mτ , κτ ). A strategy profile (µ, ψ, ρ)
is a (Markov-perfect) equilibrium if, after any history, each player’s strategy under
the profile is optimal, given that he expects all other players to use their equilibrium
strategies.
2.4.2 Solving the Equilibrium
Case 1: Partisan Nature of the Protection
Nature determines that there exist partisan politics on protecting the industry. θ = A
and all the relevant parameters are realized. The underlying logic is as follows. The citizen,
because he must always pay the cost if the protection policy is introduced, provides the
maximum incentive for the politician not to introduce protection by promising to always
reelect him if and only if he does not implement the policy. The politician, in deciding
whether to introduce the policy in any period, trades off the gain from accepting the bribe
with the future gain (ego rent, γ) from not implementing the policy. The industry compares
its willingness to pay for the policy with the minimum bribe it has to pay to get the policy
enacted and to make the incumbent choose her most preferred policy instrument if enacted.
Whether the policy is implemented in equilibrium depends on whether the industry’s equi-
librium willingness to pay for the policy exceeds the minimum bribe necessary to get it
enacted. We now have:
Proposition 3. The following strategies constitute a Markov-perfect equilibrium. The citi-
zen always reelects the incumbent if and only if he does not introduce the policy. Once the
politician introduces the protection policy and if the choice is Tariff (T), which is visible,
the citizen never reelect him. However, if the choice is N, the citizen can make a mistake
in his judgment due to the obscure and complex nature of N. Therefore, there is a positive
vote share that the incumbent politician could get from the voter. The politician introduces
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the policy and chooses N if and only if he is offered a bribe equal to κ∗(m). The industry
offers the politician a bribe equal to κ∗(m), if they decide to bribe.
Formally, the equilibrium strategy for the citizen is:
µ(θ = A) =

mτ (0, A) = 1 if σ = 0
mτ (T,A) = 0 if σ = T
mτ (N,A) = α, 0 < α < 1 if σ = N
The equilibrium strategy for the industry is:
ψ(θ = A) =
 0 if σ = {0, T}κ∗(m) if σ = N
The equilibrium strategy for the incumbent politician is:
ρ(m,κ) =
 0 if κ = 0N if κ = κ∗(m)
Proof of the Proposition 3prop.3. I show that the strategies (µ, ψ, ρ) described in Propo-
sition 3prop.3 constitute a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game. I need to show that,
after any history, each player’s strategy is optimal, given that he expects all players to use
their equilibrium strategies in the future.
First, observe that when the citizen uses the voting strategy µ(θ) = (1, 0, α), the mini-
mum bribe necessary to get the (preferred) policy implemented is
k∗(m) = 0 if σ = 0, since k∗ = max
{
0,− δPγ
(1− δF )(1− δP )
}
k∗(m) = 0 if σ = T, since k∗ = max
{
0,− δPγ
(1− δF )(1− δP )
}
k∗(m) =
αRN − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF if σ = N, since k
∗ = max
{
0,
αRN − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF
}
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We can easily show that
αRN− δP γ(1−δP )
1−δF > 0.
10
Given this voting rule and the bribing schedule, we can calculate the politician’s utility
and determine his optimal strategy. The incumbent politician’s utility function is defined
as:
max
σ
=
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(σ) + γ(σ)] (2.13)
If he chooses σ = 0, he receives γ because the citizen always reelects him. There is no bribe
from the industry. Then the utility is
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(0) + γ(0)] =
γ
1− δP if σ = 0 (2.14)
Under σ = 0, the utility of the citizen = 0 and the utility of the industry is 0 as well.
If he chooses σ = T , he receives zero ego rent because the citizen never reelect him. Also,
there is no bribe from the industry. Then the utility is
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(T ) + γ(T )] = 0 if σ = T (2.15)
Under σ = T , the utility of the citizen is 0 and the utility of the industry is 0 as well.
If he chooses σ = N , he receives some ego rent because there is a positive probability
that the citizen reelects him. Also, there is a bribe from the industry. Then the utility is
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(N) + γ(N)] =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P
[αRN − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF + αγ
]
if σ = N (2.16)
Under σ = N , the utility of the citizen is - c1−δC and the utility of the industry is
αRN− δP γ(1−δP )
1−δF , where c =
αRN
1−δF holds.
The last step of the proof is to check the optimality of proposed strategies. From 2.14Case
10The steps are follow as.
αRN− δP γ(1−δP )
1−δF =
αRN (1−δP )−δP γ
(1−δP )(1−δF ) . We know that (1− δP ) and (1− δF ) are both
positive since 0 < δF , δP < 1. Therefore, to be larger than 0, the numerator should be larger than 0. The
condition is αRN (1− δP )− δP γ > 0 and if we rearrange the formula, we get αRN − δP (αRN − γ) which is
larger than 0 since 1 > δP and αRN > αRN − γ.
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1: Partisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.14 and 2.15Case 1: Partisan Nature of the
Protectionequation.2.4.15, we notice that there is no incentive to deviate from σ = 0 to
σ = T . From 2.15Case 1: Partisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.15 and 2.16Case 1:
Partisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.16, we can verify that once the protection pol-
icy is introduced, N is the optimal choice. Now compare 2.14Case 1: Partisan Nature of the
Protectionequation.2.4.14 and 2.16Case 1: Partisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.16
to check whether there is any incentive to deviate from this strategy. For the proposed
strategy to be an equilibrium, I exploit the indifference condition:
γ
1− δP =
1
δP
[αRN − δP γ1−δP
1− δF + αγ
]
(2.17)
To simplify the problem, I assume that every player has the same discount utility, that is, δ =
δF = δP = δC . Then equation 2.17Case 1: Partisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.17
is simplified as
γ =
αRN (1− δ)
δ2 − δ − 1 (2.18)
Let λ = 1−δ
δ2−δ+1 and we can show that this constant λ moves from 1 to 0 as δ moves from 0
to 1 as appeared in Figure 2.1Comparative Statics for Discount Factor, δfigure.2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Comparative Statics for Discount Factor, δ.
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Equation 2.18Case 1: Partisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.18 is presented as:
γ∗ = α∗R∗N · λ, λ =
1− δ
δ2 − δ + 1 (2.19)
Given the discount factor, δ, equation 2.19Case 1: Partisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.19
indicates the relationship between the ego rent (γ), the obscurity of NTBs and the voting
rule (α), and the amount of rent extraction under N regime (RN ) in equilibrium. When the
incumbent is very impatient, e.g. δ → 0, λ is approaching 1, γ∗ ≈ α∗R∗N . This means that
whenever the bribe is larger than the ego rent (γ), we see the protection equilibrium where
the incumbent introduces the protection policy and chooses N as an instrument. On the
other hand, if the incumbent is very patient, e.g., δ → 1, λ is approaching 0, and to make
the equation γ∗ = α∗R∗N · λ hold RN should be almost infinity.11
From these two extreme cases, we can generalize that as the incumbent becomes patient,
a larger bribing schedule deriving from the larger rent extraction under N regime should
be guaranteed to maintain the protection equilibrium. As the ego rent (γ) from holding an
office increases more than the equilibrium level (γ∗), we are more likely to see only the free
trade equilibrium.12, given the discount factor. As the amount of rent extraction (RN > R∗N )
increases and as the NTBs give obscure signals about the incumbent’s behavior (α > α∗),
we are more likely to have only the protectionist equilibrium.
Case 2: Bipartisan Nature of the Protection
Nature determines that there exist partisan politics on protecting the industry. θ = B
and all the relevant parameters are determined according to this realization.
Proposition 4. The following strategies constitute a Markov-perfect equilibrium. The citi-
zen always reelects the incumbent if and only if he does not introduce the policy. Once the
11Since 0 < α < 1, the influence of α is minor.
12Barro, Ferejohn’s control of politician model.
62
politician introduces the protection policy, the citizen would never want to reelect him in
principle. However, the bipartisan nature of the protection makes this clear cut judgment
difficult. Also, the bipartisan state of nature makes the choice between T and N indifferent.
Therefore, the same positive vote share exists that the incumbent politician could get from
the voter when she introduces the protection instrument. The politician introduces the policy
and chooses T regime if and only if he is offered a bribe equal to κ∗(m). The industry offers
the politician a bribe equal to κ∗(m), if they decide to bribe.
Formally, the equilibrium strategy for the representative citizen is
µ(θ = B) =

mτ (0, B) = 1 if σ = 0
mτ (T,B) = β if σ = T
mτ (N,B) = β, 0 < α < β < 1 if σ = N
The equilibrium strategy for the industry is:
ψ(θ = B) =

0 if σ = 0
κT,B if σ = T
κN,B if σ = N
The equilibrium strategy for the incumbent politician is:
ρ(m,κ) =
 0 if κ = 0T if κ = κ∗(m)
Proof of the Proposition 4. I show that the strategies (µ, ψ, ρ) described in the propo-
sition 4prop.4 constitute a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game.
First, observe that when the citizen uses the voting strategy µ(θ) = (1, β, β), the mini-
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mum bribe necessary to get the (preferred) policy implemented is
k∗(m) = 0 if σ = 0, since k∗ = max
{
0,− δPγ
(1− δF )(1− δP )
}
k∗(m) =
βRT − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF if σ = T, since k
∗ = max
{
0,
βRT − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF
}
k∗(m) =
βRN − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF if σ = N, since k
∗ = max
{
0,
βRT − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF
}
We can easily show that
βRT− δP γ(1−δP )
1−δF > 0 and
βRN− δP γ(1−δP )
1−δF > 0.
13
Given this voting rule and the bribing schedule, we can calculate the politician’s utility
and determine his optimal strategy. The incumbent politician’s utility function is defined
as:
maxσ =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(σ) + γ(σ)] (2.20)
If he chooses σ = 0, he receives γ because the citizen always reelects him. There is no
bribe from the industry. Then the politician’s utility is
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(0) + γ(0)] =
γ
1− δP if σ = 0 (2.21)
Under σ = 0, the utility of the citizen = 0 and the utility of the industry is 0 as well.
If the politician chooses σ = T , he receives partial ego rent because the citizen reelects
him with a positive probability due to the bipartisan nature of the protection. Also, there
is some bribe from the industry. Then the politician’s utility is
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(T ) + γ(T )] =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [βγ +
βRT − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF ] if σ = T (2.22)
Under σ = T , the utility of the citizen is - c1−δC where c =
βRT
1−δF . The utility of the
13The steps are follow as.
βRT− δP γ(1−δP )
1−δF =
βRT (1−δP )−δP γ
(1−δP )(1−δF ) . We know that (1− δP ) and (1− δF ) are both
positive since 0 < δF , δP < 1. Therefore, to be larger than 0, the numerator should be larger than 0. The
condition is δRT (1 − δP ) − δP γ > 0 and if we rearrange the formula, we get αRT − δP (αRT − γ) which is
larger than 0 since 1 > δP and βRT > βRT − γ. The same logic can be applied to the case of RN .
64
industry is
βRT− δP γ(1−δP )
1−δF .
If the chooses σ = N , he receives some of ego rent because there is a positive probability
that the citizen reelects him. Also, there is a bribe from the industry. Then the politician’s
utility is
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P [κ(N) + γ(N)] =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1P
[
βγ +
βRN − δP γ(1−δP )
1− δF
]
if σ = N (2.23)
Under σ = N , the utility of the citizen is - c1−δC and the utility of the industry is
βRN− δP γ(1−δP )
1−δF , where c =
βRN
1−δF holds.
The last step of the proof is to check the optimality of the proposed strategies. From
the equations 2.22Case 2: Bipartisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.22 and 2.23Case
2: Bipartisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.23, we notice that there is no incentive
to choose σ = N over σ = T . We can verify that once the protection policy is introduced, T
is the optimal choice because it increases the utility of the incumbent without affecting the
voting probability of the citizen. Also the industry prefers T over N since it gives higher net
utility. Now compare 2.21Case 2: Bipartisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.21 and
2.22Case 2: Bipartisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.22 to check whether there is
any incentive to deviate from each strategy. To make the proposed strategy an equilibrium,
I exploit the indifference condition:
γ
1− δP =
1
δP
[
βγ +
αRT − δP γ1−δP
1− δF
]
(2.24)
To simplify the problem, I assume that every player has the same discount utility,
that is, δ = δF = δP = δC . Then the equation 2.17Case 1: Partisan Nature of the
Protectionequation.2.4.17 is simplified as
γ =
βRT (1− δ)
δ2 − δ − 1 (2.25)
Put λ = 1−δ
δ2−δ+1 and we can identify that this constant λ moves from 1 to 0 as δ moves
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from 0 to 1 as we already see in the figure 1.
Equation 2.25Case 2: Bipartisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.25 is given by:
γ∗ = β∗R∗N · λ, λ =
1− δ
δ2 − δ + 1 (2.26)
Given discount factor, δ, equation 2.26Case 2: Bipartisan Nature of the Protectionequation.2.4.26
represents the relationship between the ego rent (γ), the obscurity of Tariff regime due to the
bipartisan nature of the protection and the voting rule from it (β) and the amount of rent
extraction under T regime (RT ) at the equilibrium. When the incumbent is very impatient,
e.g., δ → 0, λ is approaching 1, γ∗ ≈ β∗R∗T . That means when the bribe is larger than the
ego rent (γ), we see the protection equilibrium where the incumbent introduces the protec-
tion policy and chooses T as an instrument. Compare this outcome with the equilibrium
in the partisan state of the world. There, we have γ∗ ≈ α∗R∗N . Given the same discount
factor δ, and therefore the same λ, it implies that it is easier to tilt into the protection
equilibrium under the bipartisan nature than the partisan nature since βRT > αRN holds.
This is intuitive in the sense that under the bipartisan nature of the protection, the election
does not provide a proper punishment mechanism and the choice of instrument does not
affect the signaling function due to bipartisan aspect. Therefore, at the cost of the citizen
at large, there is a higher chance of experiencing a protection equilibrium when both the
incumbent and the challenger in the next period support protection of the industry.
On the other hand, if the incumbent is very patient, e.g., δ → 1, λ is approaching 0, and
to make the equation γ∗ = β∗R∗T · λ hold, RT should be almost infinity. Since βRT > αRN
still holds, there is more likely to be a protection equilibrium than under the partisan nature
of the protection. However, as λ→ 0, the influence of β and RT is minor and therefore the
outcome in the partisan and bipartisan worlds will be very similar if the incumbent is very
patient. The implication is similar to the case of the partisan nature of the equilibrium.
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2.5 Hypothesis and Data
2.5.1 Hypothesis
This paper tests one main hypothesis: where there are bipartisan support to protect
a commodity, there will be simpler forms of protectionist policies. If this hypothesis is
borne out, it provides support for the argument that legislators implement complex protec-
tions policies when more information could be provided to voters about legislators’ favors to
special interests due to the partisan nature of the protection. In summary, different polit-
ical conditions generate different information-provision incentives, which in turn determine
protection policy choices.
In this project, I investigate the case of U.S. commodities traded from 1993 to 1999.
All trade barrier data are from the United Nations Commission on Trade and Develop-
ment(UNCTAD)’s Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS). UNCTAD-TRAINS
is a comprehensive computerized information system at the Harmonized System-based tariff
line level covering tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff measures as well as import flows by origin
for more than 140 countries.14
2.5.2 Dependent Variable: NTB Coverage Ratios
The dependent variable of interest here is the complexity of protectionist policies. TRAINS
data provide detailed information on all types of trade protections. Trade protections can
be divided into two main divisions: tariffs and non-tariff barriers. NTBs include price non-
tariff barriers, quantity non-tariff barriers (e.g., quotas), and quality nontariff barriers (e.g.,
packing standards). Measuring the restrictiveness of a trade policy is a difficult task, es-
pecially for NTBs. Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) provide a unified measure of trade
restrictiveness that accounts for different forms of trade protection and their method allows
us to disentangle how one commodity is protected by tariffs and NTBs. The overall level of
14For more details on UNCTAD-TRAINS dataset, see the Appendix E.
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protection on imports on good n is given by:
Tij = aveij + tij (2.27)
, where Tij is the overall level of protection on imports of good j in a year i ; aveij is the tariff
equivalent level of NTBs and Tij is the applied on good j in a year i. Based on this equation,
I construct the NTBs Ratio, which is defined as aveijTij , that shows the relative frequency of
NTB use out of total protection. Figure 2.2Distribution of NTB Coverage Ratiofigure.2.2
shows the distribution of NTB coverage ratios across different commodities.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of NTB Coverage Ratio.
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2.5.3 Independent Variable: Partisan or Bipartisan Conditions
The theory presented here includes one principle independent variable of interest: whether
there exists a bipartisan support on the protection of specific commodities. I employ two
indexes to measure the partisan nature of the protection. First, I follow Fordham and
McKweon (2003), who study the division of partisan support for protections on various
commodities. Some commodity lobbies contribute exclusively (or at least overwhelmingly)
to one party over another, while others’ contributions are more evenly spread across parties.
Their work investigated whether protections on specific items have clear partisan divisions
based on Congressional roll-call voting data on five trade bills.15
Each contribution has been coded by the Standard Industrialization Classification (SIC)
sector from which it originated, producing data on the amount contributed by interests
within a particular sector to each member of Congress. Then they ran a logit model to assess
how these contribution schedules predict trading voting. The following tables 2.1Sectoral
Association With Each Partytable.2.1 and 2.2Classification of Commodities by Geographic
Constituencytable.2.2 display a list of the sectoral contributions associated with each party
and a similar list of geographic areas.
My argument implies that there is little chance of bipartisan support when roll-call
vote outcomes for protectionist policies can be predicted simply by knowing the partisan
composition of the legislature. Accordingly, I include an indicator variable that takes a
value of 1 when Fordham and McKweon (2003) found that partisanship was a statistically
significant determinant of the roll-call vote for protections policy.
Second, I use another variable to measure the sectoral affiliation with the party. I
collect the PAC contributions reported to the Federal Election Committee (FEC) from the
1992 to 1998 election cycles that match exactly with the period of the trade barriers and
15Fordham and McKweon (2003) code PAC’s contribution for 1978-1988 by the SIC sector from which
it originated, producing data on the amount contributed by representatives of a particular sector to each
member of Congress. Then they chose five trade bills in the 1981-1983 Congress to see whether contribution
patterns can predict the partisan congressional voting pattern. The five bills are: (1) H.R.3398; (2) H.R.1562;
(3) H.R.1562; (4) H.R.3; (5) H.R.4328.
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Table 2.1: Sectoral Association With Each Party
Democratic Party Republican Party
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 07 Agricultural Services
33 Primary Metal Industries 12 Coal Mining
37 Transportation Equipment 17 Special Trade Contractors
41 Local and Suburban Transit 26 Paper Products
44 Water Transportation 31 Leather and Leather Products
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment
54 Food Stores 36 Electronic and Other Electric Equipment
56 Clothing Stores 46 Pipelines, except natural gas
73 Business Services 50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods
75 Auto Repair, Services, and Parking 59 Miscellaneous retail
Note: Numbers indicate the 3 digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIG). The table comes from Ford-
ham and McKweon (2003).
Table 2.2: Classification of Commodities by Geographic Constituency
Democratic Party Republican Party
131 Cotton 115 Corn
132 Tobacco Farms 24 Dairy Farms
21 Livestock, except Dairy and Poultry 28 Chemicals and Allied Products
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete 36 Electronic and Other Chemicals
Note: The table comes from Fordham and McKweon (2003).
calculate the percentage that goes to the Democratic party. As the percentage diverges from
equality (50%), it means a given PAC has a partisan tendency in their contribution and I
use this measure as a proxy for whether there is partisan or bipartisan protection.16. It is
well known that “Ideology/Single Issue” PACs contribute to only one party and therefore
I exclude Ideology/Single Issue PACs. The distribution of PAC contributions going to the
Democratic party in each election cycle is presented in Figure 3. Even after excluding
Ideology/Single Issue PACs, we still see relatively high pikes in the extreme but overall,
there is a significant variation in terms of democratic contribution ratios across industrial
16Followings are the simple summary statistics for the democratic percentage of contributions: 60.5
(26.41%) in 1992, 69.73 (25.13%) in 1994, 37.87 (26.65%) in 1996, and 41.08 (27.37%) in 1998. A large
shift from 1994 to 1996 reflects the fact that the Republican party became the majority in the House for the
first time since the 1950s.
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Figure 2.3: PAC Democratic Contribution Percentage Distribution, excluding Ideology PAC
2.5.4 Control Variables
The first control variable is “route of passage.” Hufbaueer, Berliner, and Elliot (1986)
enumerate five routes through which trade policy is formed, depending on the degree of
presidential authority to enact the protection. Research on American trade politics suggests
that the rise of free trade policies in the U.S., beginning early in the twentieth century, is
partially attributable to increased levels of executive discretion over such matters. Applying
similar logic to protectionist policies, the form should be simpler when the president is
granted greater authority to set protection policy.17 Also including the variable, route of
17There are five routes to passage and they reflect the push and pull between Congress and the president.
A: high tariff, B: escape clause, C: executive use of inherent constitutional power, D: statutory framework
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passage, controls the path dependence that might affect the types of protection instrument.
Of course, politics itself does not determine the forms of trade protection. There are
multiple factors that affect the degree of trade protection. First, I include import elas-
ticity. Second, I include output-import ratio (import-penetration ratio).18 Table 2.3Sum-
mary Statistics for NTB Coverage Ratios and Control Variablestable.2.3 shows the summary
statistics for NTB coverage ratios and the control variables.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for NTB Coverage Ratios and Control Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
NTB Coverage Ratio 4058 .0838 .1382 0 1
Import Penetration 4058 .0094 .0482 .000043 .7042
Import Elasticity 4058 .7246 .2564 .4619 1.1821
Also, previous studies present evidence that there are significant differences in the in-
dustrial characteristics of industries with tariff protection compared to those with nontariff
trade protection. Specifically, tariffs are positively related to labor intensity while just the
opposite is true for nontariff trade restrictions. In addition, nontariff trade restrictions are
negatively and significantly related to both seller concentration and geographical concen-
tration in an industry (Ray, 1981). To capture this aspect of trade protection, I divide
the commodity into four groups (e.g., manufacturing, service, agriculture and fisheries, and
mining), and employ a multilevel model to examine whether systematic differences exist
across the groups due to industrial characteristics.19
for discretionary protection, E: statues explicitly limiting imports. As the routes get closer to E, it indicates
that Congress wields more power when trade protection is initiated.
18The rationale to include these variables come from Grossman and Helpman (1994). Data on these
variables come from ?.
19Dividing commodities into four groups may not perfectly capture the industry-specific characteristics,
although there is a significant level of similarity within the industry. To address this shortcoming, I am
constructing a labor-intensity index and the a geographical-concentration index on each commodity level.
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2.6 Results
Testing the hypotheses presented here appears straightforward. I could completely pool
the data and estimate the global effects of inter-party coalitions and routes to passage
on policy complexity. Alternatively, I could estimate four separate regressions to allow the
effects estimates to differ by four commodity groups (e.g., manufacturing, service, agriculture
and fisheries, and mining).
In addition to these two approaches, I also estimate multilevel models using a partial-
pooling approach.20 The first multilevel model, the varying intercept model, allows the
intercept of the regression lines for each of the groups to vary while the slopes of the in-
dependent variables remain constant. In the varying intercept, varying slope model, the
multilevel regression estimates the global effects of the independent variables on policy com-
plexity while allowing the effects of the independent variables to vary by group (Gelman and
Hill, 2007). The approach I use here allows me to borrow strength from the global estimates
to more precisely estimate the group-specific effects of the independent variables on policy
complexity by allowing the intercepts (and then the slopes and the intercepts) to vary across
groups. I report these results in Table 2.4Mutilevel Analysis Resultstable.2.4 and discuss
the models in turn.
2.6.1 Complete Pooling
The model specification is as follows:
NTBi = β0 + β1 ∗ Partisan Suporti + γ′ ∗Xi + i,
, where Xi contains control variables. The results of this approach are shown under the col-
umn labeled Model 1 in Table 2.4Mutilevel Analysis Resultstable.2.4. The route of passage
and import penetration do not appear to have a significant effect but the import elasticity
20However, because there is no significant variation in the complexity of protectionist policies between
commodity groups, this approach is unlikely to yield more efficient or unbiased estimates.
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Table 2.4: Mutilevel Analysis Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(SE) (SE) (SD) (SD)
(Intercept) .09
(.17)
Partisan Support (β1) .28 .34 .13 .22
(.08) (.06) (.03) (.08)
Democratic Contribution Ratio .008 .01 .0083 .007
(.003) (.004) (.002) (.002)
Route .5 .2 .3 -.2
(2.3) (2.2) (1.4) (1.2)
Import Elasticity .011 .017 .018 .016
(.002) (.0025) (.0014) (.0012)
Import Penetration .12 .13 .11 .17
(.14) (.34) (.36) (.29)
Group 1 Intercept .073 .086 .094
(.34) (.42) (.3)
Group 2 Intercept -0.92 1.2 .9
(1.6) (1.9) (1.8)
Group 3 Intercept .08 .09 .1
(.51) (.64) (.41)
Group 4 Intercept -.14 -.07 .2
(.57) (.48) (.36)
Group 1 β1 .26
(.06)
Group 2 β1 .24
(.04)
Group 3 β1 .25
(.03)
Group 4 β1 .21
(.04)
Iterations after burn-in 50000 50000
Deviance 237.4 236.6
DIC 242.4 72.1
Note: Model 1 is the completely pooled regression. Model 2 is the no-pooling model. Model 3 is the
varying intercept model; Model 4 is the varying intercept, varying slope model. For models 1 and 2,
standard errors are reported in parentheses. For models 3 and 4, standard deviations are reported in
parentheses below coefficient estimates. The latter estimates are drawn from the entire population of
simulated values resulting from the specification of Bayesian priors74
has a sign in an expected direction with the significance on the complexity of protections
policy. The main variable of interest, the existence of partisan support, appears to have a
highly significant effect. According to the results of this model, protectionist policies are
considerably more complex when there is little potential for members of opposing political
parties to work together to enact protections for a particular commodity.21 Specifically,
when bipartisan support does not exist, the NTB ratio increases by a minimum of 0.13 to a
maximum of 0.34.
2.6.2 No Pooling
The results of this model are shown in the column labeled Model 2 in Table 2.4Mutilevel
Analysis Resultstable.2.4. The results are consistent with the complete-pooling approach.
Different commodity groups have no effect on the form of instruments.
2.6.3 Varying Intercept Model
Now I move on to a Bayesian hierarchical regression to simulate the values of the effect
estimates using diffuse priors. In this case, I allow the intercepts to vary by commodity
group. If there is substantial between-group variation and little within-group variation, I
will see distinct intercepts for each commodity group. The results of this model are found
in the column labeled Model 3 in Table 2.4Mutilevel Analysis Resultstable.2.4. Model
specification is the following:22
NTBi = αj[i] + β1 ∗ Partian Suportij + γ′ ∗Xij + i,
21Partisan support is measured in two different ways. One way is to measure the dichotomy variable based
on Fordham and McKewon’s work whether there is a clear sectoral association with a particular party. The
second measurement comes from my construction of the data on the democratic contribution ratio of each
sectoral PAC. Based on the percentage of money that each PAC gives to the Democratic party, I construct
a measurement called partisanindex = |dempercent − 50|. partisanindex ranges from 0 to 50 and a higher
number means PACs have clear party affiliations.
22The variable Route is a control variable which indicates how the special protection of each commodity
was initiated.
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αj ∼ N(µα, σ2α)
The intercepts appear to vary across commodity groups. However, this difference is not
statistically significant.
2.6.4 Varying Slope, Varying Intercept Model
Finally, I estimate a varying-slope, varying intercept model. This uses the same intuition
as the above model, except now I also allow the intercepts to vary by group. As before, the
intercepts and the slopes will differ by group to the extent that there is substantial between-
group variation and minimal within-group variation. Model specification is the following:
NTBi ∼ N(XiBj[i], σ2y), for i = 1, ..., n
αj ∼ N(µα, σ2α)
Bj ∼ N(MB,
∑
B
), for j = 1, ...J.
The results of this model are shown in the column labeled Model 4 in 2.4Mutilevel
Analysis Resultstable.2.4. Comparing this model with Model 3 reveals some differences
in the group-level estimates, but these differences are not robust due to extremely large
standard deviations. Further, I see virtually no difference across groups in the effects of
the independent variables on policy complexity. However, it does appear that the varying
slope, varying intercept model is a better fit because its deviance information criterion
(DIC) is considerably lower than that for the varying intercept model. Nevertheless, from
a substantive perspective the interpretation of the effects of the potential for inter-party
coalitions and route to passage on protection policies complexity remains virtually identical
when compared with the less-sophisticated single-level regression models.
Having no significant effect by using the multilevel variable may suggest that I do not
capture the commodity-specific characteristics by dividing commodities into four groups. As
the literature suggests, including a specific measurement such as labor-capital ratio could
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fully capture commodity specific characteristics.
2.7 Discussion
In this paper I have investigated the effects of political coalitions on the choice of pro-
tection instrument. Specifically, I have argued that the nature of bipartisan support which
determines the available information to voters is a significant determinant in the choice of
a protection instrument. Special interests face tradeoffs between the amount of rent they
can extract and the durability of protection. Industries desire the complex policy in order
to secure benefits for their lobby well into the future when there is more uncertainty on the
durability of the protection and this is also optimal for the incumbent politician. On the
other hand, if bipartisan support exists between Democrats and Republicans to protect a
certain industry, the incumbent and the special interest prefer an “efficient” transfer mecha-
nism over an inefficient redistribution instrument since there is little electoral risk of doing
so.
One of the central issues in political economy is to understand how electoral incentives
shape economic policy outcomes. The benchmark median voter result suggests that it is
voters’ preferences rather than political institutions that determine policy outcomes. The
new generation of political economy research gives more weight to how institutions affect
policy (Besley and Preston, 2007). In a broad sense, this paper contributes to the literature
on electoral conditions and their economic consequences (Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). More
specifically, it argues that when there is more political uncertainty over whether a challenger
with opposing preferences will be elected, it deters the incumbent from undertaking more
efficient forms of transfers.
But at the same time, this analysis seems to contradict the argument that competition
is good for democracy (Besley and Preston, 2007; Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 2010; Galasso
and Nannicini, 2011). A few decades ago, researchers pointed out that the sharp decline
in marginal districts in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives was a sign that a
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threat of electoral replacement was diminishing, and thus generated significant concerns
about the representative system of government (Erikson, 1972; Tufte, 1973; Mayhew, 1974;
Fiorina, 1977). It seems that there is an interesting tension between the impact of electoral
competition on economic efficiency and on representation issues. My next project will take
this tradeoff into account and examine the impacts of electoral competitions on various social
and political dimensions.
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3 | Money and Access: Empirical Evidence from
the Foreign Agent Registration Act/Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, scholars have attempted to understand how money influ-
ences access to politicians. Despite the abundance of theoretical research, studying the link
between money and access has been a challenging task, mainly due to the lack of sufficiently
detailed data on lobbying contacts. In this paper, we address this issue by taking advantage
of the lobbying filings mandated by the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA). This act
requires that lobbyists representing foreign entities submit a semi-annual report detailing
all lobbying contacts, including information on who, when, why, and how those contacts
were made. This comprehensive lobbying contact data, along with data on the campaign
contributions by lobbyists hired by foreign governments, enables us to systematically study
what role money plays in lobbying and access.
We study the lobbying reports submitted during the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 by the
lobbying firms that collectively represent 144 distinct foreign governments. In particular,
we focus on the fees that lobbying firms charged the foreign countries in the data and the
relationship between the campaign contributions and the contacts. The FARA reports list
all campaign contributions made by the lobbyists that were associated with the lobbying
activities on behalf of their foreign clients are listed. These lists provide very useful infor-
mation, but one limitation is that they list the campaign contributions made during the
reporting periods only. To complement the data in this regard, we collect the lobbyists’
10-year history of campaign contributions by retrieving their Federal Elections Commission
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records.
We find that democratic countries pay less fees to their lobbying firms, and there is
overall a large premium to a top lobbying firm, which often charges more of a premium
to less democratic foreign government clients. This finding is related to the literature on
endogenous lobbying costs. Some costs are relatively similar across different interest groups
(for example, the cost of setting up a Washington, D.C. office). However, other costs may
vary by groups’ specific characteristics or the information they hold. Potters and Winden
(1992) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) explore endogenous lobbying models under the
assumption that an interest group signals its type by its lobbying spending. Their main pre-
diction is that interest groups increase lobbying spending when they deal with “unfriendly”
legislators. This prediction may be consistent with our empirical findings if the level of
democracy of a country is a good predictor of the attitude of the members of the Congress
towards the country. Furthermore, we discuss how the endogenous lobbying costs may in-
teract with the characteristics of intermediaries of lobbying activities, i.e. lobbying firms in
our context, although related theories are rather scant.
There are many studies on the relationship between campaign contributions and lobby-
ing (Langbein, 1986; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Wright, 1996; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and
Tripathi, 2002) A dominant view or assumption in this literature is that campaign contribu-
tions are used to gain access to legislators so that they can engage in information provision
(Hall and Wayman, 1990; Wright, 1990; Ainsworth, 1993; Lohmann, 1995; Austen-Smith,
1995; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi, 2002). An alternative view is that campaign con-
tributions are not necessary for access, and campaign contributions and lobbying activities
are two viable choices for affecting policies (Austen-Smith, 1998; Bennedsen and Feldmann,
2006; Cotton, 2012). In contrast to the amount of theoretical research on campaign contri-
butions and information provision, there is a dearth of empirical research to analyze both
activities due to the lack of data on the identities of the legislators to whom the lobby-
ing activities are targeted. This paper fills in this important gap by exploring the actual
relationship between campaign contributions and lobbying contact.
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We find that (i) campaign contributions and contacts are positively correlated, (ii) when
controlling for both member and country attributes, past contributions are a much stronger
predictor of current contacts than concurrent contributions, especially for the House Repre-
sentatives, and (iii) for the Senators and the first-term members, the correlations between
contributions and contacts are very weak.
To further study the relationship of money and access, we look at the chronological
sequence of contacts and campaign contributions. In particular, we find that about 4% of
the contact records in the data are associated with campaign contributions within a 30-day
window of that contact (referred to as “timely contributions”). These timely contributions
are more frequently given to Senators and the members with a leadership position or a
committee chairmanship. The amount of such contributions are significantly less when they
are given by lobbyists at top lobbying firms. We do not find evidence that these timely
contributions initiates access.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the data and
present detailed summary statistics. Section 3 presents our analysis on the determinants of
lobbying costs. In Section 4, we study the relationship between campaign contributions and
lobbying contacts. We also provide more detailed analysis on the relationship by focusing
on the “timely contributions.” We conclude in Section 5. Our appendices include descriptive
summary statistics of foreign country characteristics, lobbying agents (including lobbying
firms), contacts to the members of Congress, and a scanned copy of a sample lobbying report.
3.2 Data
The Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) has provided a legal channel for
foreign governments and businesses to lobby the U.S. government policy. The main restric-
tion is that such foreign principals must hire an agent based in the U.S. These agents are
usually lobbying firms, and they contact US government officials or media on behalf of their
foreign client (Gawande, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2009)). Foreign agents must submit
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a semi-annual lobbying disclosure form.1 FARA imposes strict disclosure requirements for
anyone in the employment of foreign clients. Based on the reports, we extract the following
information on each contact record: (i) the name of the contacted individuals, (ii) the date
of the contact, (iii) the method by which the individual was contacted (phone call, email,
in-person meeting, etc.), and (iv) issues discussed with the contact. If the contact was made
to the Congress, we also have information on (i) the level of contact for the congressional
contact (whether or not the contact was to the member or his/her staff) and (ii) if the con-
tacted individual was a staffer, the office for whom he/she staffer worked. Therefore, this
dataset provides very rich information on the lobbying targets, which cannot be obtained by
looking at (domestic) lobbying reports mandated by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.
Under this act, lobbyists are required to disclose the government bodies they contacted, but
they are not required to specify any further details of their lobbying contacts.
Since May 2007 the Justice Department has maintained a website that posts image files
of FARA disclosures online, and a joint project of ProPublica and the Sunlight Foundation
has digitized these files.2 We use their digitized data based on the project, and our data
analysis includes lobbying forms submitted in 2008, 2009, and 2010, which spans the second
session of the 110th Congress and the full two sessions of the 111th Congress.
3.2.1 Foreign Countries in the Data
During the period of study, there are in total 144 foreign countries which engaged in any
type of lobbying activities in the U.S.. Among them, 57 countries did not contact any mem-
ber of Congress, and 87 countries have at least one record of having a contact with a member
of the 110th and/or the 111th Congresses by hiring a lobbyist.3 The list of the countries in
1A sample lobbying report can be found in Appendix D.
2For more details, refer to http://foreignlobbying.org.
3Out of 62, 728 unique individual contact records, 27, 168 records (43.3%) are regarding contacts to the
members of Congress or their staff. Unfortunately, 30,254 records (48.2%) do not include the agency or the
organization of the contacted person(s). If the lobbyist reports the name of the contacted person only, it is
often hard to identify him/her unless he/she is a senior official in the government. The rest of the contact
records (8.4%) involve the individuals who belong to other branches of the federal government, the state
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the dataset is extremely diverse, and this list along with detailed information about their
lobbying activities can be found in the Appendix. We collected various information on the
countries in the dataset. The sources are U.S. Department of State for the year that the
formal relations with a country started (from the US State Department), Polity IV project
for the measure of polity which spans from -10 (dictatorship) to 10 (democracy) (from the
Polity IV Project), GDP and GDP per capita (from the World Bank), the amount of trade
with U.S. and number of U.S. military personnel (from the U.S. Census), and the amount of
U.S. aid awarded to the country (from the U.S. Agency for International Development). The
summary statistics can be found in Table 3.1Foreign Country Summary Statisticstable.3.1.
The average lobbying expenditures per country during the study period is $5.7 million,
and their total lobbying expenditures amount to $821.5 million. Considering that the total
(domestic) lobbying expenditures reported via the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 amount
to $10.35 billion during the same period, the size of foreign lobbying is relatively large given
the number of participating foreign countries. The country which spent the largest amount
of money on lobbying is Liberia whose various government entities collectively spent over
$90 million, followed by South Korea whose spending exceeded $79 million.
Table 3.1: Foreign Country Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Year that U.S. Relations Started 1930.4 63.0 1781 2011 126
Polity in 2010 4.0 6.3 -10 10 112
GDP in 2010 ($B) 315.9 816.3 0.02 5,931 142
GDP per Capita in 2010 ($) 16,820.8 23,100.7 210.7 145,230 138
Import from the U.S. in 2010 ($M) 9,069.3 27,969.1 0 249,256 135
Export to the U.S. in 2010 ($M) 13,715.1 45,501.8 0 364,953 135
U.S. Aid ($M) 115.8 332.7 0 3,001.3 144
Size of the U.S. Military Personnel 1,544.9 8,157.0 0 63,000 144
Lobbying Expenditures (2008–2010, $K) 5,704.8 12,534.7 0 90,381.8 144
and local governments, the media, or or other groups such as think tanks and nonprofit organizations.
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3.2.2 Campaign Contributions and Caucus Membership
Foreign entities are not allowed to make a political donations. However, they hire lobby-
ists who can and do make campaign contributions to politicians. Although the contributions
by lobbyists are not necessarily on behalf of their foreign clients, tracking their contribu-
tions is one of the few available methods to see any monetary relationship between a foreign
entity and a member of Congress. To do this, we rely on the FARA filings on campaign
contributions and the donation records from the Federal Election Commission (FEC).
First, the FARA requires the lobbyists or the lobbying firms hired by a foreign entity
report their campaign contributions to politicians. Based on the reported contributions,
we create a binary variable that indicates whether or not the contributions were made to
members of Congress during the 2008 and 2010 election cycles by the lobbyists or lobbying
firms hired by foreign countries. In creating this variable, we only use the records approved
by the Sunlight Foundation.4 As can be seen in Table 3.2Campaign Contributions and
Caucus Membership during the 110th Congresstable.3.2 and 3.3Campaign Contributions
and Caucus Membership during the 111th Congresstable.3.3, about 5% of the pairs of a
House member and a foreign country have at least one record of a contribution in 2008.
These figures are similar for 2010. Conditional on nonzero contributions, we calculate the
summary statistics for the amount of campaign contributions and report the results in the
tables.
There are two potential limitations in using the information in the FARA reports. One
is that the contributions recorded in the reports represent all contributions made by the
employees of the lobbying firm that was hired by a foreign entity. However, the lobbying
firm may represent multiple different clients. Therefore, the contributions made by the
lobbyists who were not involved in representing a foreign entity may be included. The other
limitation is that we can track the monetary relationship as early as June 2007, when the
4There are 14,419 country-member pairs where nonzero contributions by the lobbyists that the country
hired to the member were reported to be made in the FARA filings. Among them, 7,902 pairs (54.80%)
would have different contribution amounts if we include the contribution records that were not approved by
the Sunlight Foundation.
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Sunlight Foundation started digitalizing the FARA filings. These limitations motivate us to
use the FEC filings.
Table 3.2: Campaign Contributions and Caucus Membership during the 110th Congress
Variable Prob. Amount
House Representatives
Contribution in FARA Reports in 2008 0.064 (0.245) $1,716.2 (2,010.4)
Contribution by Lobbyists in 2002–2006 0.004 (0.067) $804.7 (619.7)
Contribution by Lobbyists in 2008 0.017 (0.128) $1,335 (1,388.9)
Country/Regional Caucus Membership 0.077 (0.267) -
Senators
Contribution in FARA Reports in 2008 0.135(0.342) $3,421.7 (5,675.7)
Contribution by Lobbyists in 2002–2006 0.02 (0.13) $1,413.4 (1,194.6)
Contribution by Lobbyists in 2008 0.037 (0.191) $2,120.4 (2,217.1)
Note: There are 30,912 observations (448 members × 69 countries) for the House and 6,969 obserations
(101 members × 69 countries) for the Senate. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The
statistics on the amount of contributions are calculated conditional on nonzero contributions.
Table 3.3: Campaign Contributions and Caucus Membership during the 111th Congress
Variable Prob. Amount
House Representatives
Contribution in FARA Reports in 2008 0.052 (0.222) $1,598.5 (1,942.6)
Contribution in FARA Reports in 2010 0.046 (0.210) $1,448.4 (1,508.5)
Contribution by Lobbyists in 2002–2008 0.032 (0.176) $1,122.2 (1,174.7)
Contribution by Lobbyists in 2010 0.032 (0.176) $1,116.8 (1,064.5)
Country/Regional Caucus Membership 0.083 (0.276) -
Senators
Contribution in FARA Reports in 2008 0.113 (0.317) $3,289.6 (5,545.6)
Contribution in FARA Reports in 2010 0.103 (0.304) $2,674.3 (2,706.5)
Contribution by Lobbyists in 2002–2008 0.075 (0.264) $1,697.6 (1,640.2)
Contribution by Lobbyists in 2010 0.05 (0.217) $1,747.1 (1,813.5)
Note: There are 34,265 observations (445 members × 77 countries) for the House and 7,931 observations
(103 members × 77 countries) for the Senate. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The
statistics on the amount of contributions are calculated conditional on nonzero contributions.
Second, we use the names of the lobbyists who made a contact on behalf of a foreign
client and match it with the individual campaign contribution records from the FEC filings.5
The contribution data based on this method complements the FARA contribution data
5When matching the two datasets, not only the name but also the address and the occupation information
in the FEC filings were used to decrease the frequency of making errors.
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because we focus on the lobbyists who actually made a contact to a representative on behalf
of their clients and track their contributions for many periods. As can be seen in Tables
3.2Campaign Contributions and Caucus Membership during the 110th Congresstable.3.2 and
3.3Campaign Contributions and Caucus Membership during the 111th Congresstable.3.3,
fewer contributions are detected in both frequency and amount in the FEC data compared
to the contributions reported in the FARA reports, and this is as expected.
A representative may participate in a caucus focusing on a specific international region
or a country. Examples of such a caucus include the Congressional Caucus on Vietnam, the
Congressional Caucus on US-Turkey Relations and Turkish Americans, the Congressional
Asian Pacific American Caucus, and the Congressional Caribbean Caucus. This may or may
not represent the political interest of a representative in a region or a country depending on
his/her district characteristics and/or personal expertise. We collect the regional or country-
specific caucus membership information from various on-line sources including the website
of the Committee on House Administration. Then we create a binary variable for each pair
of a representative and a foreign country that takes 1 if the member belongs to any caucus
relevant to the foreign country and 0 otherwise. The summary statistics on this variable
can be found in Tables 3.2Campaign Contributions and Caucus Membership during the
110th Congresstable.3.2 and 3.3Campaign Contributions and Caucus Membership during
the 111th Congresstable.3.3.
3.2.3 Contacts to the Members of Congress
Contact Level Summary
Over the period between August 2007 and December 2010, there were 17,776 unique
contacts to the member of Congress by 87 different foreign countries. 94.3% of the contacts
were made by the professional or contract lobbyists, as opposed to in-house lobbyists, hired
by the foreign countries. 29.8% of the contacts were directed to the Senators and their staff,
and the rest were to the House members and their staff. Most of the contacts (77.9%) were to
the staff of a member of Congress, while the rest were direct contacts to the members. This
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direct contact to a member is slightly more frequent among the House members (23.4%),
compared to among the Senators (18.9%).
The type of contacts is also reported in the filings. A majority of contacts are e-mail
communication (44.7%), while more traditional contacts such as face-to-face meetings and
phone conversations are also frequent (24.5% and 18.1%, respectively). The rest (12.70%)
are various intended or potentially unintended contacts at various venues, such as at a party.
For each contact record, the issue discussed with the contact is briefly explained. Based
on key word search, we categorize the contact issues into security or defense (23.2%), trade,
immigration, or economy (19.9%), and other (56.9%) issues. Many issues were too general
(22.2%) to categorize, such as ‘Turkey and U.S. relationship,’ and some contacts were made
to request a meeting (5.2%).
Filing Level Summary
Table 3.4Contact Summary Statistics by Semiannual Lobbying Filing table.3.4 shows
various summary statistics on the characteristics of contacts for each semi-annual lobbying
filing that lists at least one contact to a member of Congress.6 On average, there are 30
contact records in a lobbying filing, but variation in this number is large across lobbying
reports. There can be multiple contacts to a given member, so the average of number of
the members of Congress whose contacts were reported in a filing is 15. For each filing, we
calculate statistics for several characteristics among all the contact records reported in the
filing. For example, House contacts make up 62% of all contacts, contacts to Democrats
make up 64% of all contacts, direct contacts to members make up 29% of all contacts, and
non-policy related contacts make up 46% of all contacts.
Country Level Summary
On average, a foreign country which contacted at least one member of Congress made
204 contacts via their lobbyists. Turkey made the most frequent contacts—3,071 times—
6A more detailed description of the filing-level data can be found in the Appendix F, G, and H.
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Table 3.4: Contact Summary Statistics by Semiannual Lobbying Filing
Variable Mean Median SD Min. Max. N
Frequency
Number of Contacts 30 9 58 1 535 557
Number of Members 15 6 25 1 185 557
Member Characteristics
House .62 .71 .35 0 1 557
Democrat .64 .66 .33 0 1 557
Caucus Member .17 .02 .26 0 1 557
Committee Chair .14 .04 .22 0 1 557
Leadership Position .22 .12 .28 0 1 557
Contact Type
Member Contact .29 .11 .36 0 1 557
Meeting .34 .18 .37 0 1 557
Phone .18 .01 .27 0 1 557
Email .27 .08 .33 0 1 557
Other .19 0 .33 0 1 557
Contact Issue
Security Issue .20 0 .34 0 1 557
Economic Issue .26 0 .39 0 1 557
Non-Policy Related Issue .46 .43 .41 0 1 557
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followed by the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and Egypt. In terms of the unique
number of members contacted, the average number of the contacted members by a foreign
country is 56. The rank order of foreign countries by the number of members contacted
is similar to that by the total number of contacts made. Turkey contacted the largest
number of the members, 445 out of 611, followed by Egypt, South Korea, and Morocco. In
the Appendix, we present a list of all the countries in the dataset with the total number of
contacts, number of contacted members of Congress, and total lobbying expenditures during
2008–2010.
Member Level Summary
Among 630 unique members who served either in the 110th or the 111th congress, 611
members were contacted at least once.7 Among the contacted members, the average fre-
quency of contacts in the House was 25.2 and 45.1 in the Senate. Table 3.5Top Three Most
Contacted Memberstable.3.5 shows the top five most contacted members in the House and
the Senate. In the House, Robert Wexler (D-FL19) received the most contacts, followed by
Nancy Pelosi (D-CA08). In the Senate, George Voinovich (R-OH) was targeted the most
by the lobbyists hired by the foreign countries, followed by John Kerry (D-MA). These
statistics include all types of contacts. When focusing on the direct contacts to the mem-
bers, as opposed to those to their staff, we have 559 members out of 611 who had at least
one such contact. Table 3.6Top Three Most Directly-Contacted Memberstable.3.6 shows
the top three members in each chamber who directly communicated with lobbyists. For a
given legislator, the average number of the foreign countries that contacted him/her is 7.9.
40 countries made contacts with Senator John Kerry (D-MA) and 34 countries targeted
Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA08). In the Appendix G, we present the summary statistics of
lobbying contacts for each member of Congress in the data.
7The summary statistics regarding the members of each Congress can be find in Tables I.1Members of
the 110th Congresstable.I.1 and Table I.2Members of the 111th Congresstable.I.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.5: Top Three Most Contacted Members
Name District Party # of Contacts
House
Robert Wexler FL-19 D 209
Nancy Pelosi CA-08 D 207
Donald Payne NJ-10 D 189
Senate
George Voinovich OH R 153
John Kerry MA D 149
Joe Lieberman CT I 142
Table 3.6: Top Three Most Directly-Contacted Members
Name District Party # of Contactsa
House
Donald Payne NJ-10 D 189 (50)
Howard Berman CA-28 D 171 (45)
Gregory Meeks NY-06 D 136 (44)
Senate
John Kerry MA D 149 (43)
Max Baucus MT D 65 (33)
Harry Reid NV D 138 (29)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the number of contacts that were made directly
to the member.
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Country-Member Level Summary
Now we aggregate the contact data by country and member. There are unique 9,133
country-member contact pairs in the data, where each contact pair is made if there was at
least one contact to the member by a lobbyist hired by the country. Among these, there was
at least one phone or meeting contact in 64.8% of the pairs, meaning that the rest of the
pairs are made up of emails, parties, or other types of contacts. 68.4% of the contact pairs
are made due to at least one contact on a policy-specific issue. This implies that the rest
of the pairs, 31.6%, were made due to contacts whose main purposes were administrative
or to build relationships. For 20.1% of the contact pairs, we identify economic policy issues
as reasons for a contact and the contact was made via traditional two-way methods such
as phone and/or meeting; similarly for 22.7% on security issues. See Table 3.7Contact
Summary Statistics Given One Contacttable.3.7.
Given that there was at least one contact to a member of Congress by a lobbyist that
represents a country, there were on average 3.7 contacts to the member from the country
over the three-year sample period. On average, 1.6 contacts are via phone and/or meeting
and 2.1 contacts are via email, parties, and/or other method. On average, 1.9 contacts were
policy-specific and 1.6 contacts were not.
Table 3.7: Contact Summary Statistics Given One Contact
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Two-waya 0.648 0.478 0 1
Policy Specificb 0.684 0.465 0 1
Economic Policy and Two-wayc 0.201 0.401 0 1
Security Policy and Two-wayd 0.227 0.419 0 1
Frequencye 3.694 5.941 1 106
Frequency of Two-way 1.574 2.982 0 70
Frequency of Policy Specific 1.881 3.454 0 86
Frequency of Economic Policy and Two-way 0.395 1.378 0 42
Frequency of Security Policy and Two-way 0.362 0.928 0 20
Note: These statistics are based on 9,133 member-country pairs. a. Two-way contacts refer to contacts via phone or
meeting. b. Policy specific contacts refer to contacts where a specific policy issue is listed in the reports. c. Economic
policies regard, for example, trade, U.S. foreign aid, and budget appropriations. d. Security policies concern regional
conflicts and dispute, for instance.
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3.3 What Determines the Amount of Lobbying Costs?
In this section, we examine what determines the amount of money that a foreign gov-
ernment pays to a lobbying firm. More specifically, we investigate how the characteristics of
foreign countries and lobbying firms are related to the lobbying fees. Do more democratic
countries pay less or more when they hire lobbying firms? Do the lobbying firms with some
reputation in the market receive more in fees, and if so why? The answer to these questions
may depend on the the lobbying activities that the lobbying firm engaged in on behalf of
its foreign clients. In particular, we can divide the lobbying filings into three categories: (1)
those with no contact records, (2) those with contact records to the government or media
but without any records on congressional contacts, (3) those with records on contacts to the
Congress as well as other contacts.
Table 3.8: Semiannual Lobbying Expenditures by Contacts
N Median Mean SD Min Max
Fees to Lobbying Firms (in $K)
No Contacts 501 65.8 182.1 402.3 0 5,030.1
Contacts to Non-Congress Only 211 150.0 300.1 426.6 4.5 3,433.3
Contacts to Congress (and Other) 500 158.4 252.6 318.6 0 2,619.6
Total 1,212 116.1 231.7 377.1 0 2,619.6
Expenditures of Self-Lobbying (in $K)
No Contacts 239 552.5 1,247.2 2,009.8 0.3 11,973.9
Contacts to Non-Congress Only 58 487.7 1,783.9 3,417.0 0.3 20,500.0
Contacts to Congress (and Other) 46 653.8 1,071.4 1,179.8 67.4 4,706.6
Total 343 556.0 1,314.4 2,243.5 0.3 20,500.0
There are 774 unique contracts, or client-registrant matches and 1, 938 unique reports, or
client-registrant-filing matches. Among 1, 938 lobbying filings, 1,014 filings do not report any
contacts, 318 filings report contacts but none of the contacts are to a member of Congress,
and 606 filings report at least one contact to a member of the Congress. Those filings
without contacts do report their lobbying activities, ranging from attending an event such
as a ceremony or an exhibition to giving legal service and advice. Table 3.8Semiannual
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Lobbying Expenditures by Contactstable.3.8 shows the summary statistics by whether or
not the lobbying activities were conducted by internal lobbyists or not. When lobbying
through internal lobbyists, the lobbying expenditures are usually much larger than through
external lobbyists.8 As can be seen in Table 3.8Semiannual Lobbying Expenditures by
Contactstable.3.8, the lobbying expenditures tend to be larger when there was at least one
contact than when there was no record of contacts. Among the lobbying reports with at
least one contact, the lobbying expenditures are similar with or without a contact to the
Congress.
Table 3.9Foreign Country Characteristics by Contactstable.3.9 shows the summary statis-
tics of the foreign country characteristics by type of contact their lobbyists made with
Congress. Compared to the countries that made no contacts to the U.S. government through
lobbyists, those that made contacts tend to have a closer relationship to the U.S., measured
by the size of imports from and exports to the U.S. Additionally, the larger the amount
of U.S. foreign aid to a country, the more likely that country is to have made contacts in
Congress. Furthermore, the countries that make contacts to the Congress tend to have more
lobbying contracts than those that do not.
Table 3.9: Foreign Country Characteristics by Contacts
N Aida Tradeb # of Lobbyingc Selfd
($M) ($M) Firms Hired
No Contacts 34 .99 766.5 1.55 0.47
Contacts to Non-Congress Only 21 0.00 3,143.7 2.80 0.52
Contacts to Congress (and Other) 89 20.71 3,570.4 7.49 0.36
Note: a. Median value of the U.S. Aid to the country in 2010. b. Median value of the sum of the import from the U.S.
and the export to the U.S. in 2010. c. Mean value of the number of unique lobbying contracts, including self-lobbying,
during 2008–2010. d. Mean value of the binary variable that takes 1 if the foreign country filed a lobbying report on
its own lobbying through the internal lobbyists.
To examine the factors that affect the total fees, we regress total fees on county-specific
characteristics (Xi) and lobbying firm characteristics (Zj) for each category of lobbying
8377 lobbying reports have missing information on the total lobbying fee, and 6 lobbying reports list zero
lobbying expenditures. We suspect that those with zero expenditures may have a measurement or reporting
error.
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filings, s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, if lobbying reports were filed by lobbying firms, not a foreign country’s
in-house lobbying agents. Let yijts denote a lobbying fee that a country i pays to a lobbying
firm j at a given time period of t, when the associated filing belongs to group s. The
regression model is defined as in the equation 3.1What Determines the Amount of Lobbying
Costs?equation.3.3.1.
yijts = β0s + β1sXi + β2sZj + εijts (3.1)
VectorXi represents the characteristics of country i, including a widely-used measure of how
democratic country i is, POLITY IV score, GDP and GDP per capita, the size of foreign
direct investment, the ratio of the size of the aid from U.S. to the total economy, and the
ratio of the size of imports from and exports to the U.S. to the total economy as of 2010.
Vector Zj represents the characteristics of lobbying firm j, and in this exercise, we include
one variable: an indicator variable that takes 1 if the lobbying firm is one of the top 20
lobbying firms in terms of revenue and 0 otherwise.9
Table 3.10Lobbying Fee Regressiontable.3.10 shows the regression results for the total
lobbying fees by different group. Democratic countries pay less for every different type
of lobbying activity, but the difference in lobbying fees is smaller when countries contact
members of Congress than when they contact executive branch officials or contact no one.
Trade patterns also matter a great deal: countries pay more lobbying fees as the share of
exports to the U.S. to their total economy increases, and they also pay less as the share of
imports from the U.S. to their total economy increases. Foreign countries pay more when
they hire top 20 lobbying firms, on average $92, 503 per six months, when they contact
members of Congress but pay less when they contact executive branch officials or the media.
This may imply that the reputation of lobbying firms may be closely related to access to
the Congress.
Next, we examine how different lobbying firm characteristics affect lobbying fees within
the set of cases where lobbying firms have a record of contacting members of Congress. We do
9The list of the top 20 lobbying firm is obtained from opensecrets.org.
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Table 3.10: Lobbying Fee Regression
All Groups Group 1a Group 2 Group 3
Country Characteristics
POLITY ≥ 7 -115,468∗∗∗ -142,982∗∗∗ -157,032∗∗ -82,590∗∗
(26,139) (43,016) (71,767) (3,463)
USAID/GDP(%) -6,941∗∗ -11,392 374 -7,830∗∗
(2,772) (9,164) (6,629) (3,048)
Import from U.S./GDP(%) 258 9,864∗∗∗ -110 -3,685∗∗
(1,382) (3,017) (3,654) (15,79)
Export to U.S./GDP(%) 1,973 -3,408 -4,516 7,024∗∗∗
(1,750) (3,091) (4,675) (2,184)
Lobbying Firm Characteristics
Top 20 Firms 18,666 34,403 -230,540∗∗ 92,503∗
(4,4756.6) (72,087) (102,022) (49,961)
Constant 209,478 209,478 339,983 318,342
N 1,084 462 190 432
Note: The unit is US dollars in 2010. a. We divide all lobbying filings that report non-zero lobbying fee and are
submitted by lobbying firms in the data, in total 1,084 filings, into three groups based on the associated contact
records. Group 1 are those without any contact records, group 2 are those with contact records, none of which are
congressional, and group 3 are those with congressional contacts.
analyses based on equation (3.1What Determines the Amount of Lobbying Costs?equation.3.3.1),
but unlike the previous analysis, we include more lobbying firm characteristics related to
their connections and expertise. We construct variables which capture the lobbying firm
characteristics such as connection or issue expertise from entire set of 17,776 contacts be-
tween members of Congress and lobbyists hired by foreign clients. These include how many
members of Congress each firm contacts, the total number of contacts, how often lobbyists
directly contact members of Congress, (not their staffers), the ratio of Democrats among
contacted members, and the frequency of contacts that discuss economic, security, and ad-
ministrative issues. After constructing each variable, we divide each lobbying firm in each
dimension on whether the firm is above or below the median and create a dummy vari-
able for each dimension. For example, SpecializedinDemocratsj takes 1 if firm j is above
the median of the ratio of Democrats, which is 60% in the data, and 0 otherwise. When
constructing these variables on the lobbying firm characteristics, we do not include the fil-
ings by those with one or two clients only. It is to minimize our concerns of simultaneity
bias. We consider the lobbying firm characteristics on connections and expertise are exoge-
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nously given. However, we infer these characteristics based on the observed contact patterns
in the data, and the potential simultaneity bias can be alleviated when the lobbying firm
characteristics are inferred from many filings.
Table 3.11Lobbying Fee Regression among Lobbying Filings with Congressional Contactstable.3.11
shows the results.10 Column (1) shows the results when we regress the total fees only on the
lobbying firm characteristics. Column (2) is the result when we add client country character-
istics. Column (3) includes filing characteristics, i.e. what percentage of contacts discussed
economic or security issues. Across each specification, the results are similar. When con-
tacting members of Congress, top 20 lobbying firms enjoy a significant boost, greater than
$110, 000 for six month, in lobbying fees from client countries. Lobbying firms that make
more direct contacts with members receive more lobbying fees but making more contacts
and contacting more members does not seem to make a significant difference in lobbying
fees. Firms with a reputation for specializing in economic issues receive more lobbying fees
as well
To look at the source of the premium that top 20 lobbying firms enjoy, we divide the
lobbying reports by more democratic countries (POLITY ≥ 7) and less democratic countries
(POLITY < 7), and run the regressions with the specification of (3) in Table 3.11Lobbying
Fee Regression among Lobbying Filings with Congressional Contactstable.3.11. The results
are presented in Table 3.12Country Types and Lobbying Fee Premiumtable.3.12. We find
that top 20 lobbying firms do not enjoy this premium when their clients are more democratic
countries. However, they receives $156,640 more on average than other firms when they have
less democratic countries as clients. Also, the firms that are specialized in economic issues
receive more money when they represent more democratic countries and security-focused
firms enjoy a premium when they represent less democratic countries.
10We limit the cases where the number of clients is greater than or equal to 3.
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Table 3.11: Lobbying Fee Regression among Lobbying Filings with Congressional Contacts
(1) (2) (3)
Lobbying Firm Characteristics
Top 20 Lobbying Firm 110,939∗∗∗ 138,225∗∗∗ 137,290∗∗∗
(34,327) (39,498) (4,025)
Contacted Many Times (≥ 88) -29,558 -30,018 -25,933
(46,035) (53,079) (53,797)
Contacted Large # of Members (≥ 15) -3,497 11,331 4,133
(57,778) (67,013) (68,487)
Specialized in Direct Member Contacts (≥ 15%) 1,152∗∗ 1,617∗∗ 1,597∗∗
(537) (647) (651)
Specialized in Democrats (≥ 60%) -231 -468 -362
(328) (378) (392)
Specialized in Economic Issues (≥ 4%) 1,276∗∗∗ 928∗ 925∗
(437) (506) (511)
Specialized in Security Issues (≥ 8%) 439 244 284
(337) (377) (395)
Specialized in Administrative Issue (≥ 18%) 249 442 272
(316) (382) (401)
Country Characteristics
POLITY ≥ 7 -17,561 -7,640
(35,490) ( 37,444)
USAID/GDP(%) -7,216 -6,646
(4,996) (5,163)
Import from U.S./GDP(%) -1,188 -1,409
(1,459) (1,480)
Export to U.S./GDP(%) 1,703 2,491
(2,483) (2,599)
Filing Characteristics
Economic Issue(%) -1,367
(956)
Security Issue(%) -1,156
(969)
Administrative Issue(%) -1,012
(919)
Constant 103,853 144,612 252,014
N 298 260 260
Note: The results are based on the filings by the lobbying firms that have at least three clients in the data. We
do not include the filings by those with one or two clients only in constructing the variables on the lobbying firm
characteristics.
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Table 3.12: Country Types and Lobbying Fee Premium
Country Type Top 20 Firms Economic Security Constant N
Issue Issue
POLITY ≥ 7 30,143 1,852∗∗ -578 96,611 158
(48,220) ( 656) (457)
POLITY < 7 156,490∗∗ 246 1,733∗∗ 232,426 140
(60,344) (734) (684)
3.4 Do Campaign Contributions Buy Contacts?
To answer this question, we use country-member level data for all possible combinations
of country-member pairs during the 111th Congress. There are 77 countries which contacted
a member during 2009–2010, and there were 445 House members and 103 Senators during
this period. Therefore, we have 42,196 pairs of country and member. We focus on the 111th
Congress to study the effect of campaign contributions made in the 2008 election cycle as
well as those in the 2010 cycle.
3.4.1 Campaign Contributions and Contacts
Table 3.13Probability of Contacts by Campaign Contributiontable.3.13 shows the rela-
tionship between campaign contributions and contacts. We calculate the probability that
there was at least one contact during 2009–2010 between a country and a member con-
ditional on whether or not campaign contributions were made by a lobbyist hired by the
country. Given that campaign contributions were made during 2009-2010, the probability
of at least one contact during the same period is 23.74%. Without these current campaign
contributions, the probability of contacts, 6.58%, is much lower. As can be seen in the
table, this trend is remarkably similar when it comes to past contributions. Furthermore,
although we do not report the statistics for different types of contacts, such as contacts that
were made directly to members, the trends found in the statistics are very similar to those
reported here.
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Table 3.13: Probability of Contacts by Campaign Contribution
Contribution Type Yes (%)a No (%)b Membersc
Current Contributions (2009–2010) 23.74 (42.55) 6.58 (24.79) 548
Past Contributions (2007–2008) 21.30 (40.94) 6.72 (25.05) 548
Past Contributions (2002–2008) 23.15 (42.19) 7.54 (26.41) 371
Note: a. This column shows the probability that there was at least one contact by a country to a member
given that the relevant type of campaign contribution was made by a lobbyist hired by the country. We use
both the campaign contribution records reported in the FARA filings and the matched data with the FEC
filings using the lobbyists’ name and occupation. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. b. This
column shows the contact probability given that the relevant type of campaign contribution was not made. c.
This column indicates the number of the members that are included in calculating the contact probabilities.
Depending on the type of contributions, the relevant members may differ. We include all members of the
111th Congress, but when comparing the contact probabilities by whether or not campaign contributions were
made during 2002–2008, we include only the members who served the Congress at least six years.
These trends imply that there is a positive relationship between campaign contributions
and contacts. However, this relationship is not necessarily causal. Furthermore, campaign
contributions appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain contacts to the mem-
bers: some contacts were made without (observed) campaign contributions, and campaign
contributions were made without contacts.
To control for the characteristics of countries and members, we conduct probit analyses.
Let yi,j denote whether or not there was at least one contact from country i to member j.
We consider the following model of how yi,j is determined:
y∗i,j = β0,i + β1,j + β2CurrentContributioni,j + β3PastContributioni,j
+β4CurrentConti,j ×Running2010j + β5PastConti,j ×Running2010j
+β6CaucusMemberi,j + i,j ,
yi,j =

1 if y∗i,j > 0.
0 otherwise,
CurrentContributioni,j is an indicator variable where it takes 1 if campaign contribu-
tions were made by a lobbyist hired by country i to member j during 2009–2010, and
0 otherwise. Similarly, PastContributioni,j is also an indicator variable, focusing on the
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campaign contributions made during 2002–2008. We include the interaction term be-
tween the contribution indicators and whether or not the member runs for an office in
2010, CurrentConti,j ×Running2010j and PastConti,j ×Running2010j. Lastly, we con-
trol for the relation between a member and a country by including a indicator variable,
CaucusMemberi,j , which takes 1 if member j is a member of a Congressional caucus that
relates to the region that country i resides. Note that we include both country-specific fixed
effects and member-specific fixed effects by allowing the constant terms β0,i and β1,j to vary
by countries and members.
i,j may include unobserved favors exchanged between a member and a lobbyist that
represents a country, such as gifts and paid-for travels, as well as unobserved and exogenously
determined friendship or animosity between the member and the country (not captured by
the caucus variable) that can simultaneously affect contacts. We assume that i,j and i,j′
are not correlated for j 6= j′ and that i′,j and i,j are not correlated with i 6= i′.
Table 3.14Contact Probit Regression Analysis: House Representativestable.3.14 shows
the probit regression results. We conduct the analyses by each chamber for all members
during the 111th Congress and repeat the same analyses for the first-term members only.11
We find that past contributions are positively associated with contacts when we use all
representatives, but this positive association becomes statistically insignificant when we
only regress the first-term representatives. Among the senators, the relationship between
contributions and contacts are mostly statistically insignificant.
3.4.2 Who Makes “Timely Contributions” to Whom?
Let us refer to the campaign contributions that were made to a member of Congress by
a lobbyist who represents a foreign country, as reported in the FARA reports, within the
30-day window of a contact to the member as ‘timely’ contributions. Out of 17,776 lobbying
contacts to the members of the 110th and 111th Congresses in the data, 729 contacts (4.1%)
can be classified as timely contributions. The average amount of the donation conditional on
11There are 61 first-term representatives and 37 first-term senators in the data.
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Table 3.14: Contact Probit Regression Analysis: House Representatives
All All 1st Term 1st Term
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Current Contribution 0.224∗∗∗ 0.042 0.269 1.876∗
(0.049) (0.173) (0.178) (1.082)
Past Contribution 0.285∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.030 -3.766
(0.057) (0.143) (0.206) (143.5)
Current Contribution × Running in 2010 - 0.196 - -1.661
- (0.179) - (1.097)
Past Contribution × Running in 2010 - -0.063 - 3.832
- (0.160) - (143.5)
Caucus Member 0.500∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.318 0.311
(0.046) (0.046) (0.275) (0.274)
Member Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 32,190 32,190 1,740 1,740
Note: The first two regressions are on all representatives in the data, and the rest two regressions, denoted by ‘1st
Term’, are on all the first-term representatives in the data. 2,075 observations were dropped due to collinearity when
all representatives were regressed, and 2,957 observations were dropped for the same reason when only the first-term
representatives were included in the analysis. Both Current and Past Contributions are indicator variables.
Table 3.15: Contact Probit Regression Analysis: Senators
All All 1st Term 1st Term
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Current Contribution 0.138∗∗ 0.102 0.269 0.185
(0.074) (0.091) (0.178) (0.166)
Past Contribution 0.064 0.080 0.030 0.043
(0.071) (0.137) (0.206) (0.152)
Current Contribution × Running in 2010 - 0.972 - 0.039
- (0.137) - (0.248)
Past Contribution × Running in 2010 - 0.101 - 0.416
- (0.151) - (0.286)
Caucus Member 0.534 0.539 0.318 0.968
(0.511) (0.510) (0.275) (0.743)
Member Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,210 7,210 1,740 1,740
Note: The first two regressions are on all senators in the data, and the rest two regressions, denoted by ‘1st Term’, are
on all the first-term senators in the data. 721 observations were dropped due to collinearity when all representatives
were regressed, and 1,109 observations were dropped for the same reason when only the first-term representatives
were included in the analysis. Both Current and Past Contributions are indicator variables.
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such contacts is $1,169, with a standard deviation of $1,690.4, these statistics do not show
a significant difference compared to those of the reported donations in the FARA reports,
which are $1,267.7 and $1,480.9 respectively. As can be seen in Table 3.16Contact Charac-
teristics By Timely Contributionstable.3.16, there is no statistically significant difference in
terms of contact type, contact level (member or staff), or lobbying issue (policy-relevant or
not) between the contacts with and without these timely campaign contributions.
Table 3.16: Contact Characteristics By Timely Contributions
Not Associateda Associated Total
Total # of Obs. 17,047 729 17,776
Meeting 4,182 (24.5%)b 181 (24.8%) 4,363 (24.5%)
Phone 3,030 (17.8%) 180 (24.7%) 3,210 (18.1%)
Member Contact 3,732 (21.9%) 199 (27.3%) 3,931 (22.1%)
Policy-relevant 8,669 (50.9%) 379 (52.0%) 9,048 (50.9%)
Potentially Initiativec 4,940 (28.9%) 184 (25.7%) 5,124 (28.8%)
Note: a. ‘Timely contributions’ refer to contributions made to a member of Congress by a lobbyist who
represents a foreign country, as reported in the FARA reports, within the 30-day window of a contact
to the member. b. The numbers in parentheses are the ratio of the relevant observations to the total
observations of each column. c. A ‘potentially initiative’ contact by a foreign country to a member refers
to the earliest contact among the contacts by the country to the member in the data.
We divide the members of Congress who have at least one contact from the foreign
countries in the data during the period of the study into two groups: those who have
at least one record of receiving campaign contributions by a lobbyist who represents a
foreign country and granting a contact within the 30-day window of the contributions to
the lobbyist or other lobbyists who represent the same country (in other words, those who
are on the receiving any of a timely contribution), and those who have no such records.
Table 3.17Member Characteristics By Timely Contributionstable.3.17 shows the summary
statistics for each group respectively. In the group of the members who are associated
the timely contributions, there are more senators, members with a leadership position or a
chairmanship of a committee, and foreign relations committee members, compared to the
other group.
Among the 611 members in the dataset, Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-MD05) and Rep. Donald
Payne (D-NJ10) received the most contacts that are associated with the timely contributions
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(from four distinct countries), followed by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), Rep. Charles Rangel
(D-NY15), Rep. James Clyburn (D-SC06), Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND), Rep. Roy Blunt
(R-MO07), Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D-AZ), Sen. Patrick Leahy
(D-VT), and Sen. Norm Coleman (R-MN), all of whom received contacts from three distinct
countries and timely contributions. Among these 11 members, 8 members hold either a
leadership position or a committee chairmanship.
Table 3.17: Member Characteristics By Timely Contributions
Didn’t Receivea Received Total
Total # of Obs. 436 175 611
Senators 57 (13.1%)b 60 (34.3%) 117 (19.2%)
Democrats 236 (54.1%) 91 (52.0%) 327 (53.5%)
Recent Vote Share ≥ 60% 267 (61.2%) 114 (65.1%) 327 (53.5%)
Leadership and Committee Chair 23 (5.3%) 29 (16.6%) 52 (8.5%)
Economics Committee 95 (21.8%) 37 (21.1%) 132 (21.6%)
Foreign Relations Committee 48 (11.0%) 37 (21.1%) 85 (13.5%)
First-term Member 93 (21.3%) 20 (11.4%) 113 (18.5%)
Note: a. We divide the members of Congress in the data into two groups: those who have at least one record of
receiving campaign contributions by a lobbyist who represents a foreign country and granting a contact within the
30-day window of the contributions to the lobbyist or other lobbyists who represent the same country and those
who have no such records. b. The numbers in parentheses are the ratio of the relevant observations to the total
observations of each column.
An interesting observation is that the contacts associated with timely contributions are
not necessarily the first contacts. To see this, we look at whether or not a given contact by
a country to a member of Congress appears the earliest in the data. The ratio of the earliest
contacts is 28.9% with the standard deviation of 45.3% among the contacts without timely
contributions and that statistics for the contacts with those contributions is 25.3% with the
standard deviation of 43.4%. Relatedly, among 113 first-term members in the dataset, only
20 of them received any timely contributions. This implies that timely contributions are
more likely to be made by lobbyists who already have access to members.
As for the countries, Table 3.18Countries Characteristics By Timely Contributionstable.3.18
shows the summary statistics regarding the countries among two groups: the countries which
made at least one contact associated with the timely contributions and those that did not.
Compared to the countries that did not make such contacts, countries that made timely
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contributions are more likely to be democratic, to receive more U.S. foreign aid, and to have
larger amounts of imports from and exports to the U.S. The United Arab Emirates made
the largest number of timely contributions, 22, followed by Egypt (13), Turkey (13), and
Libya (9).
Table 3.18: Countries Characteristics By Timely Contributions
Didn’t Makea Made Total
Total # of Obs. 54 33 87
Polity Measure ≥ 7 (%) 27.77 (45.21)b 48.48 (50.75) 35.63 (48.16)
US Aid ($M) 104.3 (204.8) 249.9 (615.1) 159.5 (414.3)
GDP per Capita ($K) 13.07 (20.98) 14.09 (14.17) 13.45 (18.64)
Import from US ($B) 2.83 (4.37) 25.55 (52.42) 12.09 (235.17)
Export to US ($B) 6.25 (9.86) 40.19 (86.52) 20.08 (57.73)
Import from US/GDP (%) 6.54 (10.22) 6.65 (14.54) 6.58 (12.08)
Export to US/GDP (%) 6.21 (7.16) 6.15 (8.80) 6.19 (7.82)
Lobbying Spending in 2008–10 ($M)c 209.0 (224.8) 896.8 (126.6) 469.9 (860.6)
Note: a. We divide the foreign countries in the data into two groups: those who have at least one record of having a
contact to a member of Congress to whom its hired lobbyists gave campaign contributions within the 30-day window of
the contact and thoes that do not. b. The mean values are shown outside parentheses, and the numbers in parentheses
are the standard errors. c. The statistics are on the sum of the lobbying fees during the period of the study listed in the
lobbying filings that record at least one contact to the Congress. Therefore, these sums are the same or less than the total
lobbying expenditures of a country during the period.
3.4.3 What Determines the Amount of “Timely Contributions”?
The amount of “timely contributions” ranges from $30 to $25,000, with a mean of $1,170.0
and a standard deviation of $1,691.4. We study how the various characteristics of members
and countries affect the amount of the timely contributions. To do this, we conduct a tobit
analysis. Let yi,j,t denote the observed amount of timely contributions from country i to
member j at time t. We consider the following model of how yi,j,t is determined:
y∗i,j,t = β0 + β1Xj + β2Zi + β3MemberContacti,j,t + β4CaucusMemberi,j + i,j ,
yi,j =

y∗i,j if y
∗
i,j > 0.
0 otherwise.
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Xj is a vector of member j’s characteristics, including his/her chamber, party, recent vote
share received, leadership or committee chairmanship, committee membership, whether or
not he/she is a first-term member, and whether or not he/she ran for an office in the 2010
elections. Zi is a vector of country j’s attributes, including its polity measure, GDP per
capita, the amount of aid from the U.S., the amount of trade with the U.S., and whether or
not the timely contribution and the contact were made by a lobbyist at a top 20 lobbying
firm during the period of study. We also include two other variables: MemberContacti,j,t is
an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the contact associated with the timely contribution
is direct contact with the member and 0 otherwise; and CaucusMemberi,j is an indicator
variable that takes 1 if member j belongs to a congressional caucus on the region in which
country j resides and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.19Amount of Timely Contribution Regression Analysistable.3.19 shows the re-
sults of both ordinary least squares and tobit regression analyses. Members with a leadership
position or a committee chairmanship tend to receive more money than those without, and
the average difference is estimated to be $1,465 (158.5) in the Tobit analysis. Countries
which receive more U.S. aid tend to pay a larger amount of timely contributions on average
$446.2 (171.0). When the associated contact is directly with the member, the timely contri-
butions are larger by on average $512.2 (139.9) compared to when the contact is to the staff.
Lastly, when the intermediary, or the lobbyist, is at a top 20 lobbying firm, the amount of
the timely contribution is lowered by $521.6 (190.8) on average.
3.5 Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to explore a large dataset of lobbying
contacts. We combine this dataset with various complementary datasets from other sources
on the attributes of the members of Congress, the foreign countries, and the lobbying firms
in the data and on the history of campaign contributions by the lobbyists that represented
the foreign countries. This rich dataset enables us to thoroughly examine the relationship
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Table 3.19: Amount of Timely Contribution Regression Analysis
OLS Tobit
Constant 508.6∗∗(239.0) -6,438.7∗∗∗(294.0)
House -127.3(171.9) -217.3(171.0)
Democrat -376.4∗∗∗(146.0) -893.2∗∗∗(128.7)
Recent Vote Share ≥ 60% 31.1(168.5) 49.4(145.8)
Leadership or Committee Chairmanship 1,096.4∗∗∗(165.2) 1,465.0∗∗∗(158.5)
Economics Committee 585.1∗∗∗(200.2) -335.3∗∗(167.5)
Foreign Relations Committee -167.4(155.7) 165.6(135.4)
First-Term Member 177.9(224.1) 186.7(201.5)
Running for Office in 2010 -14.6(166.5) 437.1∗∗∗(160.0)
Polity Measure ≥ 7 412.9∗∗∗(156.1) 24.4(137.7)
GDP per Capita in 2010 ($K) 23.1∗∗∗(6.1) 38.0∗∗∗(4.8)
US Aid in 2010 ($B) 342.8∗(192.3) 446.2∗∗∗(171.0)
Import from US in 2010 ($B) -14.0∗∗∗(4.9) 1.3(5.8)
Export to US in 2010 ($B) 5.8(3.7) -3.8(4.6)
Import from US/GDP in 2010 (%) -17.9∗∗∗(6.6) -0.91(7.4)
Export to US in/GDP 2010 (%) 61.0∗∗∗(11.5) 33.1∗∗∗(12.2)
Via a Top 20 Lobbying Firm -246.0(226.2) -521.6∗∗∗(190.8)
Member Contact 71.4(141.2) 512.2∗∗∗(132.9)
Regional/Country Caucus Member -284.4∗(172.8) 355.4∗∗(154.2)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The OLS regression is based on 705 observations and the
Tobit regression is on 17,018 observations.
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between money and access.
We find that more democratic countries pay less compared to their less democratic coun-
terparts, holding constant other country and lobbying firm attributes. This trend is robust
to any sub-sample of the data by the nature of the contacts associated with each lobbying
filing: those with no contacts, those with contacts but without no congressional ones, and
those with congressional contacts. We also find that top lobbying firms charge significant
lobbying fee premiums when they engage in contacting members, and this premium becomes
more salient when their clients are less democratic foreign countries as compared to foreign
democracies.
Campaign contributions and contacts appear to be positively correlated. However, when
controlling for both member and country attributes, we find that the correlations become
more nuanced. For example, past contributions are a much stronger predictor of current
contacts than concurrent contributions especially for the House members. Furthermore,
for the Senators and the first-term members, the correlations between contributions and
contacts are very weak.
To further study the relationship between money and access, we look at the chronological
sequence of contacts and campaign contributions. In particular, we find that about 4% of
the contact records in the data are associated with campaign contributions within a 30-
day window of that contact. Such contributions are more frequently given to Senators
and the members with a leadership position or a committee chairmanship. Furthermore,
the contacts associated with such contributions do not appear to initiate contacts. These
exchanges are often made among the lobbyists and the legislators who have had previous
contacts. Relatedly, the amount of such contributions are significantly less when they are
handed by lobbyists at top lobbying firms. These findings may suggest the importance of a
long-term relationship that is maintained potentially through money.
A promising direction for future research is to exploit the dynamic nature of this data.
One can study the chronological ordering of lobbying contacts and campaign contributions,
and explore how it relates to political networks and informational cascades. This analysis
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may shed light on the flow of information among policy-makers and the way that access is
obtained and sustained. Furthermore, by taking a dynamic approach, one can also study
how the lobbying strategies evolve or change as a particular issue progresses or regresses in
the political process.
108
A | Appendix to Chapter 1: Proofs of the Propo-
sitions
A.1. Proof of the Proposition 1.
The first order condition of 1.3Set Upequation.1.3.3 with the respect to eA1 is
α1β
∂Π(eA)
∂eA1
+ P¯1(e
p, α)(1− β)∂Π(e
A)
∂eA1
− ∂c
A
1
∂eA1
= 0
→ α1β + P¯1(ep(eA), α)(1− β)− ceA1 = 0
→ e∗A1 =
α1β + P¯1(1− β)
c
(A.1)
With the same logic, e∗A2 =
α2β+P¯2(1−β)
c . Given (e
∗A
1 , e
∗A
2 ), solve the optimization prob-
lem with respect to ePj . The first order condition of the equation 1.3Set Upequation.1.3.3
with respect to eP1 is
∂P1(e
P , α)
∂eP1
(1− β)Π¯(eA)− ∂c
P
1
∂eP1
= 0 (A.2)
The derivative of P1 with respect to eP1 is as follows:
∂P1(e
P , α)
∂eP1
=
α1α2e
P
2
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
(A.3)
Substituting A.3Appendix to Chapter 1: Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.3 into
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A.2Appendix to Chapter 1: Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.2 results in1
α1α2e
P
2
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
(1− β)Π¯(eA)− ceP1 = 0 (A.4)
With the same logic, firm 2’s optimization problem solves
α1α2e
P
1
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
(1− β)Π¯(eA)− ceP2 = 0 (A.5)
Solving the pair of equations A.4Appendix to Chapter 1: Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.4
and A.5Appendix to Chapter 1: Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.5 yields
e∗P1 = e
∗P
2 =
√
α1α2(1− β)Π¯(eA)
c
A.2. Proof of the Proposition 2
Given P1(e¯P , αj) is defined as
P1(e¯
P , α) =
eP1 (e
A)α1
eP1 (e
A)α1 + eP2 (e
A)α2
(A.6)
And its derivative with the respect to eA1 is
∂P1
∂eA1
=
α1α2(e
P ′
1 e
P
2 − eP1 eP
′
2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
(A.7)
, where eP ′1 =
∂eP1
∂eA1
and eP ′2 =
∂eP2
∂eA1
. Take the first order condition of 1.3Set Upequation.1.3.3
with respect to eA1 :
1ePj does not have a clean, simple solution.
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α1β
∂Π(eA)
∂eA1
+
∂P1(e¯
P (eA), α)
∂eA1
(1− β)Π(eA) + P1(e¯P , α)(1− β)∂Π(e
A)
∂eA
− c
{∂eP1
∂eA1
+ eA1
}
= 0
(A.8)
Plug A.6Appendix to Chapter 1: Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.6 and A.7Appendix
to Chapter 1: Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.7 into A.8Appendix to Chapter 1:
Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.8 and we get:
α1β
∂Π(eA)
∂eA1
+
α1α2(e
P ′
1 e
P
2 − eP1 eP
′
2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
(1−β)Π(eA)+P1(eP , α)(1−β)∂Π(e
A)
∂eA1
−c
[∂eP1
∂eA1
+eA1
]
= 0
(A.9)
Given Π(eA) = eA1 +eA2 , equation A.9Appendix to Chapter 1: Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.9
is further simplified as
α1β + (1− β)
[α1α2(eP ′1 eP2 − eP1 eP ′2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
Π(eA) + P1(e
P , α)
]
− c
[∂eP1
∂eA1
+ eA1
]
= 0 (A.10)
Denote the ex ante lobbying effort that satisfies equation A.10Appendix to Chapter 1:
Proofs of the Propositionsequation.A.0.10 as e∗Aj and it is derived as
e∗A1 =
α1β + (1− β)P1(eP , α)
c
+
1− β
c
[α1α2(eP ′1 eP2 − eP1 eP ′2 )
(eP1 α1 + e
P
2 α2)
2
Π(eA)− c∂e
P
1
∂eA1
]
(A.11)
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B | Appendix to Chapter 1: A Description of the
Bill Selection and The Process of Matching
Lobbying Reports
In this study, I select bills that originate from the House and are considered on the House
floor from the 107th through the 111th Congress in the U.S. There are 163 bills originated
from the Senate reached the House floor and these bills are dropped from the analysis. There
are 3,202 different bills originated from the House and reached the House floor through five
different congresses. A legislative proposal that reaches the floor takes one of four forms:
bills (H R), joint resolutions (H J RES), concurrent resolutions (H CON RES), or resolutions
(H RES). A concurrent resolution must be adopted by both Houses, but it is not sent to
the president for a signature and therefore does not have the force of law.1 A resolution
requires neither passage by the other chamber nor approval by the president, and it does
not have the force of law.2 Therefore I exclude the concurrent resolutions and resolutions
from the legislative proposals. Most legislative proposals before Congress are in the form of
bills and are designated by “H.R.” A joint resolution, designated by “H.J.RES” requires the
approval of both houses and the signature of the president, just as a bill does, and has the
force of law if approved. No practical difference exists between a bill and a joint resolution.
Therefore, bills designated by either “H.R.” or “H.J.RES” on the House floor are considered.
1A concurrent resolution is used to fix the time for adjournment of a Congress. It is also used as a vehicle
for expressing the sense of Congress on various foreign policy and domestic issues (Oleszek, 2011).
2Many resolutions deal with the rules or procedures. They are also used to express the sentiments of
a single house, such as condolences to the family of a deceased family, or to commit on foreign policy or
executive business (Oleszek, 2011).
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In total, there are 1,487 bills designated by H.R. or H.J.RES in five congresses.3
Bills are considered under different rules because many bills and resolutions are relatively
routine while others provoke more controversies among members. Some bills are considered
under the suspension of the rules to expedite action on relatively non-controversial measures
(Carr, 2005)
Bills under the order of “On Passage” are the most controversial and significant legislative
activities and special rules are assigned to define the length of the debate and the scope of
the amendment. Among 1,487 bills, 584 bills were considered under the question of “On
Passage.”4
For these 584 bills, there are numerous activities in both the House and the Senate,
mainly the amendment process, before final passage voting. In these cases, I ignore these
other activities and focus on the final passage voting. For example, if a bill has been amended
five times and voted on the question under “On Passage,” I drop the data on amendment
process and keep the data on “On Passage” voting. This is used to set the threshold of the
House voting. After the House passes the bill, it moves to the Senate and the Senate takes
an action. If the Senate passes the bill as well, a conference committee is formed to reconcile
the differences between the House and the Senate and if the conference committee agrees
upon the bill, that bill is sent to each house for a final vote. If both chambers pass the bill,
it is sent to the president to sign into the law. Among 584 bills, only 174 bills across five
congresses became the laws. 410 bills were passed the first House floor vote but they failed
to pass the Senate floor. For bills that passed the both Chambers, I record the conference
vote date to use it as a threshold of the final congressional action. This voting date divides
3More specifically, #H.R. = 1,428, #H.J.RES = 59, #H.RES = 1,398, #H.CON.RES = 317.
4Bills under the order of “On motion to suspend the rules and pass” or “Table motion to reconsider” are
dropped since they are usually non-controversial bills and provides for a maximum of 40 minutes of debate
on the motion, and it precludes all floor amendments. Passage of a measure suspension of the rules requires
a two-thirds vote of the members voting (Carr, p.2). But I present how the pattern of lobbying timing is
different for these types of bills compared to lobbying patterns on controversial bills those are considered for
the main analysis in the following section. I drop the legislative proposals that did not receive any committee
referrals or bills proposed by delegates from DC, VI, PR, GU, and MP. The bills vetoed by the president
are also dropped. There are 7 bills that were vetoed by the president (1 in the 109th and 6 in the 110th
Congress). Bill not lobbied at all are also dropped.
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the lobbying activities into the bill passage stage and the implementation stage. For bills
that became public laws, I match the lobbying reports that specify the bill numbers. Figure
B.1A Description on the Bill Selection and Matching Bills and Lobbying Reportsfigure.B.1
summarizes the procedures of the bill selection and matching between bills and lobbying
reports.
H R H J RES H RES H CON RES
  PROPOSAL
Question
Suspend 
the 
rules...
On 
Passage
Became 
Law
Failed to 
Become 
Law
Lobbying Reports
1,487
903 584
174
410
1,715
3,202
Figure B.1: A Description on the Bill Selection and Matching Bills and Lobbying Reports
Figure B.2Bill Composition, given they reach the House Floorfigure.B.2 shows the bill
composition, conditional on that bills are considered on the House floor. Among the 3,202
bills that reached the House floor, 46% has no enforcement power (H.RES or H.CON.RES).
36% are under enforcement but with no controversy which means the bills passed with
questions such as the “suspend the rules and pass.” 44% (or 16% of entire bills) under this
category became the law. 13% has enforcement power and are considered under the question
of “On Passage” but they fail to become laws. 5% of bills has enforcement power, considered
under the question of “On Passage” and passed the both the House and the Senate and the
president signed into the law. These are the most important and controversial bills and my
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analysis focuses on these bills. In total, the bills became the laws are 21%.
H R
Bill Composition Given Reaching the House Floor (N =3,202)
No Enforcement
Enforcement
On Passage
Pass
46% 36% 13% 5%
Became Law
16%
Figure B.2: Bill Composition, given they reach the House Floor
When I match the lobbying report into each bill, there is an issue. Some lobbying reports
mention a bill multiple times under different issue areas. For example, a company called
1-800 Contacts submitted a lobbying report through a lobbying firm Crowell & Moring in
the second quarter of 2010. In this report, it mentioned that it lobbied for the bill H.R.3590
both under the issue of Taxation/Internal Revenue Code (TAX) and Health Issues (HCR).
Raw data from opensecrets.org records this as a separate entry but I consider this as a
single attempt to influence H.R. 3590 because this comes from the same lobbying report
filed by the same registrant. If a different registrant (lobbying firms or in-house lobbyists)
filed a report at the same time and it mentioned the same bill either under the same issue or
different issue, they are treated separately because lobbying activities are done by different
lobbying groups.
There are 633,731 unique lobbying reports from 1998 through 2012. Among them,
54%(=342,215) did not specify bill names. 46%(=291,516) of the reports specify bill names
in their lobbying reports. If we divide them into further, 34% (=216,661) specify either bills
originated from the Senate or bills originated from the House but did not reach the House
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floor. 12% ( = 74,855) specify the bills that reached the House floor. See the left diagram
in figure B.3Lobbying Reports and the Frequency for Different Types of Billsfigure.B.3.
Some of the 74,855 lobbying reports mention at least one bill that reached the floor. In
this case, that lobbying report has multiple entries in the data because the lobbying report -
bill matching is unique for each observation. The total number of lobbying report for all bills
that reached the House floor is 174,320. Among 174,320 lobbying reports that mentioned
the House bills that are reaching the House floor, 98% (= 171,008) lobbied on bills that have
an enforcement power (H.R. or H J RES). Only 2% ( = 3,312) lobbied on bills that have
no enforcement power (H RES, H CON RES). See the right diagram in figure B.3Lobbying
Reports and the Frequency for Different Types of Billsfigure.B.3.
H R
Lobbying Intensity on Different Types of 
Bills Reaching the House Floor (N=174,320)
No Enforcement
Enforcement
On Passage
Pass
2% 17% 37% 44%
H R
Lobbying Reports (Total = 633,731)
Reports On No Specific Bills
Reports On Specific Bills 
Lobbying on Bills 
Reached the 
House Floor
54% 34% 12%
Figure B.3: Lobbying Reports and the Frequency for Different Types of Bills
Do we see different lobbying patterns across different types of bills? Since I only consider
the bills with enforcement and under the question of “On Passage” in the main analysis, one
may wonder the representativeness of the sample. To show that ex post lobbying is a
prevalent pattern for other types of bills as well, I compare the lobbying patterns across
different types of bills. Since some bills do not require the president to sign them into the
law or some failed to pass the Senate, the only common criteria across different types of
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bills that are reaching the floor is the date of the first House floor voting. Therefore I use
this date as a threshold to determine ex ante and ex post lobbying pattern across different
types of bills. If we set the threshold at the first House voting date, 28.77% is ex ante
lobbying and 71.23% is ex post lobbying (all cases). Among clear cases, 11.85% is ex ante
and 88.15% is ex post. I divide the lobbying patterns according to different types of bill.
Table B.1Lobbying Patterns for Different Types of Billstable.B.1 presents the details of the
lobbying patterns for different types of bills, for clear cases and for all cases respectively.
Table B.1: Lobbying Patterns for Different Types of Bills
Clear Cases All Cases
Bill Type Ex Ante(%) Ex Post(%) #Reports Ex Ante Ex Post #Reports
Type I 23.61 76.39 1,974 41.91 58.09 3,312
Type II 16.31 83.69 20,311 29.74 70.26 29,057
Type III 14.89 85.11 45,381 33.31 66.69 65,310
Type IV 7.18 92.82 53,734 23.97 76.03 76,641
Total 11.85 88.15 121,400 28.77 71.23 174,320
Note: Type I = no enforcement & no controversy, Type II = enforcement & no controversy, Type III =
enforcement & controversy & failed to became law, Type IV = enforcement & controversy & became law.
Threshold = First House Floor Voting.
Figure B.4Ex Post Lobbying Ratio for Different Types of Bills When We Set the Thresh-
old at the First House Floor Votingfigure.B.4 shows the different ex post lobbying ratio across
different types of bills, both in all cases and in clear cases only. The numbers show that
although I only focus a small subset of bills, ex post lobbying is common across all different
types of bills.
As a final robustness check, I present the lobbying pattern for all bills that became the
law. As Figure B.5A Diagram of the Composition of Bills that Reached the House Floor
between the 107th and the 111th Congressfigure.B.5 shows, there are two types of bills that
became the law: bills under the question of “On Passage” and bills under the question of
non-“On Passage” such as “On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass.” In the main analysis,
I only include 174 bills under the “On Passage” question since they are the most important
and controversial bills. But there are additional 395 bills that became the law. In this
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H R
Ex Post Lobbying Ratio (All Cases, N=174,320)
Threshold = First House Floor Voting
No Enforcement
Enforcement
On Passage
Pass
58% 70% 66% 76%
H R
No Enforcement
Enforcement
On Passage
Pass
76% 84% 85% 92%
Ex Post Lobbying Ratio (Clear Cases, N=121,400)
Threshold = First House Floor Voting
Figure B.4: Ex Post Lobbying Ratio for Different Types of Bills When We Set the Threshold
at the First House Floor Voting.
section, I include all bills that became the law and investigate how the lobbying patterns
look like.
All Bills that Reached the House Floor (N = 3,202)
No Enforcement 46% Enforcement 54%
On Passage 
18%
Non-On Passage
 36%
Pass
5%
Pass
16%
Fail
13%
Fail
20%
Became Law
Figure B.5: A Diagram of the Composition of Bills that Reached the House Floor between
the 107th and the 111th Congress.
Among the 569 bills that finally became the law, 196 bills were not targeted by any lob-
bying activities. 373 bills received at least one lobbying activity and 174 bills that passed the
Congress under the question of “On Passage” are included in the main analysis. There are
199 bills that became the law but are not included in the main analysis because they did not
pass the Congress under the question of “On Passage.” For each bill, I match the lobbying
reports. In total, there are 16,579 lobbying activities (lobbying report - bill combination)
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for the 199 bills that are not included in the main analysis and there are 76,641 lobbying
activities for the 174 bills that are included in the main analysis. Table B.2Summary Statis-
tics of Bills that Became Laws and the Corresponding Lobbying Activitiestable.B.2 shows
the summary statistics of bills and lobbying activity.
Table B.2: Summary Statistics of Bills that Became Laws and the Corresponding Lobbying
Activities
Congress N1 N2 N3 N4
107th 105 54 1,420 27
108th 113 58 2,206 38
109th 98 71 10,401 146
110th 113 94 29,380 313
111th 140 96 49,813 519
Total 569 373 93,220 250
Note: N1 = Number of bills that became law , N2 = Number of bills that received lobbying, N3 = Number
of total lobbying reports , N4 = Average lobbying reports per bill.
Using the same criteria, I determine the timing of each lobbying activity setting the
threshold at the final conference voting and Table B.3Summary Statistics on Lobbying Type
Based on the Frequency of Bill-Lobbying Report Matchingtable.B.3 shows the result. Ex
post lobbying is still prevalent among the bills that I did not include in the main analysis.
Table B.3: Summary Statistics on Lobbying Type Based on the Frequency of Bill-Lobbying
Report Matching
Clear Cases All Cases
On Passage Ex Ante(%) Ex Post(%) N1 Ex Ante Ex Post N2
No 42.52 57.48 9,982 53.26 46.74 16,579
Yes 56.37 43.63 46,808 62.68 37.32 76,641
Total 53.93 46.07 56,790 61.01 38.99 93,220
Note: N1 = Total number of lobbying reports among clear cases, N2 = Total number of lobbying reports
among all cases. Threshold = Final Congress Voting. “On Passage” means whether the bill was passed
under the question of “On Passage” or not
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C | Appendix to Chapter 1: Bill Introducing Tim-
ing, Duration of Consideration, and Ex Post
Lobbying Ratio
Figure C.1 and Figure C.2 show the relationship between the timing of bill introduction
within a Congress and the ex post lobbying ratio for 174 bills under the question of “On
Passage" and for all bills that became the law, respectively. There is no clear relationship
in each case.
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Figure C.1: The Relationship Between The Month A Bill Introduced and Ex Post Lobbying
Ratio for the Bills under the question of “On Passage."
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Figure C.2: The Relationship Between The Month A Bill Introduced and Ex Post Lobbying
Ratio for All Bills that Became the Law.
Figure C.3 and Figure C.4 show the relationship between the duration of bill consider-
ation (from the introduction to the president’s sign) and the ex post lobbying ratio for 174
bills under the question of “On Passage" and for all bills that became laws, respectively.
Again, there is no clear relationship in each case. It indicates that ex post lobbying ratio is
not a function of just timing of bill introduction or the span of consideration on the bills.
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Figure C.3: The Relationship Between Duration and Ex Post Lobbying Ratio for the Bills
under the question of “On Passage."
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Figure C.4: The Relationship Between Duration and Ex Post Lobbying Ratio for all Bills
that Became the Law.
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D | Appendix to Chapter 1: An Example of A
Lobbying Report (Harvard University)
Figure D.1: Harvard University’s 2014 First Quarter Lobbying Report Page 1
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Figure D.2: Harvard University’s 2014 First Quarter Lobbying Report Page 2
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E | Appendix to Chapter 2: TRAINS Data De-
scription
Table E.1: TRAINS Data Variables Descriptions
Variable Description
Importer Importer country code. U.S. country code is 20
HS6 Six-digit Harmonized System code
Tradeval value of U.S. imports in thousands of U.S. dollars
Spectar Number of HS codes for which a specific tariff is present
Price Number of HS subsectors subject to a Price NTB
Quant Number of HS subsectors subject to a Quantity NTB
Quality Number of HS subsectors subject to a Quality NTB
Allntm Number of HS subsectors subject to at least 1 Price, Quant, Quality NTB
Nlines the number of subsectors within each six-digit HS sector
Tariff Ad valorem tariff (A negative value indicates missing)
Year Year for the NTBs and Tariff data (1993, 1994, 1996, 1999)
Table E.2: Summary Statistics of TRAINS Data in HS6 Level
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev Min Max
tradeval 20262 148797.5 1176422 0 5.30e+07
spectar 20262 .2675452 .9515855 0 28
price 20262 .1459382 .6372392 0 22
quant 20262 .2124173 .9817886 0 38
quality 20262 .1612378 1.032043 0 50
allntm 20262 .4499062 1.44208 0 50
nlines 20262 1.878294 2.126402 1 50
tariff 20262 3.658926 7.570892 0 272.838
Figure E.1Raw Data on the Relationship Between Tariff and NTB Over Time. HS 6
Level. Number of Observation is 26202. The vertical and the horizontal lines indicate mean
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Table E.3: Summary Statistics of TRAINS Data in HS4 Level
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev Min Max
tradeval 4058 154140.5 1196888 0 5.30e+07
price 4058 .1558319 .5150529 0 6.22222
quant 4058 .2197418 .93927 0 18.4
quality 4058 .1839754 1.008904 0 30.8
allntm 4058 .499071 1.367766 0 30.8
nlines 4058 2.062864 1.843605 1 30.8
tariff 4058 3.440388 6.355485 0 255.299
Table E.4: Summary Statistics of TRAINS Data in HS2 Level
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev Min Max
tradeval 384 123949.7 246792.4 4977.56 2000000
price 384 .1227167 .3105551 0 2.71429
quant 384 .2380666 .6873295 0 5.96
quality 384 .1924223 .7607455 0 9.2963
allntm 384 .4969253 .9782777 0 9.2963
nlines 384 1.971809 1.069223 1 9.2963
tariff 384 3.44666 6.606458 0 101.813
Tariff and mean NTBsfigure.E.1 shows the scatter plot of raw data in terms of tariff and
Non-tariff barriers. There are significant variations in terms of how they are protected. The
following histogram in Figure E.2Industry Frequency in High Tariff and High NTB. This
graphic does not include outliers which show a significantly higher Tariff (e.g., Tobacco) and
NTB (e.g., Dairy Product)figure.E.2 shows the distribution of tariff and Non-tariff barriers
among the highly protected items with only one type of protection at HS2 level.
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Figure E.1: Raw Data on the Relationship Between Tariff and NTB Over Time. HS 6 Level.
Number of Observation is 26202. The vertical and the horizontal lines indicate mean Tariff
and mean NTBs.
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Figure E.2: Industry Frequency in High Tariff and High NTB. This graphic does not in-
clude outliers which show a significantly higher Tariff (e.g., Tobacco) and NTB (e.g., Dairy
Product).
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F | Appendix to Chapter 2: Campaign Contribu-
tion Data Description
Table F.1: Summary Statistics of (mean) PAC Contribution Data Across Years
Year Contribution to Democrat (A) Contribution to Republican (B) A/(A+B)
1992 210674.3 104862.5 60.51
(411299.3) (199508) (26.414)
1994 101120.7 236313 62.49
(201438.6) (445592.2) (25.13)
1996 174330.2 213623 .2 37.87
(358943.8) (388389.7) (26.65)
1998 216335.7 204373.5 41.08
(382185.5) 429161.2) (27.38)
Note: Data is organized at the RealCode level, which is the standard five character code identifying the
donor’s industry or ideology. Numbers in parenthesis means a standard deviation. Unit is U.S. dollars.
Data is obtained from opensecrets.org.
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G | Appendix to Chapter 3: Foreign Countries Sum-
mary Statistics
Table G.1: List of Foreign Countries without Congressional Contacts and their Lobbying
Expenditures
Country $Ka Country $Ka
Australia 4,453.2 Italy 1,197.7
Austria 3,389.9 Jamaica 4,131.6
Bahamas 25,654.6 Kosovo 0.0
Bahrain 123.8 Lebanon 0.0
Barbados 8,541.4 Luxembourg 91.1
Belgium 3,496.5 Monaco 4,528.5
Benin 319.2 Netherlands 4,708.8
Brazil 5,274.9 New Zealand 0.0
British Virgin Islands 2,683.8 Norway 21.1
Burma 0.0 Romania 527.8
Chad 0.0 Rwanda 390
Chile 103.5 Saint Lucia 71.5
Commonwealth of Dominica 0 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 481.6
Croatia 65.8 Scotland 7,751.7
Curacao 246.6 Sierra Leone 225.3
Czech Republic 720.0 Singapore 12,924.8
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.0 South Africa 3,814.5
Denmark 1,025.0 Spain 465.1
Djibouti 0 Sweden 1,915.1
El Salvador 143.3 Tanzania 912.4
Estonia 296.1 Tibet 1,437.3
Gibraltar 165.0 Tunisia 315.0
Greece 87.1 Ukraine 63.7
Guyana 0.0 Uzbekistan 0.9
Hungary 142.5 Vanuatu 4,353.3
Iceland 3,255.0 West Indies 346.9
Indonesia 21.4 Western Sahara 16.4
Iran 12.0 Zimbabwe 0.0
Israel 16,352.0
Note: a. Total amount of lobbying expenditures spent by the government entities of the country in 2008–2010
(thousand US dollars).
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Table G.2: List of Foreign Countries without Congressional Contacts and their Contact
Frequencies and Lobbying Expenditures
Country N1a N2b $Kc Country N1a N2b $Kc
Afghanistan 49 12 536.8 Macedonia 130 78 472.6
Albania 53 30 1,181.5 Malaysia 36 21 6,472.5
Algeria 137 23 1,259.9 Malta 16 15 88.0
Angola 2 2 2,612.0 Marshall Islands 25 12 23,030.0
Aruba 80 36 778.8 Mauritius 78 31 156.8
Azerbaijan 424 131 2,384.0 Mexico 201 91 13,261.4
Bangladesh 4 4 36.7 Micronesia 16 9 151.9
Belarus 1 1 15.0 Montenegro 6 5 858.5
Bermuda 50 24 14,023.8 Morocco 866 315 10,915.0
Bolivia 12 10 28.1 Nagalim 6 2 126.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 756 131 9838.8 Nagorno Karabakh Republic 151 124 512.5
Cameroon 18 6 1300.0 Netherlands Antilles 105 39 4,259.6
Canada 169 69 29,786.9 Nicaragua 1 1 537.2
Cayman Islands 14 13 23,284.8 Nigeria 12 8 3,069.9
China 24 11 3,836.8 Pakistan 396 117 5,036.1
Colombia 1 1 534.2 Palau 116 19 664.1
Costa Rica 30 22 1,562.0 Palestine 36 30 3,592.5
Cote d’Ivoire 22 9 932.3 Panama 139 66 4,576.3
Cyprus 367 102 4,390.5 Peru 52 12 712.9
Dominican Republic 223 47 1,221.9 Philippines 899 193 4,845.7
Ecuador 17 12 1,532.7 Poland 147 15 2,524.1
Egypt 1255 325 6,300.4 Qatar 23 12 4,442.5
Equatorial Guinea 35 21 6,607.4 Republic of Abkhazia 11 2 405.0
Ethiopia 537 80 3,918.4 Republic of Congo 163 41 8,141.5
Georgia 287 99 3,315.7 Republic of South Ossetia 10 3 432.8
Germany 148 30 3,247.9 Russia 3 2 7,384.4
Ghana 31 11 750.0 Saudi Arabia 35 18 9,031.3
Guernsey 24 8 1,911.7 Serbia 71 46 4,804.5
Haiti 123 31 442.4 Somalia 1 1 36.1
Honduras 9 2 141.7 South Korea 1338 318 79,108.7
Hong Kong 88 71 18,372.7 Southern Sudan 1 1 472.0
India 263 88 13,374.9 Sri Lanka 15 12 819.2
Iraq 366 137 12,574.9 States of Jersey 22 8 1,238.1
Ireland 35 12 40,396.0 Switzerland 1 1 7,346.2
Isle of Man 16 11 1,548.2 Taiwan 980 242 9,652.3
Japan 125 50 50,327.6 Thailand 22 15 3,401.4
Jordan 7 6 1,414.1 Trinidad and Tobago 60 26 5,240.0
Kazakhstan 74 47 2,736.8 Turkey 3071 445 12,933.7
Kenya 177 65 1,529.5 Uganda 38 14 723.5
Kuwait 9 4 6,805.8 United Arab Emirates 1431 286 46,415.5
Lesotho 112 23 800.0 United Kingdom 155 77 25,905.0
Liberia 178 41 90,381.8 Venezuela 33 20 1,805.1
Libya 368 175 9,011.1 Vietnam 24 12 110.2
Liechtenstein 114 37 1,521.2
Note: a. Total number of Contact, b. Total number of Members Contacted, c. Total amount of lobbying expenditures
spent by the government entities of the country during 2008–2010 (thousand US dollars).
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H | Appendix to Chapter 3: Lobbying Agents Sum-
mary Statistics
Table H.1: List of In-House Lobbying Agents
Registrant Name Client Country Ka Nb
Kurdistan Regional Government Iraq 4,207.9 27
Friends of Sinn Fein Ireland 1,294.3 2
Moroccan-American Center for Policy Morocco 6,555.3 21
Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the USA Nagorno Karabakh Republic 512.5 32
Palestinian Liberation Organization Palestine 3,560.0 2
Korea Economic Institute of America South Korea 6,626.6 18
Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Turkey 2,826.6 6
US-Emirates Alliance United Arab Emirates 13,336.4 1
Venezuela Information Office Venezuela 1,591.6 4
Tourism New South Wales Australia 1,029.6
Tourism Queensland Australia 3,286.1
Austrian Tourist Office Austria 3,389.9
Bahamas Ministry of Tourism Bahamas 20,500.0
Barbados IDC Barbados 3,163.6
Caribbean Tourism Organization Barbados 4,774.7
Belgian Tourist Office Belgium 1,071.6
Tourist Office for Flanders, Belgium Belgium 2,074.5
Bermuda Department of Tourism Bermuda 11,800.3
British Virgin Islands Tourist Board British Virgin Islands 2,458.8
Quebec Government House Canada 21,481.9
Cayman Islands Dept of Tourism Cayman Islands 22,161.8
China National Tourist Office China 1,230.0
Czech Center New York Czech Republic 720.0
Visit Denmark Denmark 1,025.0
Enterprise Estonia in San Jose Estonia 296.1
Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party Ethiopia 281.6
Oromo Liberation Front Ethiopia 703.5
Bavarian Ministry for Economic Affairs Germany 1,517.9
German National Tourist Office Germany 1,040.9
Hong Kong Tourism Hong Kong 3,599.6
Hong Kong Trade Development Council Hong Kong 9,564.1
Iceland Tourist Board Iceland 3,150.0
Dentsu America India 2,236.9
India Tourism India 6,917.5
India Trade Promotion Organisation India 2,282.0
Note: a. Total amount of the revenues from foreign government clients during 2008-2010 (in thousand US
dollars), b. Total number of the members of Congress to whom the registrant contacted (blank means zero).
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Table H.2: List of In-House Lobbying Agents (Continued)
Registrant Name Client Country Ka Nb
Enterprise Ireland Ireland 2,464.4
IDA Ireland Ireland 12,124.4
Supporters of Fine Gael Ireland 0.0
Tourism Ireland Limited Ireland 24,138.4
World Zionist Organization Israel 14,770.8
Italian Government Tourist Board Italy 900.7
Jamaica Tourist Board Jamaica 2,293.1
City of Osaka, Chicago Office Japan 218.5
Development Bank of Japan Japan 1,451.8
Government of Fukuoka Prefecture Japan 397.9
Japan Center for Intercultural Communications Japan 0.0
Japan National Tourist Organization Japan 5,123.0
JETRO Atlanta Japan 1,217.9
JETRO Chicago Japan 3,913.7
JETRO Houston Japan 2,680.6
JETRO Los Angeles Japan 3,125.8
JETRO New York Japan 23,170.7
JETRO San Francisco Japan 5478.1
Kobe Trade Information Office Japan 418.3
Osaka Prefectural Government Japan 161.5
LISCR LLC Liberia 89,727.3
International Relief Fund Inc Libya 0.0
Luxcore, Ltd. Luxembourg 91.1
Malaysia Tourism Promotion Board Malaysia 2,405.5
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority Malaysia 3,635.3
International Registries Inc Marshall Islands 22,684.4
Mexico Tourism Board Mexico 705.7
Monaco Government Tourist Office Monaco 4,528.5
Moroccan National Tourist Office Morocco 491.5
St. Maarten Tourist Office Netherlands Antilles 2,345.2
Pakistan Tehreek E Insaf NA USA Pakistan 0.0
Polish National Tourist Office Poland 1,948.8
Romanian Tourist Office Romania 468.6
Council for Trade and Economic Cooperation Russia 0.0
GoodWorks International Rwanda 1,459.2
St. Lucia National Development Corp Saint Lucia 71.5
Saudi Petroleum International Saudi Arabia 0.0
Saudi Refining Saudi Arabia 0.0
Scottish Enterprise Scotland 7,751.7
Singapore Economic Development Board Singapore 2,323.2
Singapore Tourism Board Singapore 8,989.0
The Puntland Development Office Somalia 0.0
South African Tourism South Africa 3,792.0
Korea International Trade Assn South Korea 1,088.6
Korea Local Government Center (KLAFIR, America) South Korea 113.6
Korea National Tourism Organization South Korea 6,383.5
Korea Trade Promotion Center South Korea 60,759.8
VisitSweden Sweden 1,915.1
Alpine Tourist Commission Switzerland 1,456.0
Switzerland Tourism Switzerland 5,598.4
Far East Trade Service Taiwan 1,048.0
Taiwan Trade Center New York Taiwan 1,990.3
Tourism Authority of Thailand Thailand 2,235.8
Office of Tibet Tibet 1,437.3
Invest Northern Ireland United Kingdom 9,513.9
The North of England United Kingdom 3,868.8
VisitBritain United Kingdom 8,314.3
Office of Deputy Commissioner of Maritime Affairs Vanuatu 4,003.3
St. Lucia Tourist Board West Indies 346.9
Note: a. Total amount of the revenues from foreign government clients during 2008-2010 (in thou-
sand US dollars), b. Total number of the members of Congress to whom the registrant contacted
(blank means zero).
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Table H.3: List of the Lobbying Firms with No Contact Records
Lobbying Firm N.a $Kb Lobbying Firm N.a $Kb
Adam McArthur 1 0.0 M+R Strategic Services 1 15.1
Al Paul Lefton Co 1 3,425.4 MPD Consultants 3 39.7
Amato Libero Berard 1 297.0 Mark Alsalih 1 49.8
Arnold & Porter 2 1,716.0 Mark Edmond Clark 1 12.0
Avalanche Strategic Communications 1 161.8 Marston Webb & Associates 1 87.5
Blank Rome LLP 1 783.5 Maynard, Cooper & Gale 1 0.9
Bockorny Group 1 15.0 Melady Associates 1 65.8
Brunswick Group LLC 1 5,367.3 Melinda Farris 1 0.0
Butterfield Carter & Associates 1 30.0 Melwood Communications 1 7.6
C Landon Parvin 1 160.0 Michael E. Veve 1 143.3
CDN International, Inc. 1 269.7 Missy Farren & Associates, Ltd 1 465.5
California Strategies, LLC 1 445.7 Mullen Advertising 1 46.0
Carmen Group 1 0.0 Navigators Global LLC 1 162.4
Cleary ,Gottlieb et al 2 2,184.8 Noonmark Capital Partners LLC 1 56.2
Cranford Johnson Robinson Woods 1 135.0 Norman Liss 1 0.0
Crescent Consultants 1 0.0 Oliver A. Dulle Jr & Company, Inc. 1 18.7
DTB Associates LLP 1 49.0 OpinionMakers LLC 1 73.5
Daniel Passacantilli 1 12.0 PD Frazer Consulting 1 337.0
David E. Everson 1 0.0 Pascal D. Kokora 1 120.0
Development Counsellors International 7 2,506.0 Pepperwood International Corp 1 25.0
DiNovo Strategies 1 237.5 Plexus Consulting Group 1 105.0
Dickens & Madson Canada 1 350.0 Porter Wright Morris & Arthur 1 0.0
FD Dittus Communications 1 22.5 Prairie Avenue Advisors, LLC 1 182.5
Fenton Communications 1 60.0 Prism Public Affairs 1 5.0
Fulbright & Jaworski 1 1,069.9 Reid Collins & Tsai LLP 2 0.0
Gavin Anderson & Company 1 0.0 Rock Creek Strategic Marketing 1 0.0
Geoffrey Weill Assoc 2 163.0 Ruder Finn Inc 2 2,538.0
Global Policy Group 1 63.5 Simon Taylor 1 18.0
Global USA 1 73.0 Slocum & Boddie, P.C. 1 111.8
Gregory J Kuykendall 1 30.0 Smith & Harroff 1 0.0
Gretchen Hamel, Endeavour Global Strategies 1 46.0 Southfive Strategies, LLC 1 0.0
Halpern Associates 1 397.4 Stephen M. Rivers 1 59.5
Hill & Knowlton 8 422.5 Steptoe & Johnson 3 322.5
Holland & Knight 1 365.5 Stewart & Stewart 1 0.0
Hopps & Associates, Inc. 1 665.0 T Dean Reed 3 445.5
Hyde Park Communications 1 100.5 TS Navigations LLC 1 96.0
International Trade & Development Agency Inc 1 447.8 The Gilman Group 1 0.0
Janet M Bitar 1 21.0 Theodore G. Kronmiller 1 0.0
Jay Footlik 1 657.5 Valerie L Van Sickle 1 122.2
Jones, Day et al 1 149.0 Vinca LaFleur 1 39.0
KWR International 2 60.4 Vivien Ravdin 1 128.3
Keene & Associates 1 53.3 Washington Media Group, Inc 1 315.0
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis 1 0.0 Watts Partners/JC Watts Companies 1 0.0
Larry L. Overstreet 1 305.2 West Wing Writers 3 295.8
Lester S. Hyman 1 225.0 Williams Mullen Strategies 1 0.0
Lou Hammond & Assoc. Inc 2 600.5 Williams, Mullen, Clark & Dobbins 1 0.0
Lubanovici, Mircea 1 59.2 Winston & Strawn LLP 1 297.1
M Silver Associates 4 1,557.1
Note: a. Total number of foreign government clients, b. Total amount of revenue from foreign country clients
during 2008-2010 (in thousand US dollars).
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Table H.4: List of Lobbying Firms with Contacts Other Than Congressional Contacts (to
Executive Agencies or Media)
Lobbying Firm N.a $Kb
Alliance Consulting Group 1 343.7
Ari Fleischer Communications, Inc. 1 44.5
BGR Public Relations, LLC 1 150.0
Daniel Louis Kunin 1 127.9
Endeavor Group 1 283.5
Global Policy Initiatives 1 0.0
Hedges Strategies 1 10.9
Hudson Consulting Group 1 0.0
Lanny J. Davis & Associates 1 513.2
McDermott Will & Emery LLP 1 513.2
McFarlane Associates, Inc. 1 1,064.3
Olivia Goumbri 1 63.7
Park Strategies 1 28.5
Sitrick & Co 1 100.0
Steven C. Radelet 1 0.0
The Advocacy Group 1 5.6
The Fratelli Group 2 868.9
Vinson & Elkins 1 95.8
Washington Global Consultants, LLC 1 600.0
Bruce Zagaris 1 356.1
Burson-Marsteller 4 2,446.2
Caplin & Drysdale 2 30.2
Daniel Bob 1 5.7
Daniel J Edelman Inc 7 3,651.5
Duane Morris Government Affairs 1 0.0
Fenton Communications 2 574.1
Garvey, Schubert & Barer 1 246.2
Global Communicators LLC 3 132.2
Gregory A. Maniatis 1 450.0
HDMK, LLC 1 746.6
Jefferson Waterman International 1 1,211.3
Miller & Chevalier 3 1,136.2
Nazmi Gur 1 0.0
Public Strategies, Inc. 2 1,179.7
Sheila O’Malley 1 88.3
Spring, O’Brien & Co., Inc. 5 1,037.2
TD International 1 0.0
Weber Shandwick 8 9,363.1
Note: a. Total number of foreign government clients. b.
Total amount of the revenues from the foreign government
clients during 2008–2010 (in thousand US dollars).
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Table H.5: List of Lobbying Firms with Congressional Contacts
Lobbying Firm N1a N2b N3c N4d $Ke
30 Point Strategies 1 1 1 2 2,102.9
Advanced Practical Solutions, LLC 16 30 0.87 1 1,020.0
AG Consulting, Inc 1 1 0 1 15.0
Ainsley Gill & Associates 26 60 0.84 2 5,050.0
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP 220 604 0.69 6 3,772.4
Alston & Bird 66 87 0.16 3 1,358.0
Amani Group 26 38 0.65 3 1,334.8
American Business Development Group 14 15 0.85 1 394.0
Anne Smith Caparso 12 16 0.08 1 33.6
APCO Worldwide 54 88 0.59 4 3,563.0
Arent Fox LLP 22 30 0.63 3 445.7
Asia Associates 25 53 0.64 1 80.0
Avatar Enterprises 1 3 1 1 265.6
Barbour, Griffith & Rogers 135 643 0.45 5 5,405.0
BKSH & Associates 36 118 0.52 4 390.6
Blue Star Strategies, LLC 3 4 1 2 94.2
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP 20 43 0.1 2 252.0
Bryan Cave LLP 7 8 0.42 1 40.0
C&M Capitolink 3 11 0 1 50.0
C&M International Ltd 1 1 1 1 919.9
Caspian Group LLC 93 363 0.54 1 168.0
Cassidy & Associates 48 72 0.37 4 6,220.2
Cedar Group 1 1 0 1 310.0
Chlopak, Leonard, Schechter & Associates 15 37 0.53 5 3,508.5
Clark & Weinstock 9 11 0.11 2 228.2
CMS Strategies 72 302 0.62 1 300.2
Covington & Burling 101 581 0.5 3 3,535.9
Daniel J Edelman Inc 2 2 0.5 5 6,797.5
Darlene Richeson & Associates 23 37 0.95 1 464.0
David M. Staton 9 16 0.44 1 151.9
Dewey & LeBoeuf 81 240 0.65 3 3,144.3
Dickstein Shapiro 203 856 0.33 2 710.5
DLA Piper US 329 2439 0.54 9 11,881.4
Dutko Worldwide LLC 1 4 1 1 60.0
Farrow, Jeffrey L 10 78 0.5 1 206.8
Fierce, Isakowitz & Blalock 11 53 0.18 2 40.6
Fleishman-Hillard 14 15 0.64 8 9,769.6
Foley Hoag LLP 29 144 0.55 4 1,306.7
Gabriel Co 21 26 0.8 1 1,674.9
Gallagher Group 6 8 0 1 90.0
Gateway Consulting, LLC 1 1 0 1 0.0
Gephardt Group Government Affairs, LLC 156 545 0.89 2 2,481.9
Global Water & Energy Strategy Team 4 9 0.25 1 143.0
Glover Park Group 129 250 0.83 4 2,539.7
Grace Collins 2 6 0 2 194.3
Greenberg Traurig 19 37 0.78 3 5,639.3
Harbour Group 108 504 0.55 1 9,236.0
Hecht, Spencer & Associates 21 36 0.28 1 870.0
Hills Stern & Morley LLP 1 1 0 1 0.0
Hogan & Hartson 18 67 0.66 4 5,703.4
Independent Diplomat Inc 1 1 1 5 624.9
Integrated Solutions Group 5 14 1 2 0.0
Johnson, Madigan et al 44 67 0.81 2 1,107.7
Jones, Walker et al 31 72 0.51 3 715.2
Jose Pertierra Pertierra & Toro 1 1 1 1 138.5
Ketchum Inc 1 1 0 2 6,502.2
KRL International 41 187 0.75 2 338.9
Lara Alameh LLC 4 5 0.25 1 32.5
LeClairRyan, A Professional Corporation 13 23 0.61 1 321.1
Levick Strategic Communications 3 8 0.33 2 2,126.4
Levine & Co 7 8 0.85 1 978.1
Note: a. Total number of the members that the lobbying firm contacted. b. Total number
of the contact records in the data. c. The ratio of Democrats among the members that the
lobbying firm contacted. d. Total number of foreign government clients. e. Total amount of
the revenues from the foreign government clients during 2008–2010 (in thousand US dollars).
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Table H.6: List of Lobbying Firms with Congressional Contacts (Continued)
Lobbying Firm N1a N2b N3c N4d $Ke
Livingston Group 389 1,491 0.41 7 6,209.5
Locke Lord Strategies 36 63 0.58 1 2.750.1
Loeﬄer Group 19 33 0.36 4 1.430.3
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips 47 223 0.65 2 1.236.9
Mark Saylor Co 9 32 0.66 4 2,643.9
McGuire Woods Consulting 26 63 0.38 1 708.5
McKenna Long & Aldridge 9 11 0.88 1 583.6
Michael Joseph Fonte 8 11 0.75 1 108.2
MITA Group 37 83 0.32 2 410.0
Native American Rights Fund 4 9 1 1 0
Nazmi Gur 13 19 0.61 1 24.6
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP 8 13 0.5 1 949.2
Neusner Communications 2 5 1 1 164.1
Nurnberger & Associates 24 24 0.79 1 216.0
O’Brien & Associates LLC 2 5 0.5 3 173.8
Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide 1 1 0 4 2,012.8
Orion Strategies 24 54 0.2 4 744.5
Paige E Reffe 3 4 0.66 1 827.5
Park Strategies 77 401 0.49 1 313.7
Parven Pomper Strategies Inc. 128 514 0.87 3 490.0
Patton Boggs 147 341 0.57 20 15,610.4
Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP 6 7 0.33 1 5,312.9
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman 36 46 0.22 3 7,426.0
PLM Group 221 695 0.58 1 3,052.5
Podesta Group, Inc. 93 279 0.76 7 1,860.3
Policy Impact Communications, Inc. 13 22 0.23 1 900.0
Powell Goldstein LLP 11 30 0.54 1 316.6
Private Public Solutions LLC 162 573 0.82 4 2,145.7
Public Private Partnership Inc. 3 5 1 1 216.6
Public Strategies Washington 22 24 0.45 2 457.5
Qorvis Communications 3 3 0.66 9 8,580.2
Quinn Gillespie & Associates 161 851 0.63 4 3,095.8
Rasky Baerlein Strategic Communications 21 32 0.61 2 843.2
Rosemont Associates 13 86 1 1 525.0
Ryberg & Smith 31 78 0.51 1 156.8
Samuels International Associates 2 2 1 2 1,949.3
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg 2 3 1 1 46.1
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A. 13 18 0.53 1 40.0
Scribe Strategies & Advisors 146 146 0.63 1 200.0
Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker, P.A. 1 1 1 1 36.1
Sidley Austin LLP 8 16 0.75 6 1,660.9
Solarz Associates 79 129 0.67 1 172.0
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP 15 16 0.53 1 84.4
Sorini, Samet & Associates 166 495 0.55 6 1,739.7
Squire Sanders Public Advocacy 30 38 0.3 3 80.6
Stuart E. Eizenstat 21 66 0.9 1 1,999.9
The Breaux Lott Leadership Group 5 6 0.2 1 442.5
The Raben Group, LLC 11 25 1 1 90.5
Thomas A Kruse 10 12 0.5 1 28.1
Thomas Capitol Partners, Inc. 169 169 0.63 1 495.0
Tool Shed Group, LLC 10 13 0.7 1 76.0
Trout Cacheris PLLC 2 13 1 1 5,808.9
Van Scoyoc Associates 14 28 0.71 2 495.5
Venable LLP 22 38 0.59 3 527.4
Vision Americas L.L.C. 19 39 0 1 220.0
Washington Group 38 68 0.23 1 346.3
Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates 24 26 0.91 1 806.2
Whitaker Group 32 203 0.68 4 2,633.0
White & Case 12 62 0.75 7 11,422.6
William B Broydrick 9 13 0.88 1 127.0
Note: a. Total number of the members that the lobbying firm contacted. b. Total number
of the contact records in the data. c. The ratio of Democrats among the members that the
lobbying firm contacted. d. Total number of foreign government clients. e. Total amount of
the revenues from the foreign government clients during 2008–2010 (in thousand US dollars).
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I | Appendix to Chapter 3: Members of Congress
and Lobbying Contact Summary Statistics
Table I.1: Members of the 110th Congress
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
House Representatives
DW-NOMINATE 0.019 0.447 -0.73 0.999 443
Democrat 0.538 0.499 0 1 448
Leadership or Committee Chairmanship 0.058 0.234 0 1 448
Economic Committee Member 0.263 0.441 0 1 448
Foreign Relations Committee Mmeber 0.123 0.329 0 1 448
Country/Regional Caucus Mmebership 0.694 0.461 0 1 448
Vote Share in 2006 0.677 0.137 0.301 1 447
Running for Office in 2008 0.906 0.292 0 1 448
Senators
DW-NOMINATE 0.03 0.39 -0.684 0.817 101
Democrat 0.505 0.502 0 1 101
Leadership or Committee Chairmanship 0.228 0.421 0 1 101
Economic Committee Member 0.099 0.3 0 1 101
Foreign Relations Committee Meber 0.168 0.376 0 1 101
Vote Share in the Most Recent Election 0.622 0.093 0.492 0.992 101
Running for Office in 2008 0.307 0.464 0 1 101
Note: a. Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Budget Committees. b. Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Homeland
Security Committees. c. This indicates that a representative belongs to at least one caucus which focus on a specific
country or region.
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Table I.2: Members of the 111th Congress
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
House Representatives
DW-NOMINATE -0.011 0.439 -0.73 0.999 439
Democrat 0.584 0.493 0 1 445
Leadership or Committee Chairmanship 0.058 0.235 0 1 445
Economic Committee Member a 0.227 0.419 0 1 445
Foreign Relations Committee Memberb 0.128 0.335 0 1 445
Country/Regional Caucus Membershipc 0.742 0.438 0 1 445
Vote Share in 2008 0.678 0.137 0.245 1 445
Running for Office in 2010 0.906 0.293 0 1 445
Senators
DW-NOMINATE -0.025 0.389 -0.684 0.817 103
Democrat 0.573 0.497 0 1 103
Leadership or Committee Chairmanship 0.223 0.418 0 1 103
Economic Committee Member 0.087 0.284 0 1 103
Foreign Relations Committee Member 0.194 0.397 0 1 103
Vote Share in the Most Recent Election 0.61 0.092 0.424 0.992 100
Running for Office in 2010 0.243 0.431 0 1 103
Note: a. Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Budget Committees. b. Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Homeland
Security Committees. c. This indicates that a representative belongs to at least one caucus which focus on a specific
country or region.
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Table I.3: Foreign Contact Frequencies by Senators
Name N1a N2b N3c Name N1 N2 N3 Name N1 N2 N3
Voinovich 153 13 15 Bayh 51 22 12 Chambliss 22 5 12
Kerry 149 43 40 Biden 49 4 13 Shelby 22 4 8
Lieberman 142 20 21 Obama 48 4 14 Carper 21 6 9
Kyl 141 12 25 Dorgan 46 11 10 Thune 21 4 9
Reid 138 29 30 Specter 46 9 11 Lautenberg 21 3 8
Feinstein 117 20 15 Reed 45 10 17 Martinez 20 9 11
Brownback 115 10 18 Burr 44 9 13 Sessions 19 8 11
Feingold 114 9 24 Murkowski 44 4 14 Collins 19 5 7
Hatch 113 10 22 Graham 43 14 16 Lincoln 19 1 13
Isakson 105 21 23 Coleman 43 9 17 Brown 18 5 12
Cantwell 103 5 13 Boxer 43 8 20 Salazar 17 2 9
Demint 93 14 28 Hutchison 42 9 14 Mccaskill 15 2 11
Mcconnell 85 26 24 Levin 41 19 16 Conrad 15 1 12
Menendez 84 19 22 Cochran 41 13 10 Bunning 15 0 7
Inhofe 84 13 18 Wyden 41 10 16 Tester 14 6 6
Bond 82 22 15 Bennett 41 8 10 Byrd 14 2 6
Dodd 82 18 24 Johnson 41 5 7 Enzi 14 1 7
Webb 81 6 18 Murray 41 3 10 Pryor 13 3 10
Lugar 80 28 28 Barrasso 40 6 13 Kohl 12 2 7
Inouye 80 19 14 Grassley 38 19 14 Dole 12 1 4
Hagel 73 17 20 Craig 38 4 5 Warner 11 2 7
Shaheen 71 7 16 Crapo 37 4 17 Merkley 11 1 4
Risch 71 6 16 Ensign 36 8 14 Hagan 10 2 7
Casey 69 4 20 Snowe 36 4 14 Johanns 10 1 6
Cardin 68 16 23 Warner 35 11 11 Allard 9 4 4
Nelson 67 4 17 Sununu 35 2 11 Brown 9 2 4
Baucus 65 33 17 Coburn 34 6 12 Klobuchar 9 2 8
Wicker 64 11 18 Gregg 33 12 9 Mikulski 9 2 4
Schumer 61 25 17 Harkin 28 3 8 Begich 9 0 2
Kaufman 61 11 15 Smith 28 1 12 Domenici 8 3 6
Leahy 60 12 20 Landrieu 26 10 14 Sanders 7 4 5
Cornyn 60 9 11 Stabenow 26 9 7 Burris 6 3 2
Bingaman 59 11 14 Akaka 26 7 8 Bennet 6 0 4
Durbin 57 14 18 Whitehouse 26 5 10 Lott 4 2 3
Vitter 57 5 15 Kennedy 26 3 7 Franken 4 0 2
Rockefeller 54 8 9 Alexander 25 6 12 Coons 2 0 1
Corker 54 8 19 Clinton 24 12 8 Thomas 0 0 0
Roberts 54 4 14 Stevens 23 4 4
Mccain 53 15 18 Lemieux 23 0 4
Gillibrand 53 9 18 Nelson 22 9 11
Note: a. Total number of the contacts made by the foreign countries in the data, b. Total number of the contacts
made by the foreign countries in the data directly to the member, c. Total number of the foreign countries that
contacted the member.
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Table I.4: Foreign Contact Frequencies by House Representatives
Name N1a N2b N3c Name N1 N2 N3 Name N1 N2 N3
Wexler 209 31 20 Miller 75 14 15 Clarke 47 14 10
Pelosi 207 22 31 Bean 75 3 7 Harman 47 10 10
Payne 189 50 26 Rangel 73 33 26 Eshoo 46 17 8
Berman 171 45 34 Klein 71 18 14 Moran 46 10 15
Burton 148 31 25 Rohrabacher 71 13 15 Thompson 46 4 13
Wilson 146 30 18 Kirk 69 9 13 Wolf 45 8 13
Tanner 141 23 23 Inglis 68 14 15 Larson 44 12 12
Meeks 136 44 33 Berkley 63 16 19 Cuellar 44 7 5
Ros-Lehtinen 134 32 25 Mack 63 8 12 Aderholt 43 14 11
Hastings 128 23 19 Smith 62 18 19 Butterfield 42 20 16
Whitfield 126 16 7 Watson 62 17 20 Snyder 42 8 10
Hoyer 124 17 23 Jackson 62 16 14 Meek 41 11 14
Mcdermott 117 16 18 Schiff 62 16 20 Pitts 41 9 10
Lowey 115 35 21 Fortenberry 62 12 12 Paul 40 2 12
Crowley 111 20 26 Sires 62 11 14 Hinojosa 39 7 13
Foxx 110 40 7 Johnson 62 7 11 Chabot 39 6 12
Filner 108 12 3 Skelton 61 16 11 Waters 39 5 6
Shuster 107 16 9 Issa 60 14 13 Dicks 38 10 11
Clyburn 105 24 22 Barrett 60 13 13 Sherman 38 9 12
Poe 104 13 16 Gallegly 59 8 15 Brady 37 12 15
Royce 103 18 24 Schwartz 59 3 10 Mccotter 36 6 14
Blunt 101 25 19 Kennedy 58 12 11 Green 35 13 12
Boozman 100 13 20 Towns 57 10 10 Camp 35 11 12
Boehner 99 26 22 Herger 56 14 9 Chandler 35 6 12
Pence 99 15 15 Scott 54 7 19 Coble 34 13 10
Bilirakis 97 7 16 Maloney 54 4 12 Rothman 34 10 10
Ackerman 91 39 22 Flake 53 20 15 Perlmutter 34 4 3
Cohen 90 30 13 Israel 52 11 13 Rahall 33 12 10
Smith 90 21 19 Costa 52 5 16 Giffords 33 8 12
Jackson Lee 89 19 20 Diaz-Balart 51 28 5 Ruppersberger 33 8 9
Granger 86 10 13 Reyes 51 16 10 Lewis 33 6 12
Delahunt 85 24 23 Price 51 12 11 Quigley 33 4 5
Lee 84 17 20 Cantor 51 4 12 Ross 32 9 9
Ortiz 83 24 12 Manzullo 50 13 20 Baird 32 7 8
Mcmahon 83 11 10 Franks 50 5 12 Becerra 31 12 10
Van Hollen 82 16 19 Kind 49 8 7 Connolly 31 3 11
Carnahan 82 11 15 Mccollum 48 12 8 Lantos 31 1 7
Engel 80 28 26 Roskam 48 10 10 Conaway 30 8 9
Ellison 80 19 16 Reichert 48 4 5 Forbes 30 6 8
Faleomavaega 78 35 14 Mccaul 48 3 8 Markey 29 13 8
Note: a. Total number of the contacts made by the foreign countries in the data, b. Total number of the contacts made by
the foreign countries in the data directly to the member, c. Total number of the foreign countries that contacted the member.
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Table I.5: Foreign Contact Frequencies by House Representatives (Continued)
Name N1a N2b N3c Name N1 N2 N3 Name N1 N2 N3
Boustany 29 12 9 Hoekstra 22 14 6 Etheridge 17 6 4
Kucinich 29 8 9 Hinchey 22 13 9 Welch 17 6 6
Delauro 28 9 6 Dingell 22 10 7 Carson 17 6 7
Fortuno 28 5 8 Wittman 22 6 8 Buyer 17 4 6
Holt 28 5 9 Lofgren 22 3 9 Tonko 17 4 5
Cramer 27 9 6 Cole 21 13 7 Stearns 17 3 7
Taylor 27 7 9 Murtha 21 9 7 Woolsey 17 1 7
Tancredo 27 5 7 Davis 21 9 6 Lungren 17 1 7
Brown 27 3 8 Conyers 21 8 9 Alexander 16 9 6
Wamp 27 3 7 Culberson 21 5 7 Stupak 16 8 3
Marchant 27 1 7 Polis 21 1 2 Rogers 16 7 4
English 26 12 9 Serrano 21 0 8 Ryan 16 6 6
King 26 9 12 Udall 20 12 8 Bachus 16 6 8
Rehberg 26 8 7 Saxton 20 12 7 Weller 16 6 7
Pomeroy 26 6 9 Wu 20 10 9 Waxman 16 6 8
Sessions 26 6 6 Abercrombie 20 9 7 Sestak 16 5 7
Schakowsky 26 5 8 Davis 20 6 7 Farr 16 4 6
Sanchez 26 5 11 Lewis 20 5 5 Mcgovern 16 4 8
Barton 26 4 5 Himes 20 3 6 Johnson 16 4 5
Souder 26 3 5 Richardson 20 3 8 Carter 16 3 6
Levin 25 12 12 Thompson 19 13 8 Boswell 16 2 6
Mchugh 25 8 7 Bilbray 19 10 6 Michaud 16 1 5
Ryan 25 5 11 Boren 19 6 6 Courtney 15 9 4
Edwards 25 5 6 Moore 19 4 5 Kline 15 8 7
Tierney 25 5 Brown 19 4 7 Gonzalez 15 8 5
Bordallo 24 8 7 Heller 19 3 7 Sullivan 15 4 4
Davis 24 7 11 Nunes 19 3 10 Nye 15 3 5
Neal 24 7 8 Schmidt 19 3 4 Arcuri 15 2 4
Kilpatrick 24 7 10 Calvert 19 1 3 Garamendi 15 1 3
Tauscher 24 6 9 Kratovil 19 0 4 Boyd 15 1 6
Larsen 24 4 11 Dreier 18 8 10 Pallone 14 7 7
Shadegg 24 3 7 Diaz-Balart 18 7 5 Bartlett 14 6 9
Bachmann 24 3 5 Jones 18 6 7 Coffman 14 5 6
Christensen 23 15 6 Spratt 18 5 6 Matheson 14 5 7
Honda 23 8 7 Blumenauer 18 5 9 Shays 14 5 2
Weiner 23 5 9 Speier 18 5 5 Frank 14 3 7
Pascrell 23 4 8 Obey 18 3 7 Price 14 3 5
Crenshaw 23 4 9 Shuler 18 1 5 Tiberi 14 1 7
Hensarling 23 3 4 Rush 17 12 7 Space 14 0 4
Schrader 23 1 2 Young 17 7 5 Halvorson 14 0 2
Note: a. Total number of the contacts made by the foreign countries in the data, b. Total number of the contacts made by
the foreign countries in the data directly to the member, c. Total number of the foreign countries that contacted the member.
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Table I.6: Foreign Contact Frequencies by House Representatives (Continued)
Name N1a N2b N3c Name N1 N2 N3 Name N1 N2 N3
Holden 13 5 3 Rodriguez 11 2 4 Turner 9 2 7
Berry 13 5 5 Yarmuth 11 1 6 Kissell 9 2 4
Edwards 13 5 8 Mchenry 11 1 5 Mitchell 9 2 5
Knollenberg 13 4 7 Bright 11 0 2 Burgess 9 2 3
Boucher 13 4 5 Mcclintock 11 0 4 Biggert 9 2 5
Myrick 13 4 5 Olson 11 0 4 Visclosky 9 1 3
Sanchez 13 3 7 Cooper 11 0 4 Loebsack 9 1 4
Cummings 13 2 10 Schock 10 7 6 Minnick 9 1 4
Putnam 13 2 6 Murphy 10 6 4 Allard 9 1 3
Cardoza 13 2 4 Hobson 10 5 5 Murphy 9 1 5
Wasserman Schultz 13 1 8 Gingrey 10 4 6 Kilroy 9 1 3
Adler 13 0 3 Bishop 10 3 4 Braley 9 0 4
Perriello 13 0 3 Mcintyre 10 2 7 Cassidy 9 0 2
Miller 12 6 7 Austria 10 2 3 Hirono 8 6 4
Langevin 12 4 8 Watt 10 2 6 Scott 8 4 6
Higgins 12 3 6 Kildee 10 2 5 Davis 8 4 5
Davis 12 3 6 Drake 10 2 3 Clay 8 4 7
Moore 12 2 5 Mccarthy 10 1 2 Goode 8 3 3
Melancon 12 2 5 Bishop 10 1 3 Gerlach 8 3 3
Emanuel 12 2 5 Olver 10 1 6 Terry 8 3 3
Buchanan 12 1 2 Foster 10 1 2 Gohmert 8 2 5
Barrow 12 1 6 Campbell 10 0 2 Dent 8 2 1
Mcnerney 12 0 3 Heinrich 10 0 2 Porter 8 2 4
Driehaus 12 0 2 Sarbanes 10 0 7 Sutton 8 2 5
Latham 11 9 5 Capuano 9 6 3 Grayson 8 2 5
Kaptur 11 6 6 Slaughter 9 6 7 Shimkus 8 1 4
Mccrery 11 6 6 Castle 9 5 6 Ellsworth 8 1 2
Hunter 11 6 3 Radanovich 9 4 4 Bono 8 1 4
Davis 11 6 6 Latta 9 4 4 Udall 8 0 6
Kingston 11 6 5 Bonner 9 4 4 Lee 8 0 4
Cleaver 11 5 6 Pastor 9 3 5 Tiahrt 7 4 5
Inslee 11 5 5 Neugebauer 9 3 4 Petri 7 4 3
Walden 11 4 5 Akin 9 3 5 Miller 7 3 5
Upton 11 4 5 Doggett 9 3 7 Broun 7 3 2
Miller 11 3 8 Lamborn 9 3 6 Paulsen 7 2 4
Harper 11 3 3 Mckeon 9 3 6 Scalise 7 2 6
Marshall 11 3 4 Johnson 9 3 5 Goodlatte 7 2 5
Simpson 11 2 4 Velazquez 9 3 4 Rodgers 7 2 2
King 11 2 7 Norton 9 3 4 Jordan 7 2 5
Bishop 11 2 4 Kuhl 9 2 3 Thornberry 7 2 5
Note: a. Total number of the contacts made by the foreign countries in the data, b. Total number of the contacts made by
the foreign countries in the data directly to the member, c. Total number of the foreign countries that contacted the member.
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Table I.7: Foreign Contact Frequencies by House Representatives (Continued)
Name N1a N2b N3c Name N1 N2 N3 Name N1 N2 N3
Weldon 7 1 3 Owens 5 2 4 Rogers 3 2 2
Latourette 7 1 3 Jones 5 2 4 Everett 3 2 2
Hodes 7 1 5 Lujan 5 2 3 Ramstad 3 1 2
Lipinski 7 1 4 Moran 5 1 2 Johnson 3 1 2
Murphy 7 1 3 Chaffetz 5 1 4 Shea-Porter 3 1 3
Capps 7 1 6 Sablan 5 1 2 Lummis 3 1 3
Hall 7 1 3 Sensenbrenner 5 1 5 Smith 3 1 3
Hill 7 0 5 Feeney 5 1 4 Deutch 3 1 2
Roe 7 0 2 Posey 5 1 3 Dahlkemper 3 1 2
Hayes 6 3 3 Pierluisi 5 0 2 Hastert 3 1 1
Brown-Waite 6 2 4 Murphy 5 0 2 Griffith 3 1 1
Mccarthy 6 2 5 Guthrie 5 0 2 Hulshof 3 1 2
Pryce 6 2 4 Lobiondo 4 4 4 Costello 3 1 3
Fattah 6 2 3 Garrett 4 3 3 Brady 3 0 1
Chu 6 2 4 Lahood 4 3 2 Luetkemeyer 3 0 3
Regula 6 2 3 Titus 4 3 4 Andrews 3 0 3
Doyle 6 2 3 Graves 4 3 3 Hall 3 0 1
Massa 6 2 4 Renzi 4 3 2 Peterson 2 2 2
Platts 6 1 2 Mollohan 4 2 3 Pickering 2 2 2
Keller 6 1 3 Blackburn 4 2 2 Oberstar 2 2 1
Grijalva 6 1 2 Schauer 4 2 3 Walsh 2 2 2
Gordon 6 1 3 Emerson 4 2 3 Lucas 2 2 1
Degette 6 1 2 Fallin 4 2 3 Lewis 2 2 2
Rooney 6 1 3 Young 4 2 2 Wilson 2 2 1
Linder 6 1 4 Capito 4 2 3 Donnelly 2 1 2
Baca 6 1 4 Jenkins 4 1 2 Herseth Sandlin 2 1 1
Thompson 6 0 2 Mica 4 1 2 Reynolds 2 1 2
Gutierrez 6 0 4 Lance 4 1 3 Hastings 2 1 2
Nadler 6 0 5 Napolitano 4 0 1 Ehlers 2 0 2
Matsui 6 0 2 Markey 4 0 2 Pingree 2 0 1
Peters 5 4 3 Tsongas 4 0 3 Djou 2 0 2
Peterson 5 3 4 Fleming 4 0 2 Hunter 2 0 2
Westmoreland 5 3 3 Kosmas 4 0 2 Stark 2 0 1
Boccieri 5 3 4 Walberg 3 3 1 Ferguson 2 0 2
Altmire 5 2 3 Sali 3 2 1 Baldwin 2 0 2
Rogers 5 2 2 Frelinghuysen 3 2 2 Jefferson 2 0 2
Kirkpatrick 5 2 3 Pearce 3 2 1 Kanjorski 1 1 1
Cannon 5 2 4 Green 3 2 2 Smith 1 1 1
Musgrave 5 2 1 Mcnulty 3 2 3 Davis 1 1 1
Fudge 5 2 3 Wilson 3 2 3 Carney 1 1 1
Note: a. Total number of the contacts made by the foreign countries in the data, b. Total number of the contacts made by
the foreign countries in the data directly to the member, c. Total number of the foreign countries that contacted the member.
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Table I.8: Foreign Contact Frequencies per House Representatives (Continued)
Name N1a N2b N3c
Walz 1 1 1
Fossella 1 1 1
Deal 1 1 1
Gilchrest 1 1 1
Lynch 1 1 1
Cubin 1 1 1
Miller 1 0 1
Maffei 1 0 1
Childers 1 0 1
Hare 1 0 1
Mahoney 1 0 1
Duncan 1 0 1
Salazar 1 0 1
Teague 1 0 1
Castor 1 0 1
Kagen 0 0 0
Baker 0 0 0
Allen 0 0 0
Campbell 0 0 0
Solis 0 0 0
Wynn 0 0 0
Lampson 0 0 0
Cao 0 0 0
Hooley 0 0 0
Castor 0 0 0
Meehan 0 0 0
Millender-Mcdonald 0 0 0
Jindal 0 0 0
Doolittle 0 0 0
Gillmor 0 0 0
Cazayoux 0 0 0
Boyda 0 0 0
Defazio 0 0 0
Note: a. Total number of the contacts made by the foreign
countries in the data, b. Total number of the contacts made
by the foreign countries in the data directly to the member,
c. Total number of the foreign countries that contacted the
member.
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J | Appendix to Chapter 3: A Sample Lobbying
Report Under the Foreign Agents Registration
Act
Figure J.1: A Lobbying Report Submitted by Fierce, Isakowitz & Balock (Page 1: Regis-
trant)
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Figure J.2: A Lobbying Report Submitted by Fierce, Isakowitz & Balock (Page 3: Foreign
Clients)
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Figure J.3: A Lobbying Report Submitted by Fierce, Isakowitz & Balock (Page 5: Lobbying
Fees)
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Figure J.4: A Lobbying Report Submitted by Fierce, Isakowitz & Balock (Supplement:
Contact Information During the Period)
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Figure J.5: A Lobbying Report Submitted by Fierce, Isakowitz & Balock (Supplement:
Campaign Contributions by Fierce, Isakowitz & Balock and Its Affiliated Lobbyists During
the Period)
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